When the Hungarian right-wing party Jobbik won
15 percent of the vote in the 2009 general election, many drew the
conclusion that the party had successfully mobilized the "traditional"
voters for far-right parties: the unemployed, poorly educated working
classes—the "losers" in the transition from Communism. Indeed, Jobbik
gained most of its votes in the least developed northeast Hungary, while
it had relatively low support in Budapest and the more developed west
of the country. The theory that Jobbik is the party of the "losers" has
remained the widely held view among journalists and analysts alike.
But new results challenge this view. Two think tanks—Demos (UK) and Political Capital (Hungary)—surveyed over 2,000 Facebook fans of the Jobbik party—the largest data set about Jobbik sympathizers. The results
show that Jobbik supporters are predominantly young men, and a
significant proportion of them (22 percent) have a university or college
education. Perhaps more surprisingly, Jobbik supporters under 30 are
less likely to be unemployed than the national average. Jobbik Facebook
supporters are motivated in large part by a desire to protect a
perceived Hungarian identity and culture—rather than economic concerns.
Of course, Facebook fans are not perfectly representative of the
Jobbik voter base—but they are not far off. Jobbik supporters spend more
time online than supporters of any other party and their Facebook group
has over 40,000 fans. Indeed over 80 percent of the sample report
having voted Jobbik at the last election. Moreover, a 2011 poll of
Jobbik voters collected by the Tárki Social Research Institute in 2011
and analyzed by the Political Capital Institute revealed that the
Facebook fans of Jobbik and its voters are not that different: the
concerns, the backgrounds, the views are all much the same.
In one respect, Jobbik supporters are fairly similar to similar
nationalist populist parties across Western Europe. Two recent studies,
one by Chatham House and the other by Demos,
both found that supporters of parties like the Front National, the
Swedish Democrats, or the English Defence League were motivated by fears
about identity rather than economics and were often better educated, or
more likely to be employed, than national averages.
But supporters of Jobbik do differ in significant ways when compared
against similar groups in Western Europe. They are driven more by
worries about Roma populations than immigration; are more pessimistic;
and are often anti-Semitic and pro-Palestinian (in stark contrast to the
concerns about Islam among Western European supporters of similar
parties). Jobbik supporters are also more likely to agree that violence
is acceptable to achieve the right outcome. Although this does not mean
they are personally violent of course, it is of concern that at its last
party congress, Jobbik leader Gábor Vona claimed that “Hungary should
prepare for a war.”
All this matters greatly if mainstream parties and civil society are
to formulate a response. To dismiss all Jobbik supporters as fascist is
dangerous on two counts. First, it ignores the more nuanced reality. It
seems that the party merely grows in popularity every time they are
labelled as such, reveling in their self-appointed role as outsiders
brave enough to stand up to a liberal, out-of-touch establishment.
Second, it ignores that the things Jobbik campaigns on are not that far
from the Hungarian mainstream. Jobbik supporters are most likely to cite
a lack of Roma integration as the biggest threat facing the country;
while one recent poll showed over 60 percent of all Hungarian voters
thought that Roma "have criminality in the blood."
Jobbik supporters have extremely high levels of distrust in political
parties, the mainstream media, and the legal system—but this too
reflects a national malaise: the Eurobarometer
showed that the Hungarian public also had among the lowest scores on
these measures too. Jobbik, seen from this angle, appears as a more
amplified version of frustrations across Hungarian society (or indeed,
even Eastern and Central European concerns).
In some respects, then, this renders the situation more difficult.
The fact that Jobbik is able to tap into wider societal worries with
such ease is an indictment of how polarized Hungarian society has become
in recent years. But it might also offer a crumb of hope: that
supporters might be brought back into mainstream politics again.
Source - OSI
by Jamie Bartlett and Kreko Peter