Crimea: Next Flashpoint in the European Neighbourhood?

• Factors leading to possible conflicts are increasing in Crimea, raising the question of whether Crimea will be the next flashpoint in Europe’s neighbourhood.
• Unresolved economic problems and bad governance are giving rise to conflicts between the Slav and Tatar
populations of Crimea.
• Ukraine’s central government has less influence than Russia in Crimea, feeding grounds for contestation of Ukraine’s sovereignty over the peninsula.
• The EU must develop a long-term conflict prevention strategy based on dialogue, aid, investments and prospective Ukrainian accession.

The Russia-Georgia war over South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008 has provoked debate over the need for a more active EU engagement regarding conflict prevention in the Eastern neighbourhood. Voices in the East and West have drawn scenarios for similar tensions in Crimea in Ukraine.

THE CHALLENGE
Although Ukraine is recognised as stable in contrast with its neighbours, a number of factors indicate that Crimea could be the next flashpoint in Europe’s neighbourhood. Internally, the territory suffers poor and corrupt governance, unresolved economic and social problems and increased tensions in relations between the Slavic majority and the Tatar minority. Externally, Russia is expanding its influence in the region. There is an ethnically Russian majority and the Russian fleet is stationed at Sevastopol harbour. This contrasts with Kyiv’s ineffective governance of the region and tensions between the Ukrainian and Crimean authorities which exacerbate the situation. Instruments of long term conflict prevention have not been directed at Crimea. Neither the United States nor the EU has specifically targeted Crimea with its aid programmes. The UNDP programme in Crimea is the most important of the few exceptions. This “Crimea Integration and Development Programme”, financed by a pool of government donors including Canada, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden (as the only EU member), focuses on areas such as democratic governance, economic development in rural areas, tolerance through education and human security monitoring. Another UNDP programme, which has been supported by the EU since 2008, is aimed at promoting local development through community mobilisation. Some new EU member states (Poland, the Czech Republic) and private donors (the Soros Foundation) pay some attention to civil society support in Crimea within their country programmes for Ukraine. Crimea is not targeted in the political dialogue between Ukraine and the EU. The European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan between Ukraine and the EU only touches upon regional development and the continuation of administrative and local government reforms. The implementation of these commitments is poor, however. The OSCE and the Council of Europe focus on Crimea only through the prism of minority rights protection. Due to the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, as well as internal political tensions in Ukraine, Western democracies are revisiting their policies on conflict prevention in Europe’s neighbourhood. The Americans have also started to improve their image through investment promotion and social projects after the anti-NATO and anti-American protests in Feodosia in 2006. Nevertheless, the idea of opening a US Consulate in Crimea has met with resistance from the Crimean Parliament. Following a similar path, several EU member states and the European Commission recently came up with a proposal for a Joint Cooperation Initiative in Crimea. Its objective is to mobilise resources for the development of Crimea while raising the EU’s profile in the region. The EU aims at harmonising bilateral and Community assistance with a clear division of labour. Participating EU member states will be responsible for a given priority sector (e.g. environment, civil society, economic development etc.).

The central role in the implementation will be given to the UNDP. So far, mainly northern EU members (Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK), Germany and several new member states (Poland, Hungary, Lithuania) have adhered to the initiative. No similar effort is being made within the recently launched Eastern Partnership, however. While a Czech proposal called for the Eastern Partnership to focus on the frozen conflicts, little of substance was included. The Commission limited its offer to dealing with the conflicts through better integration of the Eastern neighbours into the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy, as well as setting up an early warning mechanism, cooperation on arms exports and involving civil society organisations in confidence building in areas of protracted conflict.

FRATERNITY VERSUS FRAGILITY
Crimea is the most distinct and complicated region of Ukraine due to its history, ethnic composition, cultural legacy and constitutional status. It is the only Ukrainian region where Russians form the major ethnic group representing 58 per cent of the population, followed by 24 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians, and 12 per cent of Crimean Tatars who had been forcibly expelled to Central Asia by Stalin in 1940s and began to return since the early 1990s. Belarusians, Armenians, Jews, Azeris, Greeks, Bulgarians, Germans (together around 5 per cent) add further diversity. Crimea is granted political autonomy by the Constitution of Ukraine and this status is confirmed in the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (hereafter the ARC). It is the only region of Ukraine which has such an arrangement. Crimea has its own parliament, which appoints and designates a prime minister with the consent of the President of Ukraine.

