How Myanmar Liberates Asia

Myanmar's ongoing liberalization and its normalization of relations with the outside world have the possibility of profoundly affecting geopolitics in Asia – and all for the better.

Geographically, Myanmar dominates the Bay of Bengal. It is where the spheres of influence of China and India overlap. Myanmar is also abundant in oil, natural gas, coal, zinc, copper, precious stones, timber and hydropower, with some uranium deposits as well. The prize of the Indo-Pacific region, Myanmar has been locked up by dictatorship for decades, even as the Chinese have been slowly stripping it of natural resources. Think of Myanmar as another Afghanistan in terms of its potential to change a region: a key, geo-strategic puzzle piece ravaged by war and ineffective government that, if only normalized, would unroll trade routes in all directions.

Ever since China's Yuan (ethnic Mongol) dynasty invaded Myanmar in the 13th century, Myanmar has been under the shadow of a Greater China, with no insurmountable geographic barriers or architectural obstacles like the Great Wall to separate the two lands -- though the Hengduan Shan range borders the two countries. At the same time, Myanmar has historically been the home of an Indian business community -- a middleman minority in sociological terms -- that facilitated the British hold on Myanmar as part of a Greater British India.

But if Myanmar continues on its path of reform by opening links to the United States and neighboring countries, rather than remaining a natural resource tract to be exploited by China, Myanmar will develop into an energy and natural resource hub in its own right, uniting the Indian subcontinent, China and Southeast Asia all into one fluid, organic continuum. And although Chinese influence in Myanmar would diminish in relative terms, China would still benefit immensely. Indeed, Kunming, in China's southern Yunnan province, would become the economic capital of Southeast Asia, where river and rail routes from Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam would converge.

Much of this infrastructure activity is already under way. At Ramree Island off Myanmar's northwestern Arakan coast, the Chinese are constructing pipelines to take oil and natural gas from Africa, the Persian Gulf and the Bay of Bengal across the heart of Myanmar to Kunming. The purpose will be to alleviate China's dependence on the Strait of Malacca, through which four-fifths of its crude oil imports pass at present. There will also be a high-speed rail line roughly along this route by 2015.

India, too, is constructing an energy terminal at Sittwe, north of Ramree, on Myanmar's coast, that will potentially carry offshore natural gas northwest through Bangladesh to the vast demographic inkblot that is the Indian state of West Bengal. The Indian pipeline would actually split into two directions, with another proposed route going to the north around Bangladesh. Commercial goods will follow along new highways to be built to India. Kolkata, Chittagong and Yangon, rather than being cities in three separate countries, will finally be part of one Indian Ocean world.

The salient fact here is that by liberating Myanmar, India's hitherto landlocked northeast, lying on the far side of Bangladesh, will also be opened up to the outside. Northeast India has suffered from bad geography and underdevelopment, and as a consequence it has experienced about a dozen insurgencies in recent decades. Hilly and jungle-covered, northeast India is cut off from India proper by backbreakingly poor Bangladesh to the west and by Myanmar, hitherto a hermetic and undeveloped state, to the east. But Myanmar's political opening and economic development changes this geopolitical fact, because both India's northeast and Bangladesh will benefit from Myanmar's political and economic renewal.

With poverty reduced somewhat in all these areas, the pressure on Kolkata and West Bengal to absorb economic refugees will be alleviated. This immeasurably strengthens India, whose land borders with semi-failed states within the subcontinent (Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh) has undermined its ability to project political and military power outward into Asia and the Middle East. More broadly, a liberalized Myanmar draws India deeper into Asia, so that India can more effectively balance against China.

But while the future beckons with opportunities, the present is still not assured. The political transition in Myanmar has only begun, and much can still go wrong. The problem, as it was in Yugoslavia and Iraq, is regional and ethnic divides.

Myanmar is a vast kingdom organized around the central Irrawaddy River Valley. The ethnic Burman word for this valley is Myanmar, hence the official name of the country. But a third of the population is not ethnic Burman, even as regionally based minorities in friable borderlands account for seven of Myanmar's 14 states. The hill areas around the Irrawaddy Valley are populated by Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karen and Karenni peoples, who also have their own armies and irregular forces, which have been battling the Burman-controlled national army since the early Cold War period.

Worse, these minority-populated hill regions are ethnically divided from within. For example, the Shan area is also home to Was, Lahus, Paos, Kayans and other tribal peoples. All these groups are products of historical migrations from Tibet, China, India, Bangladesh, Thailand and Cambodia, so that the Chin in western Myanmar have almost nothing in common with the Karen in eastern Myanmar. Nor is there a community of language and culture between the Shans and the ethnic Burmans, except for their Buddhist religion. As for the Arakanese, heirs to a cosmopolitan seaboard civilization influenced by Hindu Bengal, they feel particularly disconnected from the rest of Myanmar and compare their plight to disenfranchised minorities in the Middle East and Africa.

In other words, simply holding elections is not enough if all elections do is bring ethnic Burmans to power who do not compromise with the minorities. The military came to power in Myanmar in 1962 to control the minority-populated borderlands around the Irrawaddy Valley. The military has governed now for half a century. Myanmar has few functioning institutions that are not military-dominated. A system with generous power awarded to the minorities must now be constructed from scratch; peaceful integration of restive minorities requires vibrant federal institutions.

Myanmar, it is true, is becoming less repressive and more open to the outside world. But that in and of itself does not make for a viable institutionalized state. In sum, for Myanmar to succeed, even with civilians in control, the military will have to play a significant role for years to come, because it is mainly officers who know how to run things.

But given its immense natural resources and sizable population of 48 million, if Myanmar can build pan-ethnic institutions in coming decades it could come close to being a midlevel power in its own right -- something that would not necessarily harm Indian and Chinese interests, and, by the way, would unleash trade throughout Asia and the Indian Ocean world.

Source - Stratfor

The ongoing battle for gay rights in the Arab world

Posted By Brian Whitaker

When the European parliament issued a critical report on Egypt's human rights record in 2008, the Mubarak regime responded with nationalistic fury. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, sided with Europe. "Respect of human rights is now a concern for all peoples," its parliamentary spokesman, Hussein Ibrahim, declared at the time. 

That Islamist movements, or at least the more mainstream ones, should take an interest in human rights is not especially surprising. They have, after all, experienced repression at first hand and had years to reflect upon it. There are some obvious limits, though. While acknowledging universal rights up to a point, they still hanker after cultural relativism. Ibrahim for his part added an important rider, that "each country has its own particulars" -- and made very clear that in Egypt's case the Brotherhood excludes gay rights.

It's a similar story in Tunisia now where the moderately Islamist Ennahda party dominates the post-revolution government. Samir Dilou, the country's first human rights minister (and a member of Ennahda) caused an outcry from activists last month by saying on television that sexual orientation is not a human right and described homosexuality as a perversion requiring medical treatment. Amnesty International quickly sought to disabuse him, pointing out in a letter that "homosexuality stopped being seen as an illness or a "perversion" by world medical organizations and associations decades ago."

Dilou's remarks, though, confused and homophobic as they might seem, also suggest that Islamists -- some of them at least -- are beginning to shift their ground. He didn't, for example, invoke religious scripture to denounce homosexuality as one of the most heinous sins known to man or suggest that gay people should be put to death, as many Islamic scholars have previously done. "We are not inciting anybody against homosexuals," his press secretary said later, but "Tunisia's distinctiveness as an Arab-Muslim society must be respected."

Unintentionally, perhaps, Dilou's remarks also raised a tricky question for Tunisia's "distinctive" society. If homosexuality is now to be regarded as an illness rather than a sin, how can they justify continuing to criminalize it, with punishments of up to three years in jail for offenders?

The "sickness versus sin" debate is a familiar if futile one, but sometimes a necessary step in adjusting to reality -- an attempt to find some middle ground between moralistic rejection of homosexuality and acceptance. To those who can't accept gay people the way they are, the idea of "curing" them can seem more enlightened than punishing them, and some societies have hovered for a time between the two. Britain in the 1950s, for instance, provided "treatment" for gay men (sometimes even in the form of chemical castration) as an accompaniment, or sometimes an alternative, to prison.

Arab societies today are in a similar position. Discovering a gay son or daughter in their midst, some families react punitively and throw them out of the house. Others send them to psychiatrists. Which they choose is partly a matter of class and partly a matter of how "traditional" or "modern" the family consider themselves to be.

Same-sex acts are illegal in most Arab countries, and even in those where they are not other laws can be used -- such as the law against "habitual debauchery" in Egypt. With a few exceptions, though, the authorities do not actively seek out people to prosecute. The cases that come to court often do so by accident or for unrelated reasons. This is mainly a result of denial: large numbers of prosecutions are to be avoided since that would cast doubt on the common official line that "we don't have gay people here."

 To continue denying that gay Arabs exist, though, is increasingly difficult. Thanks to the internet, young Arabs who experience same-sex attractions can now find information that helps to explain their feelings and gives them a sense of identity, as well as providing the means to contact others of a similar disposition. Gay activism in Arab countries is still on a relatively small scale, but it is growing. The Lebanese LGBT organization, Helem, has been functioning openly in Beirut for almost 10 years now and has won some recognition from the government for its work on sexual health. There are numerous gay Arab blogs and websites, and the latest addition in Tunisia is a magazine called "Gayday".

Inevitably, this draws a response from those who are fearful of change -- sometimes a violent one. In post-Saddam Iraq, men suspected of being gay, or simply not "masculine" enough, have been killed by vigilante squads and the number probably runs into the hundreds. The authorities turn a blind eye while newspapers provide incitement with articles condemning "fashionable" (i.e. western) hairstyles and clothes. Many Arabs blame the West for spreading homosexuality and other forms of "immorality" but also look to the West for solutions. A series of articles at IslamOnline (an Egyptian-based website supervised from Qatar by the famous cleric, Youssef al-Qaradawi) provided what was claimed to be a scientific look at homosexuality, based on the idea that sexual orientation is a choice which can also be "corrected". Its main source for this was not Islamic teaching but the National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH), a fringe psychiatric organization in the United States which promotes "sexual reorientation therapy."

Such arguments may offer a rationale for not punishing homosexuality but they cannot offer a genuine way forward. The arguments themselves are already thoroughly discredited and adopting them is nothing more than an avoidance mechanism, postponing the day when fundamental questions will have to be addressed.

The core of the Arab Spring is a revolt against authoritarian rule, but to bring real change the struggle cannot be limited to merely overthrowing regimes; it also has to tackle authoritarianism in society more widely. Doing that is more about changing attitudes and ways of thinking than politics: even as dictators fall, the Mubaraks of the mind are yet to be confronted. Attitudes towards gay rights are therefore an important measure of how far, or not, a society has moved from authoritarianism. Gay rights in the Middle East are not simply about gay people; they are intimately bound up with questions of personal liberty, the proper role of governments, and the influence of religion. Demands for gay rights add to the broader pressure for change and, conversely, progress in these other areas can ease the path towards gay rights.

Criminalization of homosexuality, for example, reflects abhorrence of the act but also a philosophy of government that seeks to regulate people's behavior in matters that ought to be no concern of the state. This applies at many levels, not just sex -- from the imposition of dress codes in some countries to the notion that publishing a newspaper or establishing an NGO requires permission from the government.

As far as religious attitudes to homosexuality are concerned, the debates in Islam are very similar to those in Christianity and largely boil down to a question of how believers interpret the scripture. So far, Muslims have generally been more resistant than Christians to admitting the possibility of new scriptural interpretations. One reason is that the "doors of ijtihad" (independent interpretation rather than dogmatic acceptance of established views) have long been considered closed. Another is insistence on ahistorical readings of the Qur'an -- the idea that its injunctions are valid for all times and all places and cannot be modified in the light of changing times and circumstances.

To successfully make an Islamic case for gay rights, those barriers have to be broken. Again, though, the key point is not homosexuality itself but the underlying principle: a more open and questioning approach to religious teaching unblocks the road to many other things.

While the calls for freedom heard during the first year of the Arab Spring have been mainly directed against unaccountable governments -- a demand, in a sense, for collective liberty -- there is also an undercurrent seeking liberty at a more personal level. This is a fundamental issue but one that Arab societies are reluctant to recognize because of the value placed on pretensions of unity (national, cultural, and religious) and conformity with social norms.

The rights of minorities are rarely considered seriously and, if they are discussed in public at all, it's usually to emphasize how harmoniously everyone is getting along. When conflicts break out -- as between Christians and Muslims in Egypt -- they are quickly hushed up rather than being examined and addressed. At the root of this is an aversion to fitna or social strife -- a feeling that difference is a problem and a source of embarrassment. The idea that diversity has some intrinsic value, and that it can enrich a society if handled properly, has not yet taken hold. Overcoming that is one of the main challenges for ethnic and religious minorities, along with those who are outsiders for sexual or other reasons.

Another huge challenge for the future is entrenched and continued patriarchy. Arab leaders personify it, but it is imbued throughout society and built on rigidly-defined gender roles in which traditional concepts of "manliness" are highly prized. Intentionally or not, gay people undermine that simply by asserting their presence -- as do women.

In the meantime, of course, Arabs are preoccupied with more broadly rendered and elemental struggles in Syria and elsewhere. But in this the question of gay rights cannot be set aside indefinitely. At some point it will have to be recognized as a part of the process of change, and inseparable from it.

Brian Whitaker is the author of Unspeakable Love: Gay and Lesbian Life in the Middle East (Saqi Books and University of California Press)

Foreign Policy

The Rise of Qatar

The upheavals in the Arab world have done much to highlight Qatar's rising prominence and its policy of active involvement in most of the areas of regional unrest. This policy – a mixture of opportunism and ambition – together with tremendous economic power and the willingness to use it for political ends, as well as the weakness of major centers of power in the region and beyond, enable the emirate's entry into the vacuum that has been created and the emergence of its new political status.

Qatar’s economic strength is a direct result of its natural gas reserves. Currently the largest exporter in the world of natural gas (LNG), the emirate has the largest natural gas reserves in the world after Russia and Iran. This coveted resource has ensured that Qatar’s 250,000 citizens (out of about one million residents) have the highest per capita gross income in the world, with the extraordinary growth rate of more than 18 percent in 2011.

Alongside this economic clout, the ruling al-Thani family has created an enormously influential tool in the form of the al-Jazeera television network, which since its launch in 1996 has become an effective tool in the emirate’s foreign policy. The network has long enjoyed large audiences in the Middle East, and the revolts in the region only increased its popularity. Furthermore, the network is a key instrument for gaining state influence. The network adapts the nature of its reports so as to curry favor with certain leaders, even outside the Arab world, and criticizes those who recognize the impact the station has on public opinion – as a means of applying pressure to change positions vis-à-vis Qatar. Indeed, more favorable TV coverage of the Saudi royal household on al-Jazeera proved itself to be valuable in improving Qatar-Saudi relations.

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Al-Jazeera gives the conflicts within the Arab world a great deal of exposure, and this in itself provides the ruling dynasty with much immunity against criticism of the lack of democracy in the emirate. The events of the
"Arab spring" placed all the royal households of the Arab world, including that of Qatar, is a difficult position. On the one hand, all are trying to preserve the traditional regime and the absolute control of internal political processes; on the other hand, there is an impetus to adopt a position that ostensibly identifies with the masses that took to the streets to protest corruption and oppression. Significantly, al-Jazeera director Wadah Khanfar, who had made a name for himself as an ardent supporter of democratic processes and the involvement of civil society in the Arab world (as well as being a supporter of Islamic movements, including Hamas) was already ousted in September 2009, in order to ensure network obedience to the emir. Not coincidentally his successor is a member of the al-Thani tribe.

Qatar’s involvement in the Arab world over the last decade is impressive. In the crisis in Yemen, Qatar served alongside other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council as a mediator and arranged the ouster (though with good terms) of former President Saleh. Among Arab states, it leads (with considerable Saudi backing) the activism regarding the civil war in Syria; leaders do not even deny that they are sending weapons and major financial aid to the Syrian opposition. Naturally these arms shipments are raising important questions, such as where were the weapons bought, how do they reach their destinations, is Qatar getting encouragement, support, or cooperation from other states that are not interested in being revealed as actively assisting the Syrian rebels, and more. Qatar is also involved in the establishment of the new government in Tunisia and perhaps more than any other Arab entity helped topple Qaddafi’s regime.

It pushed for NATO military action in Libya and even sent (in addition to the UAE) six fighter jets as symbolic assistance to the NATO effort to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya. Qatar was the first Arab state to recognize the rebel government of Libya, it sold oil in its name, and it supplied it with extensive economic and military aid. It trained and equipped the opposition forces and even sent its own forces to help with the actual fighting. This policy enabled Qatar to divert attention away from what has been happening in the Gulf and prove it is a responsible member of  the international community. From its perspective, it has already reaped the benefits of its investment: Western leaders have been effusive in their praise of Qatar’s act of moral leadership.

The emirate’s recent involvement in the inter-Palestinian conflict is also noteworthy, and it has at least temporarily taken the place of Egypt, which is preoccupied with its own internal issues, as the primary mediator between Fatah and Hamas. The framework agreement achieved on February 6, 2012 between Fatah and Hamas was signed in Doha, Qatar’s capital, and bears its name. Qatar also mediated between Jordan and Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, and the Qatari heir to the throne attended the meeting between the King Abdullah of Jordan and Mashal.

In late February 2012, the Emir of Qatar announced a new initiative calling for an international investigation of all Israeli activity in Jerusalem since 1967 designed to “erase its Muslim and Arab sites.” The Emir called on the participants of the Doha International Conference for Defending and Protecting Jerusalem to demand that the UN Security Council convene a committee to investigate the issue. This initiative will earn Qatar more bonus points in the Arab street – points it needs because of its policy towards Syria – though the initiative’s chances of realization are very slim.

Qatar’s public activism on the Palestinian-Israeli issue has hurt Israel. Qatar’s connections with entities such as Iran and Hamas – connections that, in its view, immunize it against harm from those same elements – led Israel in March 2011 to sever its ties with Qatar and close the diplomatic mission in Doha, forbid Qatari passport bearers from visiting the West Bank, and stop the cooperation between Qatar and Israel’s security industry. 

Nonetheless, Qatar has not hidden its willingness to maintain open relations with Israel on condition that Jerusalem prove its serious commitment – in Qatar’s view – to the political process, a low threshold condition compared to the terms posed by the rest of the Arab world for establishing open relations with Israel.

Qatar’s investments in East Asia, Europe, and the United States in infrastructure projects, real estate, financial institutions, and even soccer clubs are turning the emirate into a key player with influence in these arenas. In the annals of modern history, it is hard to find a similar instance of so tiny a nation implementing a foreign policy of such high profile. For the sake of comparison, Luxembourg has similar statistical characteristics but its ambitions – and its political influence – are far more humble.

Qatar excels in identifying processes and trends in the region and beyond and is quick to confront them. For Qatar, the rapid identification with trends in Arab public opinion is necessary in order to maintain its security, as long as these trends do not reach its own doorstep or threaten its relations with its stronger neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Iran. This was true in the case of the Arab spring and the key role Qatar played in its events. At home too, Qatar is trying to preempt the criticism that might be leveled against it. Emir Hamad Ben Khalifa recently announced that for the first time in the nation’s history he would hold elections for the Qatari Shura Council in the second half of 2013. According to him, in light of the huge changes in the region, pacifying messages are not enough; it is necessary to promote ongoing reforms. The promise to hold elections will allow Qatar to weather at least the next few months peacefully. Accordingly, and spurred primarily by survival instincts, the emirate can continue to enjoy political and economic stability and furnish political and economic support for the radical forces in the region, while taking advantage of the leadership vacuum left by larger nations to promote its own particular agenda.

Guzansky, Yoel and Eran, Oded
Jerusalem Post