Winds of Change in Francophone Africa

On the whole, francophone African countries lag behind others on the continent on every indicator of human development, health and modernity. The reasons for this 'francophone effect' stem from a unique colonial legacy and francafrique – France's toxic ties with the dictators of its former colonies. But the balance of the world is changing – and France's relationship with its former colonies along with it.

By Jennifer Brea

This year makes 50 since France granted independence to its African colonies. On the whole, the moment has inspired little fanfare, perhaps because there is precious little to celebrate. If you were born in an African country, and the country you were born in happens to have once been a French colony, you are significantly less likely than your counterparts in anglophone Africa to reach your first birthday. If you do, you are less likely to go to school or learn how to read, and the country you live in is, on average, poorer and less democratic. The Internet revolution, shallow though it still may be, is being absorbed by your anglophone brothers at an exponentially faster rate, who also enjoy both higher initial stocks as well as well as faster expansion rates of telecommunications infrastructure like fixed telephone lines and mobile phones, as well as physical infrastructure like roads, electricity and rail.

Fifty years after independence, in just about every measure of human well-being and progress, there is clear evidence for a 'francophone effect.' Less clear is why.

The long shadow of françafrique

For one, there is a strong sense that true independence remains elusive.

In July 2007, just two months after taking office, French President Nicolas Sarkozy stood before an auditorium of students at the University of Dakar. It was a chance for a fresh start, an opportunity to turn the page on nearly three hundred years of colonization and humiliation, not to mention the more recent legacy of françafrique, France's toxic political and economic ties with the dictators ruling many of its former colonies. He chose not to take it.

Instead, he promised to speak plainly, as one does with a close friend. He told them not all the French came to exploit. The colonizer took, but "he also gave." He built bridges and roads. He tamed the wild. He "made virgin soil fertile."

"Colonization," Sarkozy explained, "is not responsible for all the current difficulties of Africa. It is not responsible for the bloody wars between Africans, for the genocides, for the dictators, the fanaticism." What's really holding Africa back is its "absence" from history.

"The African peasant only knows the eternal renewal of time, rhythmed by the endless repetition of the same gestures and the same words. In this imaginary world where everything starts over and over again, there is no place for human adventure or for the idea of progress."

Sarkozy, seemingly intent on resurrecting the worst of colonial-era stereotypes of Africans, provoked an outrage in France and across the continent. Critics decried his speech as "racist." If anything, it was telling of the extent to which France, in its relations with Africa, remains peculiarly frozen in the past. His explicit denial of France's role in promoting corruption or violence was an odd denial of reality.

The basic calculus of French policy since Charles de Gaulle has been to support somewhat questionable leaders in exchange for natural resource concessions, turning a blind eye to bad behavior and protecting friends from domestic opposition. The Elf Gabon case is illustrative of the extent of the corruption at the heart of this contract. In 2004, thirty top officials at Elf Gabon (a subsidiary of French oil company Elf Aquitaine, now Total) were convicted in relation to the embezzlement of hundreds of millions of dollars of funds for personal use in the Mitterrand years. The journalist Nicholas Shaxson, in his book Poisoned Wells, describes the case as just the tip of the "dirty iceberg." Elf has been an important intelligence arm of the French government in Africa, and magistrates close to the case claimed to have uncovered evidence of Elf money being used for as diverse purposes as bribing African politicians, funding French political parties, and funneling cash to armed rebel movements.

France's willingness to protect its allies and support the francophone block has lead to several questionable interventions in its former colonies. By way of example, there's France's role as the exclusive arms dealer to Biafran forces during the Nigerian Civil War, or its suppression of an armed uprising in 2002 in Cote d'Ivoire. Most notable, perhaps, were its actions in Rwanda, where France trained and armed the Hutu militia, continuing to back Hutu extremists well into the genocide, some say because officials were concerned about the advance of anglophone influence – the regime's Tutsi opponents were English speakers.

Beyond the Dakar speech, Sarkozy's actions suggest he is doing little to dismantle françafrique. In his first days in office, Sarkozy made a point of reaffirming close ties with Denis Sassou-Nguesso, President of Congo-Brazzaville for 30 years, and Omar Bongo, President of Gabon for more than four decades until his death last year. (He was replaced by his son.) Meanwhile, a high-profile lawsuit brought by Transparency International against Sassou-Nguesso, Bongo and Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea in a Paris court alleged that each had embezzled millions of dollars in public revenue for their personal use, including the purchase of dozens of luxury apartments in Paris. (It was ultimately thrown out of court) In Gabon, a garrison of French troops still protects the president's mansion.

The colonial legacy

It's impossible to quantify the impact of France's postcolonial legacy in Africa. There are some who would even argue that French interventionism, its support of dictators, has lent a measure of stability to an otherwise turbulent region. Moreover, it's possible that the 'francophone effect' has its roots in an even earlier history. After all, the former French colonies at independence started, on average, at a lower level of economic and social development than their anglophone counterparts.

One explanation may lie in the way that the French and English set up their colonial administrations, which formed the basis for the political systems of independent states. The English relied on a system of 'indirect rule', which tended to incorporate, where possible, indigenous political systems. Military affairs and tax collection were left up to the British, while most other areas of life were under 'native' administration. In reality, chiefs were invented where they could not be found, and the British could rule the unruly in just as unitary a fashion as the French, but were, on the whole, more likely to leave important features of local politics intact.

French rule, by contrast, was based on assimilation, with a system of 'direct rule' that undermined and often supplanted local institutions. The result was that at independence, French colonies were left with an institutional structure that concentrated power at the center, at the expense of local administrative structures that can play an important role in supporting democracy and checking the power of the executive.

But perhaps the most fundamental difference between British and French rule comes down to money. From 1880 until just before World War II, the French invested 10 times less public capital and 20 times less private capital in their African colonies than the British. Sarkozy was right, the French did built roads, but the British built more of them.

The new frontier of investment

Earlier this month, France hosted the Africa-France summit in Nice. For the first time, the French government broke with tradition, inviting several hundred French and African businessmen to what has always been a cozy gathering of African heads of state and top officials in French government and state-owned business.

The move is no doubt a response to the changing winds. For one, the dialogue around development in Africa, at least in anglophone circles, is increasingly pro-business and pro-investment, with many pinning hopes for Africa's future on an expanded role for the private sector.

Also clear is that China's arrival on the scene has changed everything. African leaders are increasingly seeing it as in their interest to cultivate relationships with multiple foreign partners. Competition for natural resources is heating up, with renewed interest from the US and newcomers like India and Brazil also increasingly throwing their hat into the ring. Add to that the privatization of French oil in 2000, and the result is a landscape where it has become increasingly difficult for France to take hegemonic control over any of its former African colonies as a given.

Sarkozy said that in Africa, "there is no place for human adventure or for the idea of progress" on a continent that has supposedly found itself on the fringe of history. Africa once again finds itself at the center of history. France's relationship to Africa will change, not because France wants it to, but because the balance of the world is changing. France will have to adapt or risk missing out.

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Jennifer Brea is a PhD candidate in political economy at Harvard University and the Global Voices' French editor, covering francophone blogs from Africa, the Middle East, Oceania, Europe and the Caribbean. She holds a Bachelor's degree from Princeton University.

Source - the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).

Latin America’s Security Challenges Two Centuries On

Exuding self confidence and optimism, much of Latin America is focused on celebrating 200 years of independence from Spain and Portugal. However, against this celebratory backdrop numerous security challenges are begging for answers – and soon – if Latin America is to succeed in its third century of Republican history.

By Markus Schultze-Kraft

There is no doubt that two centuries after independence most Latin American countries have advanced their nation-building quest. Recent opinion polls conducted by Latinobarómetro, a Chilean non-governmental organization, reveal that a majority of Latin Americans are confident about the future, exhibit high levels of optimism and have faith in their own countries. At the same time, there is evidence which indicates that the region was less affected by the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 than, for instance, the United States and Europe. This is no small feat, considering Latin America’s past record of economic crises and vulnerability to external shocks.

Furthermore, during the past decade, Latin America has produced powerful and respected democratic leaders, such as Presidents Michelle Bachelet of Chile and Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva of Brazil. The region’s politics have also become more inclusive, as evidenced by the 2005 election and 2009 reelection of indigenous President Evo Morales in Bolivia or the rise of El Salvador's President Mauricio Funes, of the former insurgent organization Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), in 2009. Again, given the continent’s history of military dictatorships and other forms of undemocratic rule, the significance of these political developments must not be minimized.

These achievements notwithstanding, it is not all coming up roses in Latin America. The region faces multiple challenges that have to be urgently addressed by Latin Americans and their international partners. Next to still very high Gini coefficients that reveal extreme levels of social inequality and poverty, Latin America suffers from pronounced crime, rule-of-law and security governance problems. With the exception of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, the region is today the world’s crime and homicide capital. And a deeply troubling picture of regional tensions has been drawn, especially in the Andean region, where anti-crime, counter-drug and security cooperation between countries is either inefficient or nonexistent.

Crime, violence and impunityWith respect to homicide and crime, international figures leave no room for doubt: In 2009, the 10 countries with the world's highest murder rates were, in descending order, Honduras, El Salvador, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia and Brazil (next to Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean and South Africa). Statistically, the so-called Northern Triangle in Central America, made up of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, is today the deadliest zone on the globe. But levels of homicide have also increased substantially in Venezuela in recent years; and while the situation in Colombia has improved – and is paradoxically less catastrophic than in neighboring Venezuela, which does not suffer from an internal armed conflict – the country still has one of the world's highest homicide rates.

There are many factors that have to be considered when analyzing the extremely high occurrence of homicide in Latin America. Much of it has to do with drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime – and the manifest shortcomings of decades of US-driven counter-drug policy in the region. Despite large anti-drug efforts during the administrations of Presidents Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) and Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) and the multi-billion dollar ‘Plan Colombia’ underway since 2000, Colombia continues to be the world’s largest cocaine depot. To make matters worse, according to the 2010 report of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, both Peru and Bolivia are again increasing their participation in the production of coca leaf and cocaine trafficking.

Today, violent struggles over trafficking routes and Andean cocaine stocks have spread across Latin America. The battles take place between ever more sophisticated, transnational and well-armed crime and drug syndicates, including Colombian and other insurgent groups. The three source countries (Bolivia, Colombia and Peru) are heavily affected, but some of the transit countries, especially Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela, are under even more pressure. Youth gangs known as maras are running extortion rackets and are increasingly involved in the micro-trafficking of drugs in Central America’s Northern Triangle and Mexico.

Overall weak justice systems and often very high levels of impunity facilitate this crime explosion. To control the situation, a number of Latin American governments have resorted to outside help. Guatemala, for instance, established the UN-sanctioned International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) in 2006 to resuscitate its agonizing justice apparatus, reduce impunity and control high-level corruption and clandestine/criminal networks. While CICIG has been instrumental in tackling several high-profile cases, such as the murder of prominent attorney Rodrigo Rosenberg in 2009 and the arrest of former President Alfonso Portillo in 2010, it has been facing enormous challenges implementing structural reform and strengthening Guatemala’s justice sector. In June, the commission’s director, Spanish judge Carlos Castresana, resigned in frustration.

Regional tensions
Another factor propelling Latin America’s monumental problems of crime and violence is the existing disarray in regional relations. Consider, for example, the Andean region. Since the Colombian armed forces’ strike against a base camp of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) inside Ecuador in March 2008 and the signing of a new US-Colombian defense cooperation agreement (DCA) in 2009, Colombia has not had functioning diplomatic relations with its two most important neighbors – Venezuela and Ecuador. While relations between Bogotá, on the one hand, and Caracas and Quito on the other have been tense, drug-trafficking and other criminal organizations, including Colombia’s insurgents, have expanded their cross-border activities. Lacking a coherent and effective anti-crime and counter-drug policy, and regardless of President Hugo Chávez’s purchase of high-tech, mostly Russian-built weapons systems in the past years, Venezuela is today a virtually open space for illegal and criminal activities of all sorts.

Anti-crime and counter-drug cooperation between Mexico and Central America is also problematic. Under current President Felipe Calderón, Mexico is trying to deal with drug violence through heavy-handed, militarized law enforcement and within the framework of the Mérida Initiative, a three-year $1.4 billion Mexican-US security cooperation program that started in 2007. However, the drug war in Mexico is pushing the local cartels, especially Los Zetas and the Sinaloa group, into the weak and vulnerable Central American countries to the south. With more than twice as many murders per 100,000 inhabitants than in Mexico, the situation in Guatemala is particularly critical. The Mérida program, which on paper also covers Central America, is proving ineffective and insufficient to prevent the spread of drug-related violence in the isthmus.

Under the leadership of Lula, South America has made efforts to improve regional governance, including in the area of security, through the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). UNASUR was established in 2008 and is comprised of 12 countries, of which Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Surinam and Uruguay have yet to ratify the founding treaty. The new regional body has contributed to overcoming a serious crisis in Bolivia in 2008 and to smoothing over regional tensions that developed over the 2009 DCA between Colombia and the US. But UNASUR still has to develop its capacity to address transnational threats, especially drug-trafficking and other cross-border crime, and help mend relations between member states with different or antagonistic policy perspectives, such as Colombia and Venezuela or Bolivia and Peru, through improved security and other governance mechanisms.

Considering that Brazil’s foreign policy is today focused above all on furthering the country’s global reach, building regional governance will inevitably be a slow process. In addition, under US President Barack Obama, US policy toward the region has been characterized by a measure of indifference. It does not seem likely that Washington will play a more constructive role in improving regional and hemispheric relations in the foreseeable future, although it should be noted that when compared to the George W Bush administration, relations between most Latin American countries and the US have improved, at least at a rhetorical level.

Ending two hundred years of solitude
Two centuries after independence began sweeping across Latin America, the continent’s nations have undoubtedly achieved much by way of establishing democratic political regimes and developing more assertive relations with the rest of the world. But weak regional cooperation and integration and a number of entrenched structural problems, including pronounced difficulties to uphold the rule-of-law and control organized crime and domestic violence, continue to afflict the continent. Those problems have to be addressed urgently and in an integrated manner, so as to allow Latin America to conclude its transition from being the “furthermost West” or “forgotten continent” – as Alain Rouquié and Michael Reid, respectively, would put it – to becoming an integral part of the international community of democratic nations.

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Dr Markus Schultze-Kraft is director of the Latin America and Caribbean program at the International Crisis Group based in Bogotá, Colombia.

Source - the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).

Conflict Prevention: Principles, Policies and Practice

Summary

• Conflict prevention is widely endorsed in principle—including in the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy— but too rarely put into serious practice. It is thus important to narrow the gap between rhetoric and action in preventing violent conflicts.

• The interest of elites in exploiting ethnic differences for political gains, the absence of well-established mechanisms for prevention in certain regions, and the destabilizing role of external meddling continue to impede the development of effective prevention strategies.

• Yet, much progress has been made in the field of conflict prevention, both at the normative and the operational levels.

• As a crucial actor in conflict prevention, the United States should work with others to forge a consistent approach to countries at risk, urge countries to deal with arbitrary borders through negotiation rather than violence, and support greater cooperation between regional organizations.

Introduction

About 150 leading policymakers, scholars, diplomats, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders participated in a conference entitled “Preventing Violent Conflict: Principles, Policies and Practice,” organized by the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention on July 1, 2010. This Peace Brief summarizes the presentations from each panel discussion. The central focus was on the unique challenges and opportunities associated with preventing the initial onset of large-scale violence, i.e. primary prevention.

Regional Challenges for Conflict Prevention

Africa

Three African countries pose the most significant risk of large-scale violence in the near future: Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria. Regional spillovers and the prospect of violence in resource-rich nations invite international crime networks and other non-state actors to operate in the region. The fact that ruling regimes often have a stake in perpetuating social fissures and some degree of lawlessness exacerbates the risk of future conflicts. In Sudan, the gravest concern stems from a referendum which will be voted on early next year, and could result in the secession of Southern Sudan from the rest of the country. This could lead to the creation of an extremely fragile state, where problems associated with resources, poor governance, and ethnic issues could quickly lead to violent conflict. The president of the DRC lacks the financial and political means to lead his regime, which has resulted in the proliferation of rebel groups throughout the DRC and across neighboring borders. Conflict in Nigeria could result in the closure of several key oil production sites, putting considerable financial strain on the region. The U.S. could best assist efforts to prevent and mitigate conflict in Africa by supporting efforts by the African Union and other sub-regional organizations, as well as greater international coordination.

Northeast Asia

Conflict prevention activities in Northeast Asia focus primarily on North Korea. In the wake of the March 2010 sinking of the South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan, there has been a noticeable shift in the way the U.S. and regional actors assess and respond to North Korean threats and risks of instability. Uncertainties regarding the reactions of regional players to a sudden, rapid period of instability and a lack of regional institutions in Northeast Asia complicate the situation. Compounding the issue is the internal leadership succession process furthermore complicates the issue. North Korea’s internal leadership succession process furthermore intensifies the uncertainty. Recurring engagement with U.S. partners in the region and Track 1.5 dialogues can reduce the risk of conflict. Priorities include convening actors at the national and local level, mapping the key issues, and boosting capacity building efforts in the region.

Europe/Eurasia

In Europe, three sources of conflict can be distinguished: (1) unsettled geographical issues based on a variety of drivers such as ethnic tensions, resource issues and tension over the division of economic assets; (2) a lack of stable mechanisms for political transition; and (3) the meddling of external actors in fragile states. These conditions exist to some degree throughout Europe and Eurasia, but are most evident in the post-Soviet space. Economic conditions, particularly amidst the ongoing global economic crisis, are often a principal driver of conflict. As these issues persist, many sub-regions in Europe and Eurasia have well-established mechanisms for conflict resolution. However, these mechanisms often do not go far enough in laying the foundation for long-term solutions to conflicts in which violence has ceased, as critical issues remain unresolved.

Latin America

Latin America does not share the same degree of urgency for prevention of violent conflict that is seen in other regions of the world. Recent crises related to political power shifts have been relatively bloodless, and resolved quickly. Ongoing conflicts, such as the conflict in Colombia, are now largely struggles over territory and control of the narcotics trade, rather than over ideology, ethnicity, or control of government. One exception is the potential for interstate conflict between Venezuela and Colombia, in which the Venezuelan government fears regime change driven by the U.S. and views Colombia as the instrument for such change. Additionally, the linkage between crime related to the drug trade and internal violence in many Latin American countries does pose a threat to political stability in many of those countries, particularly in Mexico.

Middle East

When assessing the primary risks of violent conflict in the Middle East, it is important to stress the regional consequences related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the urgency of this matter. A lack of proper humanitarian aid and the unsustainable political role of Hamas have put prospects for a two-state solution in peril. External conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon and increased tensions with Iran have created a fragile situation where a violent conflict could quickly ignite and escalate beyond control. Israel itself is undergoing internal conflict and change. Escalation of rhetoric on all sides and the increasing assertiveness of Israel’s religious right have increased tensions and should be monitored closely. Beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict, several immediate issues exacerbate risks for violent conflict, including water as a critical resource, refugees as a potential source of future conflict, and changes in the distribution of regional power as a result of the rise of regional non-Arab states. In addition, the ongoing conflicts in Yemen and Iraq could become more urgent over time and draw in additional external actors.

Crosscutting Challenges to Conflict Prevention

Governance Issues

One can identify five gaps in governance related to the risk of conflict:

• Knowledge gaps are relatively minor. Conflicts rarely catch us by surprise and most of what we need to know already exists in the literature.

• Normative gaps remain. The difficulty is shifting from “a culture” of reaction to one of prevention the “softening” of sovereignty represents an important normative change.

• Policy gaps also persist, particularly at the national level. Many international organizations have policies to prevent conflict, but if countries themselves do not, conflicts can easily escalate.

• More investments are required to address institutional gaps by establishing, resourcing and empowering institutions at the local, national and international levels. Regional institutions are most likely to be successful, but regional efforts are limited by the capacities of their constituent states.

• The need for better monitoring and enforcement represents a compliance gap. International consensus tends to dissipate when coercion is required. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can be very helpful in this respect by producing useful news, indicators and warnings. Leadership is the most important ingredient for effective governance across each of these five areas.

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Nonproliferation is key to preventing a nuclear terrorist attack and nuclear war. It is unclear, however, whether nonproliferation initiatives have decreased the chances of violent conflict. In the post-Cold War world, two relatively new nuclear powers – India and Pakistan—knew their limits, and the 1999 conflict in Kargil did not escalate into nuclear war.

Nuclear energy development has provided cover for undeclared nuclear powers in the past, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Israel, India, Pakistan, and possibly Iran. The major issue is enrichment capability and the fuel cycle. Countries that seek control of the fuel cycle have to be transparent, as trust is vital, and the world needs to question motives if there is a violation. The U.S. should continue efforts to promote nonproliferation through multilateral institutions, and work on establishing additional nuclear weapon-free zones.

Economic Drivers of Conflict

There are clear connections between poverty, the lack of economic growth and conflict. Thirty-eight of the 50 poorest countries currently experience or have recently emerged from conflict.

Poverty and low economic growth increase the risk for conflict. International financial institutions have enormous value but are often not equipped to address many contemporary challenges.

Another important aspect of the nexus between economics and conflict are criminal economies. Conflict is prevalent where criminal economies exist. There is an emerging consensus that we need a new approach that puts an emphasis on economics while focusing on people and business communities as potential agents of change.

Global Conflict Prevention Initiatives

United Nations

Conflict prevention is a fundamental purpose of the U.N, but it has not been well articulated as a strategy. There is a need to clearly articulate the difference between structural versus operational prevention. In terms of capacity, the U.N. has an early warning capability, if only a rudimentary one.

It does not lack information, but there are several major streams of information disconnected from each other. One of the major challenges for prevention is creating political will where it may not exist. Concepts like the “responsibility to protect” can be important in creating that political will.

The question remains how to put together a multifaceted, effective peacebuilding strategy. Since the changeover of secretaries-general, the U.N. has unfortunately dropped below the radar. Perhaps the locus of action will shift to the G20. If it manages to combine the legitimacy of inclusiveness with smaller numbers, it could be the one forum where big global issues could be tackled.

U.S. Government

The U.S. Department of State and USAID have had prevention as their core responsibility. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) adopts an operational or “field”view of what is necessary for prevention. New tools that have been developed include the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, which looks at drivers of conflict and mitigating factors and has applied in many conflict environments to contribute to prevention strategies. Using funds from the 1207 Program (named after a section of the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act), the  U.S. State Department has been able to develop projects in over 30 countries that are specifically designed to prevent conflict. S/CRS also has an Office of Conflict Prevention and an early warning system for countries where violence is anticipated.

European Union

The EU integration process itself is a conflict preventative tool. The EU also developed an early warning center, intelligence fusion centers, and a checklist of root causes of conflict. On rule of law and governance issues, it launched the Instrument for Stability, which focuses on mediation projects and the role of natural resources on conflict. Examples of effective conflict prevention operations include the Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, the Border Assistance Mission to Moldova, and the EU force in Chad and the Central African Republic. One of the main challenges for the EU will be unity of purpose across its 27 member states. To address the EU’s bureaucratic challenges in implementing a common foreign and security policy, the Lisbon Treaty created an EU External Action Service.

Economic Community of West African States

ECOWAS adopted “The Mechanism” in 1999, which established its peace and security agenda, and created relevant institutions and supporting organizations. A decade later, ECOWAS adopted a Conflict Prevention Framework, probably the best existing inter-governmental framework of its kind: it draws heavily on scholarship on conflict prevention, and links each of its fourteen components with activities, benchmarks, and capacity needs. Yet, the ECOWAS framework is extremely ambitious given current capacities. The core challenge for ECOWAS is to ensure that political commitments in these documents translate into action in specific cases. In addition, ECOWAS faces a constant tension between a desire for institutionalization and the need to respond to current crises with limited resources.

Nongovernmental Organizations

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become important actors in conflict prevention as they offer “on the ground” information, provide inroads into local communities, build community relations and offer solutions. They generally stay in areas where others have left, and provide capacities to implement projects in fragile situations. Even in areas where there is no effective government, like Somalia, there will still be civil society organizations on the ground. Recognition of civil society’s positive role in conflict prevention has been harder to recognize than its role in humanitarian crises. In his 2002 report on the prevention of armed conflict, then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged the civil society community to ‘gets its act together.’ A series of conferences and conventions took place in response. Yet, as a community, civil society is still learning to act simultaneously and multi-dimensionally. One of the remaining challenges is the limited political space NGOs have to operate within. Actors like the U.S. and the EU have an important role in protecting this space.

Conclusions

Several issues continue to impede the development of effective prevention strategies. These include the unwillingness of elites to acknowledge their country’s fragility, the interest of elites in exploiting ethnic differences for political gains, the absence of well-established mechanisms for prevention and resolution in certain regions, and the destabilizing role of external meddling. Yet, progress has clearly been made in the field of conflict prevention, both at the normative and the operational levels.

As a crucial actor in conflict prevention, the United States should work with others to forge a consistent approach to at-risk countries, urge countries to deal with arbitrary borders through negotiation rather than violence, and support greater cooperation between regional organizations.

One of the key goals of the conference was to identify priority areas for USIP’s future work on conflict prevention. Suggestions included an increased focus on the nexus between crime and violence, the development of a systematic way to capture lessons of successful conflict prevention. USIP will also look for ways to link economics more closely with the prevention agenda, and assess the role of emerging countries within conflict prevention.

Source - United States Institute of Peace

Perspectives for Solving the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Regional and European Consequences

BULLETIN

No. 110 (186) . August 25, 2010 . © PISM

Editors: Marcin Zaborowski (Editor-in-Chief), Agnieszka Kopec (Executive Editor),

Lukasz Adamski, Beata Gorka-Winter, Leszek Jesien, Lukasz Kulesa,

Marek Madej, Beata Wojna, Ernest Wyciszkiewicz

by Tomasz Sikorski

There is growing understanding among the countries engaged in the Karabakh conflict resolution that stabilisation in the region is needed. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are bearing the mounting costs of present tensions, while Russia and Turkey are more inclined to accept a change of the status quo. Under the circumstances, the European Union should pursue a more active policy, especially steps aimed at enhancing security and the level of trust near the armistice line, but without addressing the controversial question of the status of Karabakh.

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia-backed separatists has been going on since 1988. In 1992–1994 it escalated into a full-scale war, which resulted in the secession of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (RNK).populated by Armenians.from Azerbaijan. This was accompanied by forced resettlements, with RNK forces also seizing control over the zone between Nagorno-Karabakh proper and Armenia. The Russia-negotiated armistice of May 1994 has preserved the status quo, with the RNK in fact independent, but not recognised internationally.

In October 2009 the threat that the conflict might be rekindled increased following attempts to establish diplomatic relations and open the border between Armenia and Turkey, which supports Azerbaijan. Azeri-Turkish relations deteriorated after respective protocols had been signed, provisionally undermining Azerbaijan’s strategic position. The process of Armenia-Turkey normalisation was put on hold in April 2010 as a result of public protests in both countries, but this has not decreased tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh. The parliamentary elections organised in the RNK in May 2010 provoked Azerbaijan’s aggressive rhetoric, with Azeri military commanders threatening to resolve the conflict by force and sporadic exchanges of fire noted over the past few months. On the other hand, it seems that both sides understand the need for stabilisation. In 2009 the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan had talks six times and on 26 April 2010 the religious leaders of the two states met in Baku for the first time. Third parties increased their interest in the conflict as well, with both countries visited on 14–16 February by OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Kanat Saudabayev, followed on 20 May by a European Parliament resolution on the need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus; the document called for stronger UE engagement in solving frozen conflicts in the region.

The negotiations held since 1992 under the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, Russia and the USA, have been focussed on preventing an escalation of the conflict and keeping the war frozen. For a long time the status quo was beneficial for all: the RNK took advantage of the armistice to consolidate state structures, the president of Azerbaijan was able to strengthen his position within the country after the political turmoil of the early 1990s, Armenia saw the truce as good for its image, while Russia was able to use the armistice to exert pressure on the post-Soviet states of the South Caucasus. France and the U.S. were not demonstrating a strong engagement in solving the conflict, as they had joined the Minsk Group solely in order to be present in the region and to prevent Russia from calling the shots.

Armenian Perspective. The Armenian authorities perceive Russia as their most important ally and safeguard against unfriendly Azerbaijan and Turkey. Nonetheless, in 2009–2010 Armenia launched an attempt to normalise relations with Turkey on its own, also in order to enhance its position on the Karabakh question. Failure to achieve a rapprochement could mean that the Armenians might be more inclined to make concessions during future negotiations. While in the first years of the armistice the preservation of the status quo was beneficial for Armenia, the costs of the unstable situation in the region have since been rising considerably. At present, the frozen conflict multiplies the economic problems of landlocked Armenia, which is left out when planning regional infrastructural projects and which is struggling for foreign investments. Leaving the problem as it is might also impede the talks.started in July.on an association agreement with the European Union.

Azerbaijani Perspective. The process of normalising relations between Turkey and Armenia was viewed in Azerbaijan with distrust and suspicion, with the proposal to open the Armeno-Turkish border seen as Turkish treason. Azeri fears were deepened by the policy pursued by Turkey, which took advantage of its strategic transit location in an Azerbaijan-Turkey dispute over the price of energy resources. Azerbaijan’s response was swift, embracing an ostentatious improvement in relations with Russia and a search for new routes of oil and gas exports, e.g. via the Black Sea. The prospect of improving Armenian-Turkish relations is likely to make the Azerbaijani authorities more flexible in peace talks. Another argument in favour of settling the conflict is the presence of 590,000 displaced persons, mostly from the area between Karabakh and Armenia. This group is strongly revisionist, unintegrated with society and frustrated with lack of progress in talks, so the

young generation of refugees’ children might provide a natural ground for recruiters from radical or fundamentalist organisations. The scenario of Azerbaijan regaining control over RNK by force is highly unlikely, as the quantitative and qualitative potential of the joint armies of Armenia and the RNK is similar to that of Azerbaijan. Hence it is impossible for Baku to execute a blitzkrieg-type war. At the same time, the Georgian war of August 2008 demonstrated the futility of unilateral efforts to solve a conflict by force, in addition to undermining seriously the image of the parties to the conflict.

External Actors’ Perspective. The Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has been in power since 2002, is pursuing a „no problems with neighbours” policy. Hence it is trying to normalise relations with Armenia while maintaining its partnership with Azerbaijan. The Karabakh conflict curbs Turkey’s freedom of action and room for maneuver in the South Caucasus, so Turkey is likely to intensify efforts aimed at reaching a settlement on the Karabakh question. Meanwhile, Russia’s policy targetted at maintaining good relations with Armenia while keeping it isolated is no longer effective due to Armenian efforts to cooperate with Georgia, Iran and the European Union. If Turkey and the EU were to enhance their engagement in the region, Russia, with its credibility as mediator undermined after the 2008 war in Georgia, might be more willing to accept new peace initiatives and even pressure Armenia to accept them as well.

The American role in solving the conflict has been marginal from the very outset as a result of balancing between the pro-Armenian and pro-Azeri stance, with the former taking into account the position of the influential Armenian diaspora and the latter stemming from geopolitical interests badly in need of energy cooperation with Azerbaijan. As the U.S. is now focussed on the war in Afghanistan, non-proliferation of WMD and the Middle East conflict, its involvement in solving the Karabakh conflict is expected to diminish.

Recommendations for EU and NATO. The unresolved conflict results in instability in the South Caucasian states embraced by the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy and—within the ENP—the Eastern Partnership program. Failure to settle the conflict is not only detrimental for security reasons, but also corroborates the weakness of EU’s foreign policy and undermines the efficiency of EU projects aimed at economic growth, good governance and regional cooperation in the South Caucasus. It would be worthwhile for the EU to boost its engagement in the peace process as Armenia and Azerbaijan are now more willing to accept small mutual concessions, the significance of Turkey is on the rise, Russia’s approach is more constructive and the U.S. is less active. This engagement should concentrate first of all on confidence-building initiatives improving security in the RNK-controlled zone between Nagorno-Karabakh proper and Armenia. The most feasible proposal is to introduce a joint Russia-NATO security contingent there while guaranteeing the security of Armenians and right of way from Karabakh to Armenia and back. Raising the issue of RNK’s status seems premature in turn, because under the circumstances the position of the two sides can by no means be reconciled.

Poland’s policy towards the Karabakh conflict should be pursued through the European Union and OSCE. Constant pressure should be put on EU institutions to increase their interest in the region, the post of EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus should be retained and stabilising initiatives should be promoted. In bilateral relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, the policy of equal distance should be emphasised and Poland should remain impartial in the conflict.

Source - The Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs

Russia and its neighbours: Warring histories and historical responsibility

Igor Torbakov, PhD

Senior Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs

The ambiguity of the Russian official position, rooted in the inability to make a comprehensive and honest assessment of the nature of the Soviet regime, makes it extremely difficult for Moscow to approach the crucial issue of responsibility that appears to be at the heart of history wars in the post-Soviet space.

At the end of June 2010, a remarkable text appeared on the website of the Russian liberal radio station

Ekho Moskvy. Its author, Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the Russian State Duma’s Committee on Foreign Relations, suggested that it was time for Russia to elaborate what he called a comprehensive “set of principles, an ‘historical doctrine’ of sorts” that would help Moscow to disclaim, once and for all, any political, financial,legal or moral responsibility for the policies and actions of the Soviet authorities on the territories of the former USSR and the states of Eastern Europe. Kosachev’s proposal is simple, blunt and seemingly effective.

It boils down to two key points:

1) Russia fulfils all international obligations of the USSR as its successor state; however, Russia does not

recognize any moral responsibility or any legal obligations for the actions and crimes committed by the Soviet

authorities;

2) Russia does not accept any political, legal or financial claims against it for violations by the Soviet authorities of international or domestic laws in force during the Soviet period.

Clearly, Kosachev’s proposal didn’t materialize out of thin air. His idea should be placed within the broader context of Russia’s attempts at crafting and pursuing the robust “politics of history”. Like other members of the country’s ruling elite, Kosachev appears to perceive memory and history as an important ideological and political battleground: Russia’s detractors— both foreign and domestic—allegedly seek to spread interpretations of past events that are detrimental to Russia’s interests and there is an urgent need to resolutely counter these unfriendly moves.

Suffice it to recall just the most important episodes of this monumental “battle over history”. In the early 1990s, Museums of Occupation were set up in Latvia and Estonia; one of the main objectives of these museums is to highlight the political symmetry between the two totalitarian regimes that occupied the Baltics in the 20th century— German national-socialism and Soviet communism. In May 2006, a Museum of Soviet Occupation opened in Tbilisi, Georgia, following the Baltic states’ example. In May 2006, the Institute of National Memory was established in Ukraine, inspired by the Polish model. In November 2006, the Ukrainian parliament passed a law recognizing the Holodomor (the 1932-1933 disastrous famine) as genocide of the Ukrainian people perpetrated by the Soviet communist regime. 2009 saw the adoption of two international documents that couldn’t fail to rile official Moscow—a resolution of the European Parliament entitled “On European Conscience and Totalitarianism” and a resolution passed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe entitled “Divided Europe Reunited”. Both resolutions branded Nazism and Stalinism as similar totalitarian regimes, bearing equal responsibility for the outbreak of World War II and the crimes against humanity during that period.

To combat this “historiographic assault”, several key elements of the politics of history have recently been introduced in Russia: a set of officially sponsored and centrally-approved textbooks with a highly pronounced

statist interpretation of 20th century Russian history; attempts to establish a “regime of truth” using legislative means; and the creation of a bureaucratic institution to combat the “falsification of history”.

Yet all of these measures have failed to produce any tangible result— as the continuing avalanche of claims and accusations emanating from Russia’s East European neighbours seems to demonstrate. Kosachev appears to believe that at the heart of Russia’s problem is the lack of a systemic approach. Hence his suggestion to elaborate what he calls a universal “historical doctrine”.

Remarkably, Kosachev has correctly defined the core reason for Russia’s current predicament: it lies, he notes, in the simple fact that the present-day Russia is a legal successor to the Soviet Union. He also notes, again correctly, that this legal continuity has both positive and negative implications. But then, when he spells out the key points of his “historical doctrine”, he takes on a markedly contradictory stance. Russia, Kosachev suggests, can carry on as the USSR’s successor state, but is not responsible—politically, morally, financially or otherwise—for any criminal acts committed by the Soviet regime.

But this stance is untenable. As some leading scholars (such as Andrei Zubov) have long pointed out, the issue of legal continuity is the crux of the matter and this is exactly what differentiates Russia from all the other countries of Eastern Europe. While in 1991 Russia chose to become, in legal terms, the continuation of the USSR, all ex-communist countries of Eastern Europe (including some former Soviet republics) opted to re-establish historical continuity with their pre-communist state entities. Thus, if today’s Russia is a direct successor to the Soviet state—a fact that all Russia’s ruling bodies willingly accept—then it bears full responsibility for the actions and crimes committed by the Soviet regime against both its own people and foreign citizens throughout that regime’s entire history. The unwillingness to do this—which the Kosachev proposal unambiguously declares—will only raise suspicions among Russia’s neighbours.

But even more important, of course, is the issue of Russia’s own identity. Back in 1991, Russia, too, had two options: to re-establish legal continuity with the 1917 prerevolutionary Russia or choose to become a legal successor to the USSR. Interestingly, Boris Yeltsin appeared to have understood the difference between the options and the possible implications. In his memoirs, having explained the reasons for the actual choice that the Russian leadership made at the time, he then mused over what might have happened had the Russian Federation chosen to become a successor to the prerevolutionary Russia.

Russia, Yeltsin suggested, would have become a different country, living according to a different set of laws that would give priority to personality and not to the state. And he added, tellingly, “The outside world would have treated us differently, too”. 

Source - the Finnish Institute of International Affairs

The Arctic oil rush

Greenland is a land apart – where many people welcome global warming, dislike Greenpeace, and hope the arrival of Big Oil will transform their lives. But at what price to this pristine wilderness?

The fight was over almost before it began. A short, middle-aged woman had smashed her fist into the face of another female drinker, and within seconds was dragged to the door by a hulking bouncer and flung on to the streets of Nuuk. It was midnight on a Tuesday but the atmosphere in the Kristinemut bar resembled a hardcore weekend: raucous band, chaotic dancing, and more than a handful of revellers (of all ages) best described as "blotto".

Not everyone in the bar may have realised it, but these residents of Greenland's capital had good reason to celebrate. That morning, local television reported that traces of gas had been discovered by the British exploration company Cairn Energy in Baffin Bay a few hundred miles to the north-west. If these first hydrocarbon traces prove an accurate indicator of major reserves below the Arctic seabed, they may in time produce untold wealth for Greenland's population – financially dependent on Denmark – of 56,000 Inuit and other ethnic groups, clinging to existence 460 miles from the North Pole in one of the world's harshest terrains.

The bulk of this huge land is a vast – and breathtakingly beautiful – white desert. A layer of ice, 3km thick, covers 80% of the country for 12 months of the year. Even along the coastline, where the population is huddled, the black rock of the precipitous mountains and brown vegetation are only visible during the summer months. With virtually no trees and a winter temperature that can sink as low as -70C, the name Greenland is misleading – deliberately so, in fact. It was an early "marketing tool" used by Erik the Red in 982, as he tried to lure fellow Vikings from warmer climes to settle here, having failed to sell a similar message about Iceland.

These days the terrain is even bleaker (where once pigs and cattle roamed in the south of the country, now there are polar bears, seals and walruses), but this frozen and largely unexplored land will not deter today's prospectors, tempted by the possibility of an Arctic "oil rush". The kind of oil and gas reserves believed to reside in the wider Arctic region could be worth as much as $7tn, which is why all the big oil companies are queueing up to woo the Greenland government into granting them exploration licences.

Ever since the days of John D Rockefeller's Standard Oil, the oil industry has thrived on breaking open new energy frontiers – and there is no greater challenge than the Arctic, particularly in the wake of BP's Gulf of Mexico nightmare.

Environmentalists, of course, regard the exploitation of one of the last remaining areas of pristine wilderness on the planet with horror, and up in Baffin Bay, there has been an ongoing physical confrontation between a Greenpeace ship, Esperanza, and the Danish navy as it defends the Cairn Energy rig from marauding protesters. The setting could not be more symbolic: around them, glaciers and icebergs melt as a direct result of global warming, a phenomenon that will only be exacerbated should the Arctic be allowed to give up its oil and gas reserves.

Inside the Kristinemut bar, Nive Nielsen, a local singer with a growing international reputation, is decidedly sober about the implications of any major oil find in Greenland. "I guess what I would like to see is the government tread very carefully. I am worried they are rushing ahead too quickly [with oil licensing]," she says. "Most people here – possibly 80% – think this drilling can only be good for Greenland, but we have already seen the traditional ways of doing things being eroded, and people herded into [modern town-housing] blocks."

Kenni Rende, a 44-year-old shop assistant at the Nota Bene electronics shop, is more positive about the prospect. "We have always believed there was oil and gas off this island; we've been waiting for something like this to happen for decades. I hope it will provide income for Greenland, so we can finance our way to becoming a more independent nation."

His upbeat mood is, not surprisingly, shared at the Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum a few blocks away, where Henrik Stendal has been digesting the news of the Cairn find in a presentation room packed with rock samples and geological maps. "It is exciting . . . This amounts to an appetiser for all oil companies to come here and do more exploration," says Stendal, who is head of the bureau's geology department. The affable rocks specialist claims not to have known about Cairn's find until the company announced it on 24 August with a simple statement: "First hydrocarbons discovered in Baffin Bay basin by T8-1 well, which has encountered gas."

The release of drilling information is always sensitive. It can send a company's share price soaring and act as a magnet for competitors. As a result, relations between small government and Big Oil are complex. The Greenland government is keen to keep the discovery's momentum going and attract new investment; but it is also anxious not to upset Cairn and its City investors by speaking out of turn (when the Guardian quoted a foreign ministry official as saying he was "hopeful" of a positive drilling result the day before Cairn announced it, a government public relations adviser was quickly in touch to admonish me).

Cairn Energy's founder and chief executive officer is Sir Bill Gammell, a former Scottish rugby international and public-school friend of Tony Blair. His Edinburgh-based company, while not in the Shell or BP league in scale, likes to work in frontier areas and has already attracted a stream of loyal investors after striking oil in the Indian state of Rajasthan, on acreage sold to it for a song by an unusually slipshod Shell.

Speaking about Cairn's Arctic find, Gammell said he was "encouraged that we have early indications of a working hydrocarbon system with our first well in Greenland, confirming our belief in the exploration potential". Yet even such tentative enthusiasm was dampened by one worker on the rig who, asking to remain anonymous, told the Guardian that there had been laughter aboard Cairn's Stena Don drilling unit when newspapers and television began to report the discovery. "We thought the media had made it up until we saw the company's statements," said the rig worker, adding that the quantity found was little more than you might find if you drilled a hole in your back garden.

Cairn has dismissed this version of events and most industry commentators do not take it seriously. Tellingly, it is not what the majority of Greenland's politicians and public want to hear either, determined as they are to loosen their sovereign ties with Denmark and, ultimately, establish independence.

At around four times the size of Britain, Greenland is the least densely populated country in the world, and desperately dependent on fishing, a small amount of tourism, and one working gold mine. The national books are balanced courtesy of a DKK3bn (£333m) annual handout from the Danish taxpayer. While the hunting of seals and other local animals is still practised by a handful of Greenlanders, the bulk of the population finds work in the public sector – in schools, hospitals or administration. But all that would change if the oil industry moved in.

The town of Nuuk is a strange mixture of attractive clapboard houses painted in bright colours typical of the Nordic region, and drab apartment blocks with graffitied stairwells that might look more at home in the former Soviet Union. Mineral extraction – be it oil or gas, gold or diamonds – is seen as a huge opportunity by the residents here. Already, crude oil has been found leaking out of the rocks in the Disko Bay area, and offshore, Greenland's west coast is believed to possess the same basic rock formations as those on the Canadian east coast, where massive oil finds have already been made.

According to a 2009 US Geological survey, there could be 90bn barrels of oil – a third of the size of Saudi Arabia's reserves – and 5otn cubic metres of gas in the wider Arctic region. Tentative drilling has already been happening all the way from the Chukotka Sea off Alaska to the Faroe Islands north of Scotland, although some has been halted while safety agencies reconsider the risks in the light of the Deepwater Horizon spill.

Few regions, though, have been pushing as hard to attract Big Oil as Greenland. As early as this week, its government may announce the winners of new exploration licenses, with many of the big names including Shell and Statoil of Norway – but not BP – expected to begin frontier-drilling here for the first time. With the continued rise in global commodity prices, this could yet turn into a fully fledged oil rush.

And, while the Cairn gas discovery has centred attention on hydrocarbons, there is a parallel drive to uncover all sorts of precious metals including diamonds, rubies and other rare earth products. This autumn, the Greenland government will decide whether uranium for nuclear power stations could also be mined here.

Dennis Thomas, a veteran British mining prospector, is currently making his first visit to Greenland in more than 40 years, as he scouts the world for new projects. "I have seen gold prospects, iron, copper, rare earths," he says. "It's all very early stage, but the time is right in terms of the economics and the willingness of the government [to open up]."

But it is not going to be easy. While global commodity prices have boomed over the last decade due to demand from countries such as China, Greenland remains a high-cost place to mine, not least because of the treacherous weather conditions. "You have to bring in everything by helicopter and you might have only a three-month season to do the work," Thomas says. But the prospector, who lives near Yeovil in Somerset but works for financial and mining investors around the world, still describes Greenland as an "exciting" prospect.

As for the islanders themselves, they are very focused on self-determination and self-sufficiency. Unemployment in some towns now runs as high as 15%, and the standard of food in the shops is often rudimentary. And while the number of people living below the poverty line was last measured at 9% – lower than in the United Kingdom – the suicide rate here increased from a historically very low level in the 70s to one of the highest in the world by the mid-90s, at 107 per 100,000 people.

Clearly, politicians in Nuuk regard economic and political independence as the path to a better future for their people. (This, remember, is a country that has already stuck its nose up to the west by leaving a club that everyone wants to join: the European Union.) But while they want to see more oil exploration – and hopefully production – they also insist their safety regulations meet the world's toughest standards, aware that most Greenlanders fear the health issues that could arise from an influx of oil companies.

The politicians' and public's views on global warming – another key reason for Greenpeace's presence in Baffin Bay – are more mixed, however. Global warming might be threatening to harpoon the local hunting way of life, but it will also lessen the hardships of living in a country where burying dead bodies in the frozen ground can be problematic. The melting of the local ice cap, which currently covers 80% of the country's land mass, will raise sea levels in countries such as Bangladesh and the Maldives – but it could open up further economic opportunities in Greenland. In future, Nuuk might act as a lucrative stop-off point for ships traversing the world via the currently iced-up North West Passage, and also make it a centre of onshore mineral mining.

"Yes, we are gaining more land, you can say that," says Stendal. And a spokesman from the Greenland Natural Institute of Resources and Climate Change talks about the possibility of "golden years" ahead, as the temperature warms up.

This is not the only unexpected view that foreign visitors encounter in Nuuk. Greenpeace, which has hero status in most capitals of the world, is fairly unpopular here, even among the young – not so much because the environmental group is opposed to an oil industry that could be good for Greenland's political self-determination, but because it once opposed seal hunting. Greenpeace now says its campaign was only ever aimed at "unsustainable" activities in Canada, but it admits that Greenland got caught in the slipstream, because any kind of seal hunting was deemed unacceptable by a north European public. As a result, what was a healthy export trade of the distinctive and mottled skins has been stopped in its tracks. Seal skins still cover rows of seats in the otherwise rudimentary airport lounges around this vast country, but only locals will buy a seal-skin waistcoat.

So, while a top team of daredevil environmentalists has led (only temporarily successful) raids on the Cairn rig, others have been making an equally brave attempt to appease vocal critics in Nuuk – without, apparently, much success.

Political correctness as prescribed by the west is not something that hangs heavy in the priorities of the Greenlander. The tourism industry on the island is built around the top end of the market, not least because it costs a pretty penny to fly here, involving a transit in Denmark or Iceland. Once here, visitors are still forced to move around by plane because no towns are connected by road – in fact, there are only two traffic lights on the entire island, a vast country of 840,000 square miles.

It is hardly an easy place for Nive Nielsen to fulfil her musical ambitions. Despite having recorded in Britain, she must still shrug off depressing attempts to label her Deer Children band "eskimo rock", and ignorant questions such as "How do you plug in an electric guitar in an igloo?" But Nielsen, and her fellow Greenlanders too, are determined to shape their own destiny – with or without oil.

Source - Guardian

Indonesia And The Challenge Of Papuan Separatism

If there are any symbols of Papuans’ continued quest and determination for sovereign independence1, it is their continued attachment to their flag, the Morning Star or Bintang Kejora (in Indonesian), their Anthem, Hai Tanahku Papua (in Indonesian) or Oh, My Land Papua, written by a Dutch missionary in the 1930s and the continued existence of the OPM, Papua Independence Movement since 1964. The Morning Star was first formally unveiled on 1 December 1961, symbolising the onset of the Republic of West Papua and flew till October 1962, when the former Dutch colony was transferred to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority through a deal brokered by the United States, mainly to prevent Indonesia from joining the Soviet Camp during the Cold War.

Indonesia took control of the territory in the following year and formally incorporated West Papua, renamed West Irian, into Indonesia in 1969, recognised by the United Nations. However, Papuans have continued to challenge the territory’s integration into Indonesia and a bloody struggle has ensued ever since, with supporters of Papuan independence claiming that more than 100,000 Papuans have been killed by the Indonesian military. The violence has continued right to the present period and it remains illegal to fly the Bintang Kejora in Indonesia and many Papuans continue to be incarcerated for doing so.

Anatomy of Papua

Located on the easternmost part of Indonesia, geographically it constitutes one-fifth of the country but only has a population of 3 million (of which the natives constitute only 50 per cent). Indonesia, where 90 per cent of the people are Muslim, has a population of nearly 240 million. Papua is a largely Christian territory, where the Protestants constitute the majority, followed by the Catholics and then Muslims. However, tribalism is extremely dominant with more than 265 tribes representing the Putra Daerah or Sons of the Soil (natives). Yet, the territory is extremely rich in natural resources, especially oil, gas, gold and copper. It is also geo-strategically important, bordering on land with Papua New Guinea and fronting the Pacific Ocean.

Explaining Papuans’ Desire for Independence

Even though Indonesia declared independence in August 1945 and had to fight the Dutch to gain complete sovereignty in December 1949, the Dutch only surrendered Papua in October 1962. This represents an important historical anomaly as Papua remained for another 12 years as a Dutch colony compared to the rest of Indonesia. This provided the Dutch ample time to develop a local Papuan elite that was committed to independence and hence the importance of the Morning Star, National Anthem, not to mention a rudimentary Parliament that was formed in Jayapura in 1961. However, due to the Cold War, President Kennedy succeeded in pressurising the Dutch to surrender the territory in 1962 and Indonesia, with the support of the West, legitimately gained control of the territory by 1969. However, this was largely undertaken against the wishes of the Papuan elites and hence the continued struggle for Merdeka or independence ever since.

From the perspective of Papuans, there are a number of grievances that have provided a catalyst and triggered their demands for independence. First, the sense of historical injustice when Papua was handed over to Indonesia by the Dutch in 1962 without consulting Papuan elites and later, the fraudulent manner in which the referendum, called Act of Free Choice (but what the Papuans call Act of No Choice) was held in 1969. Thus, for the Papuans, Indonesia is an illegal colonizer and the territory’s status should be reviewed through a referendum. Second, gross unhappiness in the manner Jakarta has flooded the territory with non-Papuans, mostly Muslims, thereby creating what Papuans refer to as ‘demographic and cultural genocide’ and where they are fast becoming minorities in their own land. This has also intensified social-cultural conflicts between the natives (Putra Daerah) and the transmigrants (Pendatangs), the latter usually backed by officialdom. Third, demographically, Papuans feel discriminated against, with the majority Malay Indonesians looking down on the Melanesian Papuans (for their dress code, eating and drinking habits, etc) and worst still, most privileges being given to the former at the expense of the latter.

Fourth, there is the rising impoverisation of the Papuans. Despite the immense wealth of the territory, Papuans are among the poorest in Indonesia. Instead, the wealth is sucked out to benefit non-Papuans and foreigners, who in alliance with Jakarta, continue to benefit from Jakarta’s rule over the territory. The operation of Freeport McMoran, the world’s largest gold mine operator, is a case in point. Fifth, Papuans are also in rage as the territory’s environment has been pillaged and more important, the forest, which for the Papuans is not only a community property but also important religiously, being plundered. Finally, most blatant of all, has been the immense human rights violations undertaken continuously by almost every government in power in Jakarta since the days of Sukarno. Papuans have continued to suffer as Indonesia has continued to treat the territory as a colony and where any form of opposition, peaceful or otherwise, is dealt with brutally. Indonesians refer to this as the ‘security approach’ to development and Indonesia’s democratization in 1998 has not really altered much as far as Papua is concerned. Many Papuan leaders have been murdered by the Indonesian military, such as Theys Eluay in November 2001. The continued existence, despite weaknesses, of the Papua Independence Movement, is a testimony of Papuans’ willingness to take to arms to achieve their goal of independence. In short, injustice, intolerance, exploitation and violence are the main drivers that have motivated Papuans to seek an alternative future for themselves.

Why is Indonesia Unwilling to give in to Papuan Separatists?

Papua is not only strategically vital, being a land, air and maritime border zone, but probably more important is the immense wealth it posseses. Jakarta depends on Papua for the bulk of its revenue and Papua is probably Indonesia’s most important ‘golden goose’. It would be a strategic and economic disaster if the territory were to be lost. Also, Indonesians view Papua as an integral part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and any leader even contemplating giving independence to Papua would be viewed as a national traitor, a price President Habibie paid for East Timor’s independence. At the same time, despite Papuans’ unhappiness, the bulk of the international community continues to support Indonesia’s ownership of Papua given that Indonesia is much more important than Papua. Jakarta leaders have also argued that to give in to Papuans’ demand for independence would open the Pandora’s Box leading others to demand likewise, resulting in the break-up of Indonesia. In the final analysis, it is the simple issue of political, economic and military asymmetry, and where the Papuans are simply not in a position to challenge and dislodge Indonesia. As such, while Indonesia is unprepared to abandon the territory and most Papuans are unhappy to remain in Indonesia, the impasse cannot be broken due to the paralysis both parties find themselves in.

Indonesia’s Peace Overtures

Following the collapse of Suharto’s New Order and the onset of democratic Indonesia, Jakarta has made peace with other separatists, be it in East Timor (through a referendum leading to independence) or with Aceh (leading to greater autonomy and local rule). In the same vein, Jakarta has peddled what is referred to as Autonomi Khusus or Special Autonomy in 2001, to meet half way Papuan grievances and demands, and rejected a referendum a la East Timor as was demanded by Papuan activists, fearing a break up Indonesia. While Papuans have gained much in terms of Special Autonomy funds (5 trillion Indonesia Rupiahs to date), the territory remains backward as the bulk of the money is used for administration and pilfered through corruption. At the same time, despite agreeing to a Special Autonomy status for Papua, Jakarta has continuously undermined it. First, without consulting the local administrative bodies, as was provided for in the Special Autonomy arrangements, Jakarta divided Papua into three administrative provinces even though later the Constitutional Court deemed this illegal but two provinces remain in operation today. Second, despite agreeing to permit Papuans to display their cultural attributes, Jakarta reneged on this, arguing that it was promoting separatism, especially with regard to the display of the Morning Star and singing of Hai Tanahku Papua. In short, Papuans continue to view Jakarta in bad faith and this is the main reason why the Cendrawasih (Bird of Paradise) symbolising Papua, continues to fear the Garuda, symbolising Indonesia.

Papuans Remain Unsatisfied and Suspicious

While some Papuan elites accepted the Special Autonomy proposal, eventually, most in Papua were unhappy as hardliners in Jakarta believed that too much had already been given to the Papuans and that if no ‘roll-back’ takes place it will only be a matter of time before Papuan independence becomes a reality. Also, most Papuans do not see any major improvement in their livelihood, especially the violence against them by the military, police and intelligence apparatus. Instead, many Papuans would prefer to internationalise their plight and seek a third party to settle the issue as they do not trust the Jakarta elites and Indonesians in general. Jakarta, instead, realising that the Papuans are being lost, has tried to launch various ‘peace talks’, organised by the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Legal and Security Affairs, the Indonesian Intelligence Agency, Home Affairs and even Indonesian Resilience Agency (linked to the Defence Ministry) but with no success. Incumbent President Bambang Yudhoyono has tasked the Indonesian Institute of Sciences to draw up a ‘road map’ for Papua’s future, but again little progress has been made. All these Indonesian measures are aimed at circumventing internationalization of the Papuan issue, which most Papuan elites demand but which Jakarta has been unwilling to agree even though with regard to the Aceh settlement, a third party, with the support of the Norwegian Government, succeeded in making a breakthrough. Papuans are hoping for a similar opportunity so as to ensure that the agreement reached between Jakarta and themselves will be honoured.

In the meantime, as the deadlock continues, Papua continues to burn. Violence by the security apparatus against Papuans continues to be reported, with the military and police hunting the new separatist leader, Goliat Tabuni, who succeeded Kelly Kwalik, who was shot dead in December 2009 by security forces. With little or no hope of progress, with the abuses and violence continuing, the traditional separatist leaders are also losing their grip over their followers, with many of these leaders accused of being covert operatives for Jakarta. Amidst the continuing violence, Jakarta is rumoured to be thinking of creating additional provinces in the territory, in a traditional game of divide and rule, to weaken Papuan nationalism and quest for independence. This has, instead, led to the rise of new radical and hard-line younger leaders who are prepared to raise the stakes through greater violence, to make Jakarta pay more dearly, and more importantly bring the fight to Jakarta so that Indonesians and the world community will pay greater attention to their plight. In short, the HAMAS of Papua seems to be surfacing and if Jakarta continues to neglect Papuans’ demands, the struggle is likely to worsen, at great cost of life to both Papuans and Indonesians as a whole, and where the international community, with stakes in Papua and Indonesia, will also be affected. Not only will Indonesia’s democracy but more importantly the very idea of Indonesia as a unitary state will probably be under stress and test.