The most spoken language is Russian, which the Crimean Constitution grants official status. In fact, Russian is the sole language used in the public administration, the media and the educational system in Crimea. Although Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar have the same status, these are rarely used. A reality check confirms this: while there are 987 Russian-language printed media in Crimea, there are only five published in Ukrainian and four in Crimean Tatar. Despite the 250-thousand strong Crimean Tatar population, there is not a single Tatar school. Even though Crimea voted in favour of Ukrainian independence in the 1991 referendum, the early 1990s saw the rise of separatist movements. When the Crimean government introduced the post of President of Crimea, the elected pro-Russian politician Yuriy Meshkov disbanded the Crimean Parliament and called for independence. Separatism flourished as Russia was reluctant to recognise Ukraine’s sovereignty over the peninsula. only the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996 and the ratification of the Ukraine-Russia Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership in 1997 (tied to the agreements arranging the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet until 2017) led to an easing off of territorial tensions. Loyalty to Russia among Crimeans is still strong and this has increased during the last few years. According to a recent study by the Razumkov Centre, a Kyiv-based think-tank, 32 per cent of Crimeans do not consider Ukraine as their native country, while 48 per cent would like to change their citizenship, mostly to Russian. Importantly, 63 per cent of the population would support the idea of Crimea joining Russia.However, there is no single vision on the future of the region – the same proportion would support greater Crimean autonomy within Ukraine. Only 25 per cent are in favour of Ukraine joining the European Union, with 52 per cent against; in Ukraine as a whole, support for EU integration (47 per cent) prevails over opposition to it (35 per cent). Tensions have deepened over land, political, social, economic and language rights, over historic and religious places, and between Kyiv and local authorities. Often the division lines lie between the Russian-Slav and the Crimean Tatar populations. These are exacerbated by the hate speeches of the Crimean media against the Tatars and the Muslim population. Ukrainian authorities have not developed legislation that would renew Crimean Tatar rights as an aboriginal ethnic group. This has pushed the Tatars towards radical behaviour, such as illegal land grabs, street protests and the radicalisation of national movements. Land is one of the major sources of conflict. The land promised to the repatriated Tatars is also a major focus of corruption in which local and national authorities and the Tatar representatives are involved.

INFLUENCE VERSUS GOVERNANCE
When the post-Orange Revolution leadership of Ukraine took a more decisive stance towards EU and NATO integration, Russia, through both its increasingly aggressive rhetoric towards Ukraine and boosted funding for the Russian community of Crimea, signalled that it was willing to use Crimea as a bargaining chip vis-àvis Ukraine. Moscow’s claims toward Crimea have become more frequent, culminating in the Russian State Duma’s decision to seek the abrogation of the 1997 Treaty if Ukraine joined the Membership Action Plan for NATO or forced NATO accession. Additionally, the Russian media have created an image of Ukraine as a country that discriminates against the Russian-speaking population.

The Russian position is backed by the influence it has over the Crimean peninsula, which is stronger than that of Ukraine. A constant source of tension in Ukraine-Russia relations, the Russian Black Sea fleet is also a main source of income for the Sevastopol budget and inhabitants. Russia is the largest investor in the region and the main destination of Crimean exports – although overall Crimean exports to the EU almost equal those to Russia. The dominance of the Russian media and the power of pro-Russian political parties is crucial. The Russian Community of Crimea (RCC), an NGO funded by the Moscow major Yuriy Luzhkov’s “Moscow – Crimea” Foundation, together with the Russian Block, has a 30 per cent quota in the Block for Yanukovych, which has formed an 80-seat ruling coalition together with other pro-Russian parties in the 100-seat Crimean Parliament. Moreover, the RCC’s head, who holds the chair of the Crimean parliament’s deputy speaker, is a member of the Compatriots’ Councils for the Moscow government and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although Crimea is an issue in Ukraine, Kyiv has no Crimea policy. As some European diplomats cautiously note, the political establishment in Kyiv cannot – and perhaps does not want to – make serious efforts to integrate Crimea fully into Ukraine’s political and social context. Rather, it is merely interested in keeping the current status quo. Indeed, Kyiv lacks the necessary resources, and the political elite remains inward looking. The national government fails to implement even the adopted policy decisions regarding Crimea. Local Crimean authorities feel unheard and ignored by the Kyiv government as political dialogue is limited to the party structures’ communications during the electoral campaigns. No wonder there is often harsh Crimean resistance following decisions by Kyiv, as happened after the decision of the Minister of Education to introduce school graduation tests only in Ukrainian. In critical situations the Crimean politicians and population reveal more public support for the Russian authorities than those of Ukraine.

Despite the favorite local habit of waving Russian flags (although the Crimean, very similar to the Russian, is much more popular) and protesting on every possible occasion against NATO, most experts agree that there is a reasonably strong Crimean identity among locals – Russians and Tatars both. Moreover, Crimean politicians certainly feel that the depth of the autonomy ensured by the weakness of the Ukrainian government gives them a stronger position than the authoritative Russia ever would.

Last, but not least, Kyiv tends to forget its biggest leverage toward Crimea – its European integration plans. With more Western (especially European) engagement, Crimea could even be an engine of integration, as socio-economically it would probably benefit the more from this than other regions. This dimension could in fact capitalise on the growing interest in Crimea’s development expressed by the EU.

THE EU AS NEWCOMER
By facilitating social and economic development, promoting good governance, access to citizens’ rights and democratic dialogue, and increasing the demand for European integration, the EU would help avert the roots of internal conflicts. Despite the geopolitically oriented rhetoric, local partners nurturing the status quo are ready to cooperate, especially as the EU is a more credible partner for Crimea’s society and authorities in contrast with the U.S. This would be the EU’s long term investment not only in projecting stability in Crimea, but in the whole Eastern Neighbourhood.

Within the political dialogue with Ukraine, the EU should press the Kyiv government to continue with decentralisation and local and regional government reforms, focusing on economic development (based on the wasted potential of Crimea in trade, tourism, etc.), as well as introducing effective multi-ethnic management that might encompass all the key ethnic groups living in Ukraine today.

At the regional level, apart from the economic and social development of Crimea, the EU should aim at promoting socialisation and better communication in a Crimea-Ukraine-EU triangle through the following policies: educational mobility both to the EU and within Ukraine of Crimean students and teaching staff; joint EUCrimea university programmes in such areas as tourism; mobility programmes for journalists
and local government representatives; European-Crimean twin towns programmes; and trilateral (EU-Ukraine-Crimea) and bilateral (EUCrimea, Ukraine-Crimea) civil society cooperation in areas of human rights, good governance, multicultural and multi-ethnic management and community services.

European-Crimean cultural communications should be facilitated. EU member states’ institutions should launch their activities in Crimea. People-to-people contacts would benefit from the development of low-cost international air and sea transport communications. The EU countries’ consular networks should be spread to Crimea to support trade, cultural activities, people-to-people contacts and a better understanding of the region. None of the EU member states has its consulate in Crimea. Lithuania, Estonia and Hungary have honorary consulates, while the closest consulates are those of Poland, Romania, Greece and Bulgaria, in Odessa. Internationally, the EU should make better use of the opportunities for regional cooperation opened up by the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership and seek for the promotion of EU-Ukraine-Russia and EU-Ukraine-Russia-Turkey cooperation aimed at the development and European integration of Crimea.

За матеріалами NGO "Fride"

Україна російська чи українські росіяни?

Якщо Україна не стане нормальною національною державою, українці розділять долю безправних удмуртів та чувашів

Життя чи смерть – держава нарешті повин¬на наважитися й полишити сере¬динний шлях між життям і смертю, бо, як і кожен «третій шлях» – це ілюзія, згубна ілюзія, що неминуче веде до державної смерті. Держава нарешті повинна наважитися мати власне обличчя, стати, так би мовити, особою, а не бути мертвотним держапаратом, що сіє серед своїх номінальних громадян зневіру та відчай.

Власне обличчя – це національна ідентичність, держава повинна або набути її, або зникнути. Ідентичність – це передусім мова. Завдання зберегти свою ідентичність постає перед багатьма державами, навіть перед такими високорозвиненими, як Франція. Французьке суспільство не те що мультиетнічне, а мультирасове, й ходять чутки, що білих етнічних французів у країні менше половини населення. Але будь-яка статистика за національною ознакою в країні заборонена, Франція свято шанує республіканські принципи, а вони, як відомо, – свобода, рівність, братерство. З огляду на таке людське розмаїття Україні – зі «своїми», як полюбляють наголошувати місцеві «інтер¬націоналісти»-русифікатори, ста тридцятьма з гаком «національностями» (більше, ніж у колишньому еСеРеСеРі, де розводилися про «сто тридцять рівноправних»!) – ще далеко до Франції, а проте в тій країні про «національності» не згадують і докладають великих зусиль для збереження свого обличчя, своєї ідентичності, своєї мови, там немає недорік-президентів та чужомовних депутатів, які плюють на Конституцію. Чистота мови – основа культури, французи люблять і плекають свою мову, її панівне становище видається непохитним, і все-таки французькі законодавці 1993 року були змушені закріпити державний статус французької мови в Конституції. За даними опитувань громадської думки, французька мова – голов¬ний елемент національної ідентичності (80% ствердних відповідей), на другому місці стоять республіканські вартості (64% ствердних відповідей), а вже далі йдуть такі дрібниці, як гімн або герб. Усі французькі громадяни мають одну мову, одну національність – французьку, навіть німці Ельзасу та Лотарингії, що їх так розпачливо й не раз намагалася пригорнути до «материнського лона» Німеччина. (Але й свого німецького діалекту вони теж не забувають!)

В Україні є досить численна російська громада, сформована тут унаслідок колоніальної політики царської, а надто совєтської Росії, бо після революції в Україні жило близько мільйона росіян, а тепер їх увосьмеро більше, дарма що кількість українців за цей час змінилася мало. Значна частина нинішніх росіян – нащадки примусових переселенців, якими Москва колонізувала «провінцію» (зокрема Крим після війни), та армійські відставники, з яких тепер сформовано загони «українського козацтва», – в денікінських мундирах! У принципі, більшість росіян лояльно ставляться до української держави, і за розумної державної політики у сфері куль¬тури ніхто б уже не згадував ані про двомовність, ані про якийсь особливий статус російської мови. Але держава не просто усунулася від виконання своїх функцій у мовно-культурній сфері, а чинить точнісінько навпаки, ніж треба: зводить українців до статусу упослідженої національної меншини, заганяє українську культуру в гетто, всіляко потурає націоналістам-русифікаторам, не чинить опору масованій культурній інтервенції з боку Росії. Така держава готує собі смерть. Потрібні не лицемірні заяви з високих трибун про любов до України (як схожа ця облудна любов на колишню «любов партії до народу»! Чи не тому, що країною заправляє «вся комсомольская рать» пристосуванців і кар’єристів, які й досі святкують ювілеї свого комуноюгенду?), а реальні масштабні дії. Без них збереження України як держави неможливе. Або росіяни, які живуть в Україні, стають щирими українськими громадянами, розуміючи, що країну об’єднує мова та національна ідентичність, або Україна летить у прірву, і та прірва – Російська Федерація, де українці поділять долю безправних і вже фактично безмовних удмуртів та чувашів.

Де ти, Українська державо? Доки ти будеш ганьбою для кожної чесної людини, яка прагне бути твоїм щирим громадянином? Доки ти будеш нездатна мати власне обличчя й забезпечити гідні умови життя своїм підданим, доки будеш державою-паразитом, яка служить не народові, а держапарату, не виховує громадянських чеснот, а формує і зміцнює мерзенну касту бюрократів – хапуг та безбатченків, які нищать усе людське й наповнюють наші серця зневірою?

Автор - Таращук Петро
За матеріалами "Тиждень"

Slovakia criminalises the use of Hungarian

LANGUAGE laws may protect minority rights or infringe them. Slovakia’s new law, which comes into force on September 1st, is under fire for its harshness. It imposes fines of up to €5,000 ($7,000) on those who break rules promoting the use of Slovak in public. Hungarian-speakers, who number around a fifth of the population, mainly in the south of the country, see that as a direct attack on their right to speak their mother-tongue. So do politicians in neighbouring Hungary. A long-running dispute between two of Europe’s most prickly neighbours is turning nasty.

Slovakia’s left-leaning populist government has been needling Hungary since it took power in 2006. It sidelined plans for a joint Hungarian-Slovak history textbook last year and has publicly endorsed the Benes Decrees, which expelled most Germans and many Hungarians from the then Czechoslovakia after 1945, as a punishment for their supposedly Nazi sympathies. The new law tightens rules about speaking Slovak in dealings with public officials: not just police officers or teachers, but also, say, doctors. Exceptions apply to monoglots, or in districts where the minority makes up a fifth or more of the population. Hungarian-language schools must conduct their administration in Slovak. The new law also lays down detailed instructions for the way in which memorials and plaques may be inscribed.

A party representing the Hungarian minority is mounting a challenge in the constitutional court: it calls the law “19th-century language imperialism”. The Slovak response similarly accuses the Hungarians of hankering for the 19th century: they dominated the region in the Habsburg era. The Slovak prime minister, Robert Fico, said the real problem was those wanting to bully Slovaks in the south of the country into learning Hungarian.

The Slovak foreