Rise of the Right

The fall of parliamentary seats into extremist hands represents the biggest shake-up on the continent since the disappearance of communism.

Marcel Antonisse / AFP-Getty Images

A supporter of far-right Dutch politician Geert Wilders holds a poster supporting him outside the Amsterdam court where he's being tried on charges of inciting racial hatred

Sweden has revealed the future direction of Europe, and not for the first time. For decades, Sweden led the way in defining the mixed model of free trade and social solidarity that became the European ideal. Not anymore. In the election this month Swedish voters joined their less successful EU neighbors in turning their backs on traditional politics, in which the pendulum swung between parties advocating more free trade and parties on the center left advocating more solidarity—but no further. Now even the solid Swedes have ushered in to Parliament a block of single-issue politicians obsessed with the perceived loss of national identity and angry about immigrants and other outsiders who supposedly threaten their Swedishness.

Thus the arrival of a new politics in Europe. A decade ago extremist politics was confined to fringes and street protests. It has now arrived as a parliamentary force and is beginning to change how other parties behave and speak. The binary politics between a Christian democratic right and social democratic left, with a small space for classic liberal parties, is now over. The world’s biggest democratic region, the 46 nation-states grouped in the Council of Europe, is now giving birth to a centrifugal politics with identity replacing class alignment. No single party or political formation can win control of the state and govern on the basis of a manifesto with majority support from voters. Even Britain requires a coalition to have a majority in the House of Commons. Belgium and the Netherlands still have not formed governments months after elections produced inconclusive results.

Postwar Europe had one great foe and one great friend to produce unity of political purpose, even if big parties battled over priorities. Social and Christian democrats were united against sovietism and Moscow’s proxy parties on the communist left. The United States allied itself to the moderate right and left to create NATO, support the suppression of nationalisms with the creation of the European Union, and wean Europeans away from protectionist economics in favor of open trade and competitive markets.

Now Europe no longer faces an agreed common threat, despite the best efforts of an Islamaphobe right to present Muslims as an alien invading force that must be confronted and contained. Nor is the United States an inspiration any longer. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have been quagmired in their respective wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, from which most Europeans recoil with dismay. The recession and banking crisis are blamed on unregulated American free markets. Even the business minister for David Cameron’s new Conservative government, Vince Cable, was heard lashing out at the evils of capitalism and the “murky world” of corporate behavior at his party conference this month in Liverpool.

Without a common foe and without agreement that the Atlantic alliance is an overwhelming priority, politics in Europe has lost its moorings. The politics of Gemeinschaft (community) is replacing the politics of Gesellschaft (society). New communities of true believers are forming all over Europe. Those who trace their national woes to immigrants—or nuclear power, or the EU, or Muslims, or Jews, or market economics, or the United States—are uniting in new political communities, all of them harmful to society. To govern a society requires compromise and a choice of priorities. The guiding impulse of the new identity politics in Europe is to reject, to cry “No!”

Sweden now has to live with an ugly nationalist identity party, the Sweden Democrats, with 20 members of the Riksdag, the Swedish Parliament. Despite the pretty name, the Sweden Democrats are anti-immigration and anti-Muslim, and call for authoritarian solutions to Sweden’s growing social crisis. Swedish unemployment stands at 9 percent after four years of a center-right coalition led by Fredrik Reinfeldt. But high unemployment does not automatically mean a turn to the left. Swedish Social Democrats saw their vote slumped to 30 percent—the lowest in a century—and had never before lost two elections in a row.

The conversation among Social Democrats was typical of the disarray on the European left. The Swedish party leaders had begun talking to themselves, believing their own rhetoric when it was obvious fewer and fewer voters did. Traditionally the party was staunchly anticommunist and pro-industry, but it had drifted toward the fuzzy left, led by Mona Sahlin, a product of 1970s feminist-leftist politics. The party allied itself with a hard-left party and with the Greens, producing an election manifesto calling for more taxation and higher public spending. That platform was roundly rejected by voters. The middle classes liked the tax cuts offered by the center right. Many in the dwindling Swedish working class turned to the new Democrats of the hard right.

The decay of the centrist ruling parties is being hastened by European electoral systems based on the 19th-century philosophy of proportional representation, which allows even small parties to gain a share of the seats in Parliament. This is now preventing any coherent leadership from emerging in Europe. Each movement or group can create its own party to maintain its electoral purity. Recent elections fought under variations of proportional representation have seen the rise of nationalist and anti-immigrant parties into national parliaments. Some parties, like Jobbik, which also calls itself “The Movement for a Better Hungary,” are anti-Semitic. The nationalist right in East Europe seeks to downplay the Holocaust by comparing the crimes of European communism with the industrialized extermination of Jews in Nazi death camps.

Voters’ support for the extreme right in Europe can no longer be downplayed as a marginal, country-specific phenomenon. The world’s biggest democratic region is now the breeding ground for extreme-right politics. The most recent election totals are 11.9 percent in France (National Front); 8.3 percent in Italy (Northern League); 15.5 percent in the Netherlands (Geert Wilders’s Dutch Freedom Party); 28.9 percent in Switzerland (Swiss People’s Party); 16.7 percent in Hungary (Jobbik); and 22.9 percent in Norway (Progress Party). There are also significant parties of the extreme right in Belgium, Latvia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Most of these parties have either seen significant gains since 2000, or did not even exist a decade ago. The fall of parliamentary seats into extremist hands represents the biggest shake-up in European politics since the disappearance of communism. In all these cases, the latest vote totals represent an increase between 5 and 15 percent since the beginning of the century. Most of these parties have seen significant gains since 2000, or did not even exist a decade ago. This support from voters has reduced considerably the mandate to govern of traditional parties and eroded the self-confidence of the once dominant formations of post-war politics.

Nor can this new politics be quarantined. In France, President Nicolas Sarkozy, searching for a populist boost to his fading political fortunes, launched a campaign of angry criticism and forcible expulsions against the Roma minority. Even many backers of Sarkozy were shocked by the crudeness of rounding up an ethnic minority for deportation. One European commissioner, Viviane Reding from Luxembourg, compared Sarkozy’s expulsion of the Roma to the expulsion of the Jews in World War II, and came close to calling Sarkozy a Nazi, provoking a suitably angry rebuttal from the French president. But there is no question that the spectacle of a centrist like Sarkozy playing to the fringe is a harbinger of more to come. Germany’s Social Democrats, a traditional party of the center left, are playing on the same fears by accusing Chancellor Angela Merkel of failing to speed up compulsory integration for immigrants. Even Britain’s new coalition government, which is not racist or extreme, has pushed through a savage limit on foreigners being allowed to work in Britain. Despite squeals from employers worried about such crude protectionism, David Cameron has to throw some anti-foreigner, anti-immigrant red meat to voters who last year sent two far-right British National Party politicians to the European Parliament.

The decline of the ruling parties undermines the entire European project. Having spent a decade fretting and fussing over its constitution, the EU elites in Brussels have no answer to the slow disintegration of national political parties. The project of building a united Europe requires national parties that can command majority support, including support for granting greater powers to the EU elite, which has yet to command much respect on its own. The inward-looking, infighting Brussels governing class regulates a weak regional economy that now has 23 million unemployed, and no plan of attack. No commissioners ever lose their job, no matter how crude or incompetent they are. Europe now has three presidents—for its Commission, Council, and Parliament—but no leadership.

The EU leadership gap creates another easy target of opportunity for the extreme right, which is adept at exploiting the resentments stirred by economic decline. In the years of strong European growth in the 1960s, foreign workers were seen as adding value to national economies, but now they are blamed for stealing jobs. And the EU’s newly opened borders are blamed for letting in the outsiders. Nationwide rightist parties go on the attack. And regional communities like Catalan, Flemish, or Scottish nationalists reject staying within Spain, Belgium, or the United Kingdom. The dreams that a common European economic and social liberalism would replace the old atavisms of nation-first politics are on hold.

Voters looking to community and identity are shaping a new politics in Europe. Those who think the new populist right is taking politics back to prewar fascism are too alarmist. Europe’s democracy remains strong, perhaps just too strong, as political parties fragment and the din of competing voices grows louder. The myth of “Eurabia,” or the takeover of Europe by Muslims, is a myth for the same reasons. The majority of Europe’s 20 million Muslims aspire to integrate into a middle-class European lifestyle, and while their numbers are growing, in no nation are they on track to become anything more than just another small minority community. What Europe needs is a confident leadership that can unite its splintering communities behind a vision that can say more than no.

Source - Newsweek

Liberal multiculturalism masks an old barbarism with a human face

Across Europe, the politics of the far right is infecting us all with the need for a 'reasonable' anti-immigration policy

The recent expulsion of Roma, or Gypsies, from France drew protests from all around Europe – from the liberal media but also from top politicians, and not only from those on the left. But the expulsions went ahead, and they are just the tip of a much larger iceberg of European politics.

A month ago, a book by Thilo Sarrazin, a bank executive who was considered politically close to the Social Democrats, caused an uproar in Germany. Its thesis is that German nationhood is threatened because too many immigrants are allowed to maintain their cultural identity. Although the book, titled Germany Does Away with Itself, was overwhelmingly condemned, its tremendous impact suggests that it touched a nerve.

Incidents like these have to be seen against the background of a long-term rearrangement of the political space in western and eastern Europe. Until recently, most European countries were dominated by two main parties that addressed the majority of the electorate: a right-of-centre party (Christian Democrat, liberal-conservative, people's) and a left-of-centre party (socialist, social-democratic), with smaller parties (ecologists, communists) addressing a narrower electorate.

Recent electoral results in the west as well as in the east signal the gradual emergence of a different polarity. There is now one predominant centrist party that stands for global capitalism, usually with a liberal cultural agenda (for example, tolerance towards abortion, gay rights, religious and ethnic minorities). Opposing this party is an increasingly strong anti-immigrant populist party which, on its fringes, is accompanied by overtly racist neofascist groups. The best example of this is Poland where, after the disappearance of the ex-communists, the main parties are the "anti-ideological" centrist liberal party of the prime minister Donald Tusk and the conservative Christian Law and Justice party of the Kaczynski brothers. Similar tendencies are discernible in the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Hungary. How did we get here?

After decades of hope held out by the welfare state, when financial cuts were sold as temporary, and sustained by a promise that things would soon return to normal, we are entering a new epoch in which crisis – or, rather, a kind of economic state of emergency, with its attendant need for all sorts of austerity measures (cutting benefits, diminishing health and education services, making jobs more temporary) is permanent. Crisis is becoming a way of life.

After the disintegration of the communist regimes in 1990, we entered a new era in which the predominant form of the exercise of state power became a depoliticised expert administration and the co-ordination of interests. The only way to introduce passion into this kind of politics, the only way to actively mobilise people, is through fear: the fear of immigrants, the fear of crime, the fear of godless sexual depravity, the fear of the excessive state (with its burden of high taxation and control), the fear of ecological catastrophe, as well as the fear of harassment (political correctness is the exemplary liberal form of the politics of fear).

Such a politics always relies on the manipulation of a paranoid multitude – the frightening rallying of frightened men and women. This is why the big event of the first decade of the new millennium was when anti-immigration politics went mainstream and finally cut the umbilical cord that had connected it to far right fringe parties. From France to Germany, from Austria to Holland, in the new spirit of pride in one's cultural and historical identity, the main parties now find it acceptable to stress that immigrants are guests who have to accommodate themselves to the cultural values that define the host society – "it is our country, love it or leave it" is the message.

Progressive liberals are, of course, horrified by such populist racism. However, a closer look reveals how their multicultural tolerance and respect of differences share with those who oppose immigration the need to keep others at a proper distance. "The others are OK, I respect them," the liberals say, "but they must not intrude too much on my own space. The moment they do, they harass me – I fully support affirmative action, but I am in no way ready to listen to loud rap music." What is increasingly emerging as the central human right in late-capitalist societies is the right not to be harassed, which is the right to be kept at a safe distance from others. A terrorist whose deadly plans should be prevented belongs in Guantánamo, the empty zone exempted from the rule of law; a fundamentalist ideologist should be silenced because he spreads hatred. Such people are toxic subjects who disturb my peace.

On today's market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol. And the list goes on: what about virtual sex as sex without sex? The Colin Powell doctrine of warfare with no casualties (on our side, of course) as warfare without warfare? The contemporary redefinition of politics as the art of expert administration as politics without politics? This leads us to today's tolerant liberal multiculturalism as an experience of the Other deprived of its Otherness – the decaffeinated Other.

The mechanism of such neutralisation was best formulated back in 1938 by Robert Brasillach, the French fascist intellectual, who saw himself as a "moderate" antisemite and invented the formula of reasonable antisemitism. "We grant ourselves permission to applaud Charlie Chaplin, a half Jew, at the movies; to admire Proust, a half Jew; to applaud Yehudi Menuhin, a Jew; … We don't want to kill anyone, we don't want to organise any pogrom. But we also think that the best way to hinder the always unpredictable actions of instinctual antisemitism is to organise a reasonable antisemitism."

Is this same attitude not at work in the way our governments are dealing with the "immigrant threat"? After righteously rejecting direct populist racism as "unreasonable" and unacceptable for our democratic standards, they endorse "reasonably" racist protective measures or, as today's Brasillachs, some of them even Social Democrats, tell us: "We grant ourselves permission to applaud African and east European sportsmen, Asian doctors, Indian software programmers. We don't want to kill anyone, we don't want to organise any pogrom. But we also think that the best way to hinder the always unpredictable violent anti-immigrant defensive measures is to organise a reasonable anti-immigrant protection."

This vision of the detoxification of one's neighbour suggests a clear passage from direct barbarism to barbarism with a human face. It reveals the regression from the Christian love of one's neighbour back to the pagan privileging of our tribe versus the barbarian Other. Even if it is cloaked as a defence of Christian values, it is itself the greatest threat to Christian legacy.

Source - Guardian

Перу: 400 років самотності

Дроздовський Дмитро 
Український Тиждень 

Перу прагне сконструювати свою національну ідентичність, позбувшись комплексу меншовартості й примиривши в свідомості людей колоніальність і колонізаторство

Перу – особлива країна Південної Америки. Це й не Бразилія з її грандіозними карнавалами та неймовірною бідністю околиць мегаполісів. Це й не Венесуела з авторитаристськими манерами її президента. Перу – країна-медіум, яка сьогодні разом із іншими державами Латинської Америки шукає своє національне мотто. Ще Ґарсіа Маркес у Нобелівській промові говорив про проблему «самотності Латинської Америки» як особливого геополітичного й культурного суб’єкта, який для світу залишається чужим, екзотичним. Самотність Перу, країни, яку Паскуаль де Андогоя відкрив 1522 року, триває вже чотири століття.

Сьогодні ми розуміємо, що «екзотичність» живе лише в колонізаторській свідомості. Ще Едвард Саїд описував цей феномен: коли для нас щось видається «дивовижним», «чарівливим», то це свідчить радше про приписування нашого значення певному об’єктові реальності. Схід є Схід. Латинська Америка є Латинська Америка. Вони не загадкові й не надзвичайні. Але свідомість західноєвропейської людини часто прагнула позначити «Іншого» як такого, що належить її простору. Студії з постколоніальної проблематики країн Латинської Америки й досі залишаються незораним полем в українському гуманітарному просторі. Досвід цього регіону для нас видається занадто далеким.

Шукаючи себе

Нині Перу прагне вибудувати відносини не тільки із сусідами, а й із країнами Північної Америки й навіть Росією. Два роки тому на саміті Асоціації країн тихоокеанської спільноти (АТЕС) Росію представляв Дмітрій Мєдвєдєв. У Лімі можна було побачити білборди з обличчями президентів країн АТЕС. Медвєдєв на них був зображений у центрі, впадала в очі його вищість. Тоді візит російського президента викликав неабиякий резонанс. На відміну від України, для Росії країни Латинської Америки не захмарні висоти чи заховані в загадковому Ельдорадо землі, а регіон, у національній пам’яті якого вона намагається оживити соціалістичне минуле, коли СРСР був його надійним партнером.

А ось про відносини Перу зі США не можна сказати, що вони вельми успішні. Американським громадянам віза для в’їзду в Перу не потрібна. Натомість перуанці навіть не можуть перебувати в аеропортах США без транзитної візи. Громадяни США часто в претензійній формі наголошують у розмові з представниками Латинської Америки: «We are citizens of America» (ми є громадянами Америки), – а перуанці додають: «І ми». Адже Америка – це частина світу, яка складається з двох материків: Південної та Північної Америк. Такі ці дрібниці засвідчують: Перу сьогодні прагне сформулювати свою інтерпретацію історії, сконструювати перуанську національну ідентичність, щоб позбутися комплексів меншовартості.

Перше враження від країни формується в аеропорту. Міжнародний аеропорт Ліми нічим не відрізняється від найкращих аеропортів Європи: Віденсь­кого, Цюрихського або Ґетвіку в Лондоні. Кілька років тому німецька компанія придбала цей аеропорт і перетворила його на «європейську лялечку». А от сама столиця Ліма – це місто-мегаполіс зі складною екологічною ситуацією, з корками в години пік, з типовими латиноамериканськими нетрями, куди туристам краще не потикатися.

Як відомо, Перу – країна інків. Мачу Пікчу – стародавнє місто інків, загублене в горах. Місто існувало до вторгнення іспанців 1532 року. Після появи загарбників на їхніх землях його населення таємничо зникло. До наших днів збереглася столиця імперії інків Куско. Місто пережило й іспанських конкістадорів, і численні землетруси.

У Перу реально відчутна проблема діалогу етносів та вироблення спільної ідентичності. Там досі можна помітити неприязнь із боку нащадків конкістадорів до тубільного населення. Освічені мешканці Ліми (нащадки європейців) зустрічають представників автохтонного населення в крамницях поглядами, сповненими зневаги. В Лімі якось саме постає запитання: звідки в Європи, наділеної християнською мораллю, розумом, стільки агресії, спроможної знищити цивілізацію? Невже вся причина в золоті інків? При цьому обличчя корінного населення випромінюють особливе світло. Вони ніби звикли до свого підлеглого становища, але зберегли душу.

Загалом формування ідентичності в Латинській Америці (зокрема в Перу) є однією з найболючіших проблем. Ще на початку ХХ ст. у країнах цього континенту філософи почали замислюватися над проблемою співіснування спільнот у межах однієї країни, над діалогом між тубільним населенням і нащадками конкістадорів. Тоді ж логічно постало запитання: як бути з національною мовою в Латинській Америці? Якщо за основу взяти іспанську, то в такому разі національною буде мова, чужа для тубільців. Зреш­тою, історично іспанська мова – це мова колонізаторської Іспанії, а не Латинської Америки. Дискусія щодо цього триває

Перуанідад

Початок ХХ ст. в Перу ознаменувався спробою подолати колоніальну свідомість та витворити нову політичну модель. Тоді почалося конструювання перуанідаду (перуанської ідентичності). Крім того, в 1930–1940-х багато жителів країни захоплювалися Радянським Союзом, соціалістичними моделями розвитку.

У 1910-х формується гурток інтелектуалів «Група Трухільйо» (С. Вальєхо, В. Айя де ла Торре, А. Оррего). Його представники не приділяли особливої уваги культурним проблемам індіанського населення, вдаючись до індихеністської (див. Словничок) риторики лише при спілкуванні з представниками півдня країни.

А ось у 1920-ті при Міністерстві економіки Перу було засновано відділ у справах індіанців. У Перу в 1920–1930-х було взято курс на ствердження індіанської, а не метисної сутності національної культури. Саме індихенізм стає першою за часом течією, спрямованою на роз­в’я­зання проблеми національної само­ідентифікації. Криза європоцентристської картини світу на певний час відсунула в тінь європейський складник перуанської культури. В середині 1920-х з'являється чимало індихеністських часописів. Зок­ре­­ма, 1925 року в Куско виходить «Кечуанська душа», 1926 року в Пуно – «Бюлетень Тітікаки».

У 1930-х у Перу виникає «чолізм» – явище не тривале, але важливе для розуміння політичних процесів. Термін «чоло» трактують по-різному. Так називають метисів перуанської Сьєрри, а також індіанців, котрі покинули свою громаду та стали торгівцями або ремісниками. Перуанський чоло може бути іспанським монолінгвом, білінгвом або навіть погано володіти іспанською, послуговуючись кечуа, та в будь-якому разі він усвідомлює своє змішане походження, хоч індіанська сутність дещо переважає.

На шляху до демократії

З 1940-х до 1990-х історія Перу – це злети й падіння, драми військових протистоянь і прагнень до утвердження національних цінностей. Президент Хосе Бустаманте, котрий прийшов 1945 року до влади, скасовує цензуру, відновлює громадянські права й звільняє політичних в’язнів. Уряд водночас посилює контроль над цінами, зміцнює державний сектор економіки, підвищує мінімальний рівень зарплат. У жовтні 1948-го за підтримки Народної партії, з якою Бустаманте був у конфлікті, повстали моряки Кальяо. Придушивши повстання, армія скинула президента. До влади прийшла військова хунта на чолі з генералом Мануелем Аполінаріо Одрія, якого, зрештою, обрали президентом країни (1950–1956). Військові скасували громадянські свободи, розпустили профспілки, заборонили опозиційні партії й заарештували опонентів. Було запроваджено цензуру. Проте в зовнішній політиці режим Одрії орієнтувався на США. 1960 року Перу розриває дипломатичні відносини з Кубою.

Далі в країні трапилися поспіль два військові перевороти: 1968-го та 1975 року. Реальні соціально-економічні зміни відбулися після президентських виборів 1980 року, на яких переміг Фернандо Белаунде. Прийшовши вдруге до влади (вже обіймав посаду президента в 1963–1968 рр. – Ред.), Белаунде (1980–1985 рр.) скасував більшу частину реформ військового уряду. Він прагнув створити нові робочі місця, започаткувавши масштабні будівельні проекти в зоні тропічних лісів. Але невдовзі почався економічний спад. Уряд був змушений призупинити виплати іноземних боргів. Тоді ж під тиском США Перу вживає заходів зі скорочення в країні плантацій коки, головного джерела доходів багатьох індіанців.

А от вагомі демократичні зрушення відбулися після приходу до влади 2001 року Алєхандро Толедо. Саме з цим іменем пов’язаний період в історії Перу, коли почалися процеси формування незалежної національної політики в царині економіки та гуманітаристики, конструювання національної ідентичності з усвідомленням постколоніальності. За цей час вдалося приборкати інфляцію, здійснити низку важливих соціальних змін, спрямованих на боротьбу з бідністю, залучити інвестиції в медицину й підвищити рівень освіти. Толедо – перший президент Перу, який посів цей пост у результаті демократичних президентських виборів, будучи етнічним представником корінного індіанського населення.

Весь світ спостерігав за виборами у квітні 2000 року, як Алєхандро Толедо боровся з Альберто Фухіморі, котрий до того вже двічі обіймав президентську посаду (1990–2000). За тиждень до виборів Толедо направив офіційного листа до Національного виборчого комітету, в якому йшлося, що вибори нечесні. Таким чином він намагався привернути увагу Організації американських держав до фальсифікацій. Ця Організація оголосила, що Національному виборчому комітетові потрібно більше часу, аби розібратися в ситуації. У підсумку Толедо попросив прихильників написати «Ні – брехні» на бюлетенях, а сам зняв свою кандидатуру. Він закликав провести «Марш чотирьох кінців світу», що став найбільшим народним протестом у перуанській історії. Фухіморі таки був оголошений переможцем у цих скандальних і фальшивих виборах. Але він пішов у відставку під час третього терміну й утік до Японії, коли голова Комітету національної безпеки Владіміро Монтесінос звинуватив його в корупції й порушеннях прав людини.

Перемога Толедо на виборах 2001 року – це удар по корупції. Корупція й бідність і раніше викликали народні протести в Перу, однак через невисокий рівень політичної грамотності людей вони мали сумнівні форми. Можна згадати маоїстський рух «Сендеро луміносо» («Світлий шлях»), що з 1980-го провадить збройну боротьбу з владою й знищив більше бідняків, не згодних із його тоталітарними діями, ніж корумпованих чиновників.

Алєхандро Толедо, випускник Стенфордського університету, на власному прикладі показав перуанцям, що, здобувши освіту за кордоном, вони можуть повернутися додому й розбудовувати свою країну. Саме зусиллями таких освічених людей можна впорядкувати хаос минулого. Впродовж усього ХХ ст. Перу весь час шукала своє мотто після 500-річного колонізованого стану. Тепер вона отримала шанс стати послідовнішою та осмисленішою.

Однак після половини свого президентського терміну Толедо, людина, яка очолила народний рух, щоб повалити Фухіморі, мав рейтинг популярності 7% – найнижчий серед перуанських лідерів, починаючи з 1980 року, коли в країні відновили демократію. Він посів президентське крісло, плануючи викоренити корупцію, але й сам став учасником політичних ігор. Толедо заявляв, що відправить усіх нечесних чиновників до в’язниці. Ці слова полонили уяву перуанців, які палко бажали, щоб злочинних політиків притягли до відповідальності. Та його держ­апарат було звинувачено в тих самих корупційних оборудках, що й попередній. Напрошуються паралелі з ситуацією в Україні після Помаранчевої революції 2004 року.

Проте саме за президентства Толедо перуанська економіка зростала в середньому на 6% за рік. Це один із найвищих показників у Латинській Америці. Інфляція була на рівні 1,5%, що також є досягненням. Одним із головних здобутків Толедо вважають створення програми для боротьби з бідністю JUNTOS. У 2005 році її допомогою скористалися бли­зь­­ко 100 тис. сімей, у 2006-му – 200 тис. Перуанська економіка зростала протягом 60-ти місяців, що було обумовлено високими цінами на мінеральні ресурси, а також інтенсивним притоком приватних інвестицій. Одним із головних партнерів Перу під час президентства Толедо стали США.

«Ми не такі…»

Тому Перу сьогодні – країна, яка передусім прагне витворити нову філософію розвитку, даючи відповідь на базові державницькі питання: якою є свідомість, мова й культура нації? Ця країна існує на перетині ліберально-демократич­них і національ­них стратегій розвитку. Прагнучи побудувати міцні відносини із США, Перу також геополітично є партнером Китаю та Росії. Перуанська історія – це шлях від імперії (хоча «імперію інків» навряд чи можна порівняти зі світовими імперіями XVIII–ХІХ ст.) до колонії, а згодом від колонії – до національної держави. Й досі у розмовах людей різних класів чуєш: «Ми не такі, як іспанці. Наша мова інша». При цьому за зразок націєтворення, вартий наслідування, вони вважають Бразилію. Можливо, дається взнаки колоніальний статус, пов’яза­ний із бажанням сформувати власний наратив на вже чиїйсь основі. Попри все Перу – країна на шляху до самотворення з величезним національ­но-історич­ним спадком і духовним потенціалом.

Ключові дати

28 червня 1821 року – проголошено утворення Республіки Перу.

1824 рік – Перу здобуває остаточну незалежність після битви біля Хуніне й Аякучо.

1948 рік – встановлено диктатуру Одрії, який проводив політику терору.

1960-ті – президент Перу Мануель Прадо (1956–1962 рр.) встановлює демократичний лад.

28 червня 1990 року – до влади приходить Альберто Кенйо Фухіморі, який у другому турі виборів випереджає письменника Маріо Варгаса Льйосу. Правління Фухіморі позначено терором, антидемократичними рухами, корупційними скандалами.

З липня 2001-го до червня 2006 року – президентом країни був Алєхандро Толедо, він проводив політику демократизації та утвердження ліберально-національних цінностей.

З червня 2006 року й понині – президентську посаду обіймає соціал-демократ Алан Ґарсіа Перес, котрий уже перебував на ній з 1985-го по 1990-й

Словничок

Індихенізм – ідейна течія, що прагне осмислити роль і місце індіанського населення в історії Латинської Америки, зберегти й утвердити індіанську ідентичність.

Вартість життя в Перу

$7 ціна одного галона (4 літри) бензину

$5 ціна одного галона нафти

$30-40 тис. вартує 2-поверховий будинок у Лімі

Від $20 тис. коштує квартира в Лімі

Neo-nationalism threatens Europe

Giving way to nationalist groups from Scotland, the Basque country or Flanders would only highlight old differences

Stewart Motha

Source - Guardian

The prevailing view seems to be that the idea of Europe as a cultural, political, and even economic institution is under threat. What threatens Europe? A glib response would be: "It's the UK, stupid!" We will find more than a grain of truth in this response. The UK straddles Europe's margins – at once a major economy dependent on European trade, adapting its legal institutions to a transnational European legal order where EU law has direct effect; but refusing the common currency, and resisting further political integration. But the deeper threat to Europe is the very thing that it was designed to overcome – nationalism as the root of political unity and commonality.

The European project was inspired by the injunction "never again". Never again would European nations allow virulent and competitive nationalism to tear them apart as they had done in two disastrous wars. Never again would the fate of minorities be left to national parliaments, and racist and populist sentiments. According to Europe's founding myth, a new commonality, beginning with a European common market, respect for democratic institutions, human rights, and the rule of law, would define the European project.

These lofty ambitions were of course a far cry from the xenophobia and racism experienced by many migrant and refugee communities in Europe after the second world war. Nonetheless they provided a juridical framework within which discrimination was contested, and a liberal-democratic social project of tolerance and diversity was advanced. This was facilitated by the highly integrationist jurisprudence of the European court of justice in the early 1960s.

The impact of juridical unification was starkly brought home to Margaret Thatcher's government when a British court granted an injunction to stop the application of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 (MSA) while its compatibility with European laws was tested. The MSA had sought to introduce a qualifier of nationality for fishing licenses in UK waters. Spanish fisherman challenged the legislation. The courts decided that nationality would not be allowed to interfere with the freedom of inter-European trade and commerce.

What, then, are the perceived threats to this new European order? The greatest perceived threat has been from the so-called "return of religion". Recall the furore in February 2008 when the archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, gave a highly nuanced speech about the need to be open to the application of sharia law in certain limited circumstances. It was a speech explicitly addressed to lawyers, with a sophisticated analysis of particular laws and the theories on which they are based.

The irresponsible silence of the legal community when the archbishop came under attack was a low point that should shame all lawyers. He was only articulating what is currently a fact – that Christian, Jewish, and Islamic law does play a significant role in people's lives, and regulates family life and marriages in particular. Moreover he noted that a sense of wider religious belonging, such as with Muslims and the umma, coexists with citizenship in many nation states. Where there is an inconsistency between religious law and the putatively secular "law of the land", the latter would usually prevail. This is not different from a range of other jurisdictions such as India and South Africa where customary and state law coexist. Political and religious plurality is consistent. Citizenship does not mean that the citizen need accept "civil religion" alone. But such discussions about the return of religion are a distraction when nationalism is on the march in Europe again.

I would argue that we have more to fear from nationalism than from religion. And the paradox of European integration is that closer institutional ties with Europe, the principle of subsidiarity, and the apparent obsolescence of the modern nation-state are the calling cards of resurgent nationalism. The Scottish National party's white paper on Scottish independence carries this headline quote from the Dundee summer cabinet of 2009: "In my view the most cogent argument for independence for Scotland is the need for separate representation at the European Union." Scottish independence looms large as a major constitutional issue facing the UK.

At the heart of the European project, in Belgium, the viability of the nation-state that is the home of Europe's capital is now in question. As Nationaal Vlaamse Alliantie (National Flemish Alliance), a democratic nationalist party, put it in its programme for the European elections in 2004: "Europe became of essential importance for Flanders. The future of our people is more and more situated in Europe. From now on our identity will be projected in a European framework."

So what's the problem, some might ask? What does it matter if the constituent elements of the European Union are drawn from Scotland, England and Wales rather than the UK; from Flemish, Catalan, and Basque nations rather than Belgium or Spain? It matters a great deal, as the nation-state is not just a neutral differentiation. While the UK, Spain, Germany, Italy etc are the unions of previously rival regions, principalities, or remnants of imperial formations, they are also the sedimentation of decomposed differences. These nation-states have evolved into commonwealths where national differentiation is not the only unifying characteristic. Do we want a Europe where the Flemish cannot bear to hear French spoken within earshot, let alone Urdu? Will a Scotland with a higher per capita GDP be more open to foreigners or more likely to protect its relative affluence?

The neo-nationalists will try to sell nationalism to us in the name of economics, better corporate tax rates, greener government, and better energy policies. Here is what the SNP white paper on independence has to say about the Basque country: "[Basque] GDP per capita is approximately 30% higher than the Spanish average, and at the start of 2009 the Basque country government enjoyed a higher credit rating than the Spanish federal government." A coalition of better credit raters is not one of the grander political ideas. But this banality signals a radical reversal of what the European project envisioned, albeit in the name of closer ties to Europe.

Spain's Tolerance of Gypsies: A Model for Europe

Antonio Moreno lives on what is reputedly Madrid's most dangerous street, where dealers openly offer any type of drug around the clock. He owns a four-bedroom house with a pool; he works out of his own photo and video studio - and he's a gypsy, one of the 40,000 inhabitants of an illegal settlement on the outskirts of the Spanish capital. Had they been in just about any other European country, Moreno and his neighbors would be the source of tension and controversy: On Tuesday, the E.U. called France's continued deportation of its gypsies a "disgrace" and threatened disciplinary action against the country. Suddenly, all across Europe, a community that's used to living on the fringes is now in the spotlight - and, in some cases, suffering heightened prejudice as a result. But Moreno isn't worried. Because when it comes to dealing with gypsies - also known as Roma - Spain is different.

"[The deportations] will never happen here," says Moreno. "We are integrated. I'm first Spanish, then gypsy, and I'm proud to be both." While many European countries see their Roma communities as problems to be tackled, Spain has embraced its gypsies, giving them rights, celebrating their history - making them feel at home. "Of course there is racism, but it's better here than anywhere else I've seen," Moreno says of his trips to Italy, France, Germany and the Czech Republic. "Spain has helped gypsies a lot." (See pictures of France cracking down on migrants.)

Indeed, 35 years after the death of dictator Francisco Franco, the lives of the Roma have improved dramatically. "We weren't even human before. We were animals," says Moreno of a time when authorities prevented gypsies from working, studying, or even gathering in groups bigger than four. Today, the European Commission, European Union member countries, and the Roma themselves all agree that Spain has become the model for integrating gypsies, often citing it as "a case of good practices." So good that the governments of Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and even Romania - where many Roma come from - are looking to Spain for ideas to apply themselves.

Of the between 10 and 12 million Roma living in Europe, Spain has the second biggest community, estimated at about 970,000, or around 2% of the total population. And the country spends almost 36 million euros annually bringing them into the fold. In Spain, only 5% of gypsies live in makeshift camps and about half of Roma are homeowners. Just about all gypsies in Spain have access to healthcare, and while no recent figures exist, at least 75% are believed to have some sort of steady income. (See "Who Are Gypsies, and Why Is France Deporting Them?")

Spain is also investing in an area that many experts believe is the key to keeping Roma out of poverty: education. Almost all gypsy children start elementary school (although only about 30% compete it) and more than 85% of the country's gypsies are literate. "Spain's use of European social funds is a good example for other member states," says E.U. Commission Vice President and Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding in an e-mail to TIME. "The Spanish government has shown that it is working on integrating the Roma population and we've seen some positive results."

Spain's two-pronged integration approach has been instrumental in those results, pairing access to mainstream social services with targeted inclusion programs. For example, Roma can have access to public housing and financial aid on the condition that they send their children to schools and healthcare facilities. Then there's the Gypsy Secretariat Foundation Acceder program, which experts say is one of the best integration initiatives in Europe. The program takes young unemployed gypsies, teaches them technical skills and helps them earn the equivalent of a high-school degree. At the end, they are placed in jobs through a series of agreements with private companies. It's been such a success that Romania's National Agency for Roma is now trying to implement its own version. (See pictures of immigration in Europe.)

But can the rest of Europe replicate Spain's success? Much of the country's good work in integrating Roma is thanks to its specific history with the community. In order to guarantee stability in a country split along nationalist lines, the constitution written after Franco's death was inclusive of all ethnic and cultures, thus shielding Roma from institutional exclusion. And because gypsies were the single-most impoverished population in the 1980s, they attracted the most development efforts.

Despite centuries of victimization, gypsies have also melded into Spanish mainstream culture - Flamenco dancing and traditional Spanish dress are both borrowed from the community. "Spanish gypsies also resisted integration efforts less than in other countries because they have been sedentary for centuries," says JosÉ Manuel Fresco, an adviser to the E.U. Commission on Roma issues and head of the Spanish government's antiracism commission. (Read: "Spain's Immigrants Suffer in Economic Downturn.")

Even if other E.U. countries do follow in Spain's footsteps and learn to love their Roma, that only solves half the problem. The best way to stop countries such as France and Italy from deporting gypsies is to ensure the gypsies are happy enough at home that they don't need to go to France or Italy in the first place. "Spain has done much more than other old member states [to integrate Roma], but now we have to make sure that success transfers to new member states," says Ivan Ivanov, executive director of the Brussels-based European Roma Information Office. "Then Roma migrations might stop." Deportations are futile, he says: "The gypsies will just come back in a few months. Policies need to be adopted now, or in five years the very same countries will complain of migrations from other countries."

Antonio Moreno would agree. A Spanish gypsy as far back as he can trace his roots, he can't imagine his family living anywhere else. And while he appreciates that his children get financial aid and the state pays for his grandchildren to go to school, he also believes that gypsies themselves have a responsibility to integrate. "Most gypsies are good people and want to coexist with others," Moreno says. "There are some who exclude themselves, but not us. We're staying in Spain because this is our home."

Source - Time (UK)

French film highlights racism

French comedy L'Italien exposes immigrant's dilemma

By Christian Fraser

BBC News, Paris

Kad Merad, who plays Dino in L'Italien, is said to have shortened his name to win more roles Dino Fabrizzi is not what he seems.

To his friends he is an Italian car salesman; successful, popular, on the cusp of promotion, soon to be married.

But at home - to his mother - he is Mourad Ben Saoud, a French Algerian who changed his name to get a job.

Dino is the main character in a new French comedy called L'Italien.

It lifts the lid on a disturbing reality - one in which an increasing number of second- and third-generation immigrants now play a similar role.

"Dino has two lives," says Farida Ouchani, the woman who plays his mother Rashida in the movie.

"He changes his name to get a job, an apartment, to build a normal life. He is an Arab!"

With an Arab name you have to be excellent. And if you are excellent, it still might not be good enough”

Mustapha Kessous

Journalist, Le Monde

"It is the way it is here - people have to make a choice about their origin. The role I play in the film is interesting. The first generation of immigrants didn't have to make this choice."

In this economic climate, getting a new job anywhere is tough. Employers are picky because they have plenty of people to choose from.

But here in France, it is especially hard if you come from an immigrant background.

The unemployment rate nationally is hovering at 10%. It is said to be double that figure in the poorer city suburbs, or "banlieues".

Even Kad Merad, the man who plays Dino in L'Italien, is said to have shortened his name from Kaddour, to win himself more acting roles.

There are plenty of others who have been forced to make that same difficult choice.

Naima Mili has had no luck despite submitting her CV about 100 times Naima Mili is a third-generation French Algerian. Her grandfather came to France after World War II to work in the construction industry.

But she is aiming higher.

Ms Mili is a graduate who can speak four languages. In the past, she has worked for top French companies like Credit Agricole, Total and France Telecom.

And yet in her mid-30s she has hit a glass ceiling. She has not had one interview despite sending out her CV more than 100 times.

So now she has decided to change her name from Naima to Naomi.

"I just want to get one interview," she says. "I need to get through the door to show them what I can do. Most of the time I don't even get a response to my application."

It is an extraordinary failure rate and strange since Naima is highly experienced and, you would have to say, highly presentable.

On meeting her, she says, most will comment on her "good Italian looks".

Postcode lottery

But it is not just names that employers are looking at.

If you live in the department of Seine-Saint-Denis, otherwise known as "93", you are fortunate if your CV gets even a second look.

Where you live in France can affect your job prospects Ms Mili's cousin now sends her applications from her address in "92", or Hauts-de-Seine, which seems to be more palatable to a prospective employer.

"There's something sadly wrong in France," says Mustapha Kessous, a sports journalist with the Le Monde newspaper.

"With a foreign-sounding, Arab name you have to be good. In fact, you have to be excellent. And if you are excellent, it still might not be good enough."

In a recent article, widely debated here in France, Mr Kessous recounts the story of his first meeting with the current Interior Minister, Brice Hortefeux, formerly the minister for national identity and immigration.

Mr Kessous stood to greet him, they smiled, shook hands.

"Have you got your papers?" asked the minister jokingly.

But the government has gone some distance to encourage companies to trial anonymous CVs.

One group using them to good effect is the main public transport operator in the capital, Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP).

They receive applications through the internet. There is no requirement for a name or an address.

"Yesterday, we welcomed another group of applicants from an extremely diverse background," says Jean Pierre Baratta, director of development at RATP.

"It is big plus for our company and hugely encouraging for applicants who come in, to see who else is being invited. They're immediately set at ease. For us it has been a big success."

Identity and immigration are the two biggest themes in France at the moment and not just on the silver screen.

The movie, L'Italien, is not accusing France of being racist, but it does open eyes to how complicated it can be integrating into French society - even when you are French.

Comedy it might be - but for some, Dino's story is the frustrating reality.

Increasing tolerance for anti-immigrant views in Germany

2010-09-08 | Artur Ciechanowicz and Marta Zawilska-Florczuk

An unprecedented debate on the degree of the integration of immigrants living in Germany is underway. The theses which sparked off the discussion were presented in a book by the controversial SPD politician and German central bank executive, Thilo Sarrazin. Problems related to immigrant integration, such as unemployment, educational problems and the existence of parallel societies in Germany, are being discussed. Key German politicians, including Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle, publicists, experts, Internet users and newspaper readers joined in the debate. The dispute revealed increasing support among a section of the public and the political elite for an open expression of views previously unacceptable in public discourse. This acceptance means that anti-immigrant rhetoric may become part of political campaigns in Germany, as it is for example in France and Holland.

The integration of foreigners poses a real problem

One in five residents of Germany is of immigrant background, yet a large part of this group is not integrated in German society. As a consequence of long-lasting negligence and the lack of an effective integration policy, parallel societies have developed in Germany, in which immigrants live without knowing German and, as a result, do not receive education. The level of unemployment in such societies is much higher than among ethnic Germans and naturalised immigrants, which, according to estimates, costs the German budget approximately 16 billion euros annually. 84% of German citizens believe that people who are unable to adapt themselves to life in Germany should leave their country. Assimilated individuals of immigrant descent who enjoy successes in politics, media and business raise no controversies.

Demographic changes in Germany, the ageing society and the demand for a well-qualified workforce on the labour market have made politicians take action. The CDU/CSU/FDP coalition mentioned the integration of foreigners as one of the priority tasks for the government in their coalition agreement signed in 2009. The government’s wide-scope activity (a conference on Islam, bringing into effect the guidelines of the National Integration Plan and integration summits) is to contribute to the assimilation of foreigners to the largest possible extent through learning German and vocational training. The goal of this integration policy is immigrant naturalisation. However, these are long-term actions, the effects of which are impossible to present to public opinion in the short term. Hence, the widespread opinion that the present government is also making insufficient efforts to resolve the problem of poorly integrated immigrants.

A new impulse to the old debate

The controversy over Thilo Sarrazin’s theses results mainly from their harsh wording (for example, “Muslims are people who have a clearly lower intelligence than ethnic Germans”). Similar ideas have already appeared, albeit in a milder form, in rhetoric used by local Christian Democrat politicians. However, a majority of the political elite has found them inadmissible in public debate.

The ongoing debate reveals a change in the approach by part of society and the political elite to the open criticism of immigrants. While being sharply criticised by leaders of the key parties, Sarrazin has been supported by some well-known Christian Democrats, including Peter Gauweiler (CSU) and Roland Koch (CDU). Some politicians have defended Sarazzin, stating that he has done a good thing in raising this serious issue. According to a survey conducted by the polling institute Emnid, 18% of Germans would vote in an election for a party whose programme was focused on a critical approach to non-assimilating immigrants and a restriction of their influx to Germany. Such public sentiments are nothing new, however open approval for slogans hostile to immigrants has so far been deemed to be the domain of the electorate of neo-Nazi parties and, as such, discredited. The propagation of theses offensive to individuals of immigrant descent by a representative of the SPD (which along with the Green Party supports a multicultural society) may be perceived by some of the public as acquiescence to openly stating their anti-immigrant views, which have so far been concealed.

Consequences of the debate on integration

1. The debate on the unsuccessful integration of immigrants reveals the scale of public dissatisfaction with the integration policy conducted by the German government although its guidelines (namely the desire to ensure the assimilation of immigrants to the largest possible extent) meet the expectations of citizens. The discussion currently underway may bring about a change in the German government’s communication strategy: conducting a more open debate on integration (including naming the problems) and providing better information on the actions the government is taking in this area.

2. The scale of support for anti-immigrant views indicates a change which has taken place in German society. At the same time, the use of such rhetoric in countries which are Germany’s neighbours (Holland and France) no longer raises major controversy and allows electoral success to be achieved. Therefore, it may be expected to play a larger part in future election campaigns in Germany, as well.

3. The fact that well-known Christian Democrat politicians have offered their support to Sarrazin also reveals a serious problem which the CDU/CSU has been facing for a long time. Many conservative politicians accuse Chancellor Angela Merkel of having departed from traditional Christian Democratic values, such as the attachment to religion and the motherland. The increasing tolerance for demonstrating anti-immigrant views, evident in public opinion polls, indicates that a niche for a new conservative party – which, however, would distance itself from the neo-Nazi NPD – is emerging on the German political scene to the right of the Christian Democrats.

Source - Center for Eastern Studies

Los gallegos sólo podrán elegir en Infantil la lengua en la que educar a sus hijos

La Xunta ha aprobado el decreto del plurilingüismo que estará en vigor el próximo curso. La normativa regula la enseñanza de la lengua gallega en la educación obligatoria e incluye la consulta a los padres sólo en la etapa de educación infantil, "avalada por sentencias del Tribunal Supremo y del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña".

El presidente de la Xunta, Alberto Núñez Feijóo, ha explicado al término de la reunión semanal del Gobierno gallego que para la elaboración del decreto el Ejecutivo ha tenido en cuenta el dictamen del Consello Consultivo, que "veía falta de cobertura legal" en la consulta a los padres en las etapas de educación Primaria y Secundaria.

Por este motivo, Núñez Feijóo explicó que la Xunta remitirá al Parlamento autonómico un proyecto de ley que dé cobertura legal a la consulta a los padres en esas etapas, de modo que ésta se pueda realizar en la presente legislatura para cumplir con su "compromiso electoral".

El titular de la Xunta afirmó que el decreto garantiza el "equilibrio" entre gallego y castellano, introduce la enseñanza "progresiva" de una lengua extranjera y "garantiza la libertad de profesores y alumnos", así como la participación "máxima posible" de las familias en la educación de sus hijos.

Núñez Feijóo rechazó que retirar la consulta a los padres en las etapas de educación Primaria y Secundaria fuese una "rectificación" y señaló que su Ejecutivo ha tenido en cuenta el dictamen el Consello Consultivo, que establecía "falta de cobertura legal suficiente", según dijo, para hacer esta pregunta en estas etapas.

El jefe del Ejecutivo gallego afirmó que "se omite" que el decreto en vigor, aprobado la pasada legislatura, está en los tribunales porque "ignoró" el dictamen del Consello Consultivo.

En Educación Infantil los padres tendrán que marcar cada año en una casilla la lengua materna de sus hijos en los sobres de matrícula, que es el modelo "avalado" por sentencias del Tribunal Supremo y del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña.

'Equilibrio 50/50'

En el caso de educación Primaria y Secundaria se establecerá por "criterio pedagógico" y en "equilibrio del 50/50" el idioma de las asignaturas troncales .

Este modelo cambiará cuando el Parlamento apruebe la ley que dará cobertura legal a la consulta a los padres en esta etapa, según indicó Núñez Feijóo.

Esta ley, que se elaborará 'ad hoc', no tiene referencias similares en otras comunidades autónomas y contemplará, además, dotar de mayor autoridad a los profesores en las aulas e incentivará la corresponsabilidad "padres profesores".

El presidente gallego indicó que el informe de la Asesoría Jurídica de la Xunta sobre el dictamen del Consello Consultivo acredita "de forma clara y rotunda" la consulta a los padres en Infantil y advierte de la "falta de cobertura legal" para realizar esta pregunta en Primaria y Secundaria, por lo que ése es el motivo para hacer una nueva ley

Source: elmundo.es

Germany’s policy towards immigrants

Marta Zawilska-Florczuk

Center for Eastern Studies, Warsaw

Over the last decade there has been a huge change in the way the German elite perceives the challenges posed by the large number of immigrants living in Germany. After decades of downplaying the problem of the increasing immigration to Germany, its economic and social consequences have made politicians realize that it is necessary to introduce mechanisms to make it easier for Germany to function as a country of immigration.

The forerunner of the new approach to immigration has been the German left, however, the genuine change was made possible only after the policy of the Christian Democrats -until 2005 negatively or indifferently inclined towards people of immigrant origins in Germany – had been reviewed. In the coalition with SPD it was the Christian Democrats who outlined the policy of immigration which is currently seen as one of the guarantors of social solidarity in Germany (this is proven by the fact that the CDU/CSU/FDP government set the precedent by placing provisions in the coalition agreement on the integration of people who have an immigrant background).

The new strategy of the Christian Democrats, set to be continued under this government with the participation of the Liberals, is based on the promotion of integration through naturalization. This will be facilitated by an emphasis being put on language education and the fostering of a favourable climate for adopting German citizenship. This concept seems to stand a great chance of being implemented because of the ongoing parallel processes in the circles of people of immigrant origins and in German society. These are: an increasing presence in the public sphere of people coming from an immigrant background and having German citizenship and their support for integration, as well as a growing acceptance in German society of people of immigrant origins taking prominent positions in public life. The evolution of the German approach to the integration of people of immigrant origins German politicians for a long time did not see the lack of a strategy for immigrants living in Germany as a major problem either for the immigrants themselves or for society as a whole.

A change in this attitude was brought about by the social and economic situation of the country. The German political class realized that further neglect of the integration of people who have an immigrant background would only exacerbate the threat to the German welfare system as family allowances, unemployment benefits and the lack of a broader participation of foreigners in the labour market would weigh more heavily on the country’s budget.

The question of the integration of people of immigrant origins was present as early as the public debate under the first SPD and Green Party government in 1998-2002. The concept of a well thought out policy of integration was, however, lacking. The debate was dominated by a dispute between the left camp and the conservative camp over fundamental issues on limits of tolerance and the place of people who have an immigrant background in German society. The SPD and the Green Party were in favour of the idea of a “multicultural society” based on a free coexistence of various nations, cultures and religions with minimum state intervention. On the other hand, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals championed the model of a new society based on assimilation with a leading culture (Leitkultur). There was no detailed strategy for a policy of integration, the issue was met with resistance from the parliamentary opposition, and society was not open to people of immigrant origins; this led to the coalition partners failing to introduce any significant qualitative changes in this area1. The newly established CDU/CSU/FDP government was the first one to include a policy of integration in the coalition agreement.

The issue of integration had already been raised in the agreement of the SPD and Green Party government of 1998 but in quite general terms and to a much lesser extent. The Christian Democrats and the Liberals placed the integration of people of immigrant origins as one of key issues in the chapter on social solidarity, alongside such topics as pro-family policy, gender equality, social assistance and social welfare, the pension scheme and healthcare system. The inclusion of the policy of integration in the concept of the program of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition indicates an important shift in the approach taken by the parties of the conservative camp regarding the place of people who have an immigrant background in German society. They have abandoned the conviction (previously widespread particularly in the Christian Democrats) that Germany is not an immigration country and the migrant influx is only temporary. There were two factors that directly influenced the breakthrough in the perception of the immigration to Germany and the recognition of the need for a concept of integration for foreigners into German society: the social one and the economic one. Firstly, the number of people with immigrant origins living in Germany form a large group (1/5 of the German population). Some of these live in parallel societies (i.e. functioning independently, alongside German society)2. In this context also feelings in society considered the lack of integration to be a source of criminality and were reluctant to see state funds being spent on unemployment benefits for people of immigrant origins. The second important factor was the problems on the German labour market, particularly the high unemployment rate among people with an immigrant background (20.3% according to the data for 2007) constituting a burden for Germany’s budget. According to the research conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation in 2008, the costs of failed immigration (among them unemployment benefits and social welfare) incurred by the German state amount to EUR 16 billion annually. Another increasingly felt problem is the growing demand for highly skilled workers in the technology and IT sectors – with the emigration of highly qualified Germans to Switzerland and Anglo-Saxon countries, a gap, estimated at approximately 70,000 vacancies (data for 2007), has been created.

1 The most important reform was the amendment of the law on German citizenship in 2000. Its main provisions are: the automatic obtaining of citizenship by persons born in Germany and the obligation to relinquish one of the passports between the age of 18 and 23.

2 The history of post-war immigration to Germany dates back to the 1950s and 1960s. At that time Germany ran an action of encouraging unqualified workers, mainly from Southern Europe and Turkey, to go to Germany in order to perform simple manual jobs. Both politicians and gastarbeiters assumed that would be only a temporary stay. The government did not therefore ensure that the offer enabled immigrants to learn German, to increase their professional skills, have their national diplomas recognized in Germany and to gain access to the labour market. That strategy of ignoring immigrants turned out to be very short-sighted,

particularly given the fact that the number of immigrants kept rising, due to the procedures of reuniting families and letting in refugees, despite the end of the enrolment, announced in the 1980s. The growing number of people of immigrant origins and worse economic circumstances, combined with unfriendly regulations granting access to the labour market, led to an increase in unemployment among people with an immigrant background that was further exacerbated by them and their children not speaking German. Unemployment benefits and family allowances generated huge costs for the country’s budget. German politicians for a long time did not see the lack of a strategy for immigrants living in Germany as a major problem either for the immigrants themselves or for society as a whole. A change in this attitude was brought about by the social and economic situation of the country.

The Christian Democrats as the precursors of the naturalization policy

A genuine breakthrough in the approach towards the integration of people of immigrant origins was made possible due to the change in the attitude of CDU/CSU after their ascension to power in 2005. The fact that the Christian Democrats had clearly lobbied for granting German citizenship to people leaving in Germany but having citizenship of other countries proves that their goal was more about the naturalization of immigrants than enabling them to orient themselves better in German realities.

Paradoxically, it was the Christian Democrats who set the new direction for integration policy and gave a greater significance to it than politicians from parties traditionally viewed as being pro-integration. The Christian Democrats used to be rather ill-disposed to the integration of people with an immigrant background which manifested itself partially in blocking the option of double citizenship, pushing for restrictions in the procedure of reuniting families (lowering the age of children eligible to come to Germany under this procedure) and emphasizing that Germany is not an immigration country. The unfavourable attitude of the Christian Democratic parties towards foreigners living in Germany is clearly illustrated by the election campaigns for the parliaments of Hesse (in 1999 and 2007) and North Rhine-Westphalia (2000) which portrayed immigrants as a source of criminality, and politicians campaigning intensified the related negative emotions in society by using slogans such as „Kinder statt Inder” („Children instead of Indians”). The focus of the German federal government on integration, aimed at immigrants acquiring German citizenship is visible in the dialogue established with people of immigrant origins at state and federal levels: among other events, at the integration summits initiated by Chancellor Merkel (which resulted in the National Integration Plan3) and at an annual conference on Islam held in 2006 and chaired by the interior minister Wolfgang Schäuble.

The aim to naturalize foreigners is also confirmed by a series of new laws that have been in force since the law on immigration was passed in 2007 (among them integration courses covering lessons in German, history, geography, the politics and culture of Germany, compulsory courses in German for spouses coming to Germany under the procedure of reuniting families and naturalization tests intended to verify whether persons applying for German citizenship have a sufficient knowledge of Germany). The new objective of subsequent governments led by the Christian Democrats is above all visible in the open lobbying of politicians for granting German citizenship to people with an immigrant background and also symbolically, in organizing festivities during which Chancellor Merkel grants certificates of citizenship to new German citizens. This encouragement towards naturalization from politicians is a response to the flagging interest foreigners are expressing in obtaining German citizenship (according to the Bundestag’s data, the number of cases of naturalization in 2008 fell by 15% in comparison to 2007).

The government points to the fact that children of immigrant origins that have German citizenship fare a lot better in school education than their counterparts without citizenship.

It seems that this emphasis put on the benefits derived from having citizenship, learning 3 The National Integration Plan was adopted at the integration summit in 2007 and includes over 400 tasks for the government, federal states and immigrant circles, that are intended to create education opportunities for immigrants, increase the offer of courses in the German language, facilitate access to the labour market, etc.

A genuine breakthrough in the approach towards the integration of people of immigrant origins was made possible due to the change in the attitude of CDU/CSU after their ascension to power in 2005. The fact that the Christian Democrats had clearly lobbied for granting German citizenship to people leaving in Germany but having citizenship of other countries proves that their goal was more about the naturalization of immigrants than enabling them to orient themselves better in German realities.

the German language from pre-school and an increased knowledge of German culture and history are a modification of the Christian Democratic model of assimilation to the leading culture. In terms of rhetoric, politicians are avoiding calling the new policy of integration an action leading to the largest figures possible. Officially, the aim of the new policy is to establish a society open to people of immigrant origins ready to integrate with Germans and to harmonize the rights of Germans with the rights of people of immigrant origins. In reality this harmonization (which needs to also include participation in civil society and therefore – voting in elections) is not possible without the harmonized status of the two groups and de facto – without people with an immigrant background obtaining German citizenship.

Immigrant groups are opening to integration

In parallel to the political changes, immigrant circles are also evolving. The examples of naturalized persons that have been successful in Germany point to a strong link between their chances of full participation in social and political life and the fact that they have German citizenship.

A diversification among people of immigrant origins is particularly important in the case of people born and brought up in Germany or naturalized, and those people of immigrant origins without German citizenship. Whereas the first group is becoming more and more active in the social and political life of Germany, the second one integrates with German society more seldom and more often remains excluded from active participation in the labour market. These differences are visible even at the level of pre-school or early school education – children without German citizenship more often have problems while learning than their counterparts who have citizenship; consequently, they drop out of school more often and more seldom find employment and obtain a degree in higher education (according to the report on the extent to which immigrants are integrated, published by the German government in 2009, 16% of immigrants have a certificate of having finished a school, only 11% have passed the secondary school leaving exams and only 23.9% of young people with an immigrant background have completed vocational training – in comparison to the respective figures for Germans – 6.5%, 30% and 57.6%). This problem is passed on from generation to generation – parents not participating in Germany’s social life do not give their children any positive models to follow. Poorer results in school are usually the result of an insufficient command of German and lead to the exclusion of subsequent generations of young people of immigrant origins from active participation in the social life of Germany.

On the other hand, people of immigrant origins are becoming increasingly active and do not want to be perceived any longer as a workforce or exclusively as representatives of immigrants. They want to take part in politics and the public sphere in Germany on equal terms with Germans. Good examples of such an attitude are two politicians – Cem Özdemir from the Green Party and Philipp Rösler from FDP, pursuing political careers at the federal level. Özdemir, a politician of Turkish origin born in Germany, was elected as one of the two presidents of the Green Party in November 2008. Rösler, of Vietnamese origin and adopted as a baby by Germans, is the health minister in the CDU/CSU/FDP government. Apart from politics, representatives of people of immigrant origins are also visible in the media, culture and scientific institutions, although, as in other spheres of life, their number is definitely small compared to the scale of immigration in Germany. Many prominent representatives In parallel to the political changes, immigrant circles are also evolving. The examples of naturalized persons that have been successful in Germany point to a strong link between their chances of full participation in social and political life and the fact that they have German citizenship.

Surveys commissioned by the German TV channel RTL from November 2008 indicate that 58% of the interviewees agree with the statement that Germany is not ready for an outsider to take the office of Chancellor.

As of the recent elections to Bundestag (September 2009) there are only fifteen politicians with an immigrant background in the Parliament (in the previous term there were eleven), and in the European Parliament only three (in the previous term – seven). Also, differences in parties’ openness to people of immigrant origins are distinct. The greatest number of people with an immigrant background are active in left-wing parties– first of all in Alliance ‘90/The Green Party, in The Left Party and the SPD; the fewest such cases can be noted in the Christian-Democratic CDU and CSU and in the FDP This reflects the observed voting preferences of people of immigrant origins and the long-term approach of such parties towards foreigners.

Emphatic examples are: the “Pro Köln” and “Pro NRW” movements active in Western Germany, who propagate combat against the Islamization of Germany; attacks on a black CDU politician in Thuringia and the anti-Polish voting campaign in Saxony organized by the local neo-Nazi NDP bodies before parliamentary elections in those states. of immigrants (e.g. a sociologist of Turkish origin Necla Kelek and a lawyer Seyran Ates participating in the work of the German Conference on Islam) are involved in the debate over integration, criticizing mistakes committed by both the German state and people with an immigrant background themselves. It is worth noticing that these people are against the model of a multicultural society, seeing in it reasons for the creation of parallel societies. It can therefore be assumed that they will be receptive to the arguments of the government and will contribute to a better understanding of the premises of the new policy of immigration in immigrant circles.

German society and immigrants. It seems that the Christian Democratic and Liberal government may count on German society to support its integration policy. The ever-increasing presence of naturalized persons of immigrant origins in the public sphere of Germany is commonly accepted by the majority of society; Germans are however not ready yet for outsiders to hold the highest national positions. At the same time, the negative attitude of Germans to non-integrated immigrants remains stable.

Despite the growing acceptance of immigrants in the public sphere, the number of people who would allow a person of foreign origin to take the post of Chancellor is still significantly lower than the number of persons excluding such an option4. On the other hand, the choice of Cem Özdemir as the leader of the Green Party and later the nomination of Philipp Rösler as health minister were met with a positive reaction from both politicians and citizens. A similar dualism in the approach to outsiders can be observed in the attitudes of the political parties towards the role of immigrants in their structures. While it is common to meet politicians of non-German origin at the communal and state levels, their presence at the federal and European level still remains rather insignificant.

Despite the neutral or positive attitude of most Germans to foreigners, immigrants are still the target of attacks from radical rightist parties and organizations6. In the east of Germany, neo-Nazi groups and parties point to foreigners as the main reason for unemployment among Germans. While it is true that support for such movements nationwide is marginal (in the elections to the Bundestag of 27 September the neo-Nazi parties NPD and DVU gained 1.5% and 0.1% of the votes respectively in the whole country), representatives of the NPD sit in two state parliaments and representatives of the DVU in one state parliament. The negative attitude of Germans is felt mainly by people of immigrant origins with the lowest qualifications who perform simple manual jobs or are jobless, who do not speak German and live in hermetic societies (Turks make up a large proportion of them), and also people of different skin colour.

The research, commissioned by the Federal Anti-Discrimination Office and carried out by Sinus Sociovision in 2008, revealed that 84% of Germans surveyed believe that people who cannot adjust to life in Germany should leave the country; 50% would not like to live in a block of flats with Turkish people. The scale of these attitudes was visible during the debate that swept across the German media in October 2009 and concerned the degree of the ability of Turkish people and Arabs living in Germany to integrate. The discussion was initiated by the interview given by Thilo Sarrazin, the former Social-Democratic finance minister of Berlin, now sitting on the management board of the Bundesbank. In his interview for the quarterly Lettre International he stated that the majority of Turks and Arabs living in Germany were unable to integrate.

A survey commissioned by the weekly Bild am Sonntag reveals that this view is shared by 51% of Germans. The degree of acceptance of people of immigrant origins seems to grow with the level of their education and their social status – for this reason there are no controversies concerning politicians coming from immigrant families and holding prominent positions in the country. The policy of integration leading to naturalization appears to be a reflection of the attitudes and expectations of German society.

Conclusions

1. Economic factors, including a forecasted increase in unemployment and the unused intellectual and professional capacities of people with an immigrant background living in Germany, have led the CDU/CSU/FDP government to recognize the question of the integration of immigrant origins as one of the priority challenges of the current government. The coalition partners are seeking to improve the level of education among immigrants by using the following measures: more hours of courses in German and for knowledge about Germany, an emphasis put on linguistic education as early as in pre-school, easier access to offers of vocational training planned for young people, and simplified regulations concerning the recognition of foreign diplomas in Germany. They are also supporting the continued creation of a policy of integration in agreement with immigrant circles and are planning to introduce integration agreements between new immigrants and the German state.

2. The ongoing evolution in immigrant circles is exerting an important influence on the shift of the approach of politicians to people with an immigrant background. Representatives of the naturalized descendants of former gastarbeiters seem to be allies of the new line of the German policy of integration; they oppose in public debate a wrongly interpreted tolerance which is leading to parallel societies. Furthermore, the careers of representatives of the second and third generation of immigrants possessing German citizenship show that successful integration is dependent on a good command of the German language as the key to obtaining a better education and job.

The model of integration focused on naturalization and promoted by the German government seems to respond to the expectations prevalent in German society. Such circumstances increase the CDU/CSU/FDP government’s chances of making changes that will be beneficial both to the German state and to people of immigrant origins (increased educational opportunities, a reduced scale of the social exclusion of foreigners).

3. The increased interest in the integration of foreigners may prove extremely beneficial for the Christian Democrats and Liberals. The circles of immigrants not possessing German citizenship form a sizable group of prospective voters. With the traditional electorates breaking down they constitute an attractive new electorate not yet linked to any party. It is above all the Christian Democrats who could benefit from the new German citizen vote as its conservative profile stands close to values declared by people with an immigrant background.

4. The unresolved issues, which the government of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals did not take into account during the development of the strategy for integration are: problems of immigrants with an undetermined status, i.e. tolerated immigrants and foreigners living in Germany illegally, and the introduction of a harmonized instrument for managing the migration of labour. The professional reintegration into the labour market of people of immigrant origins living in Germany can turn out to be insufficient in order to meet the demand. It seems that German politicians are consciously putting this issue aside, possibly fearing the reaction of society, and making the development of a long-term strategy conditional on the success of the new policy of integration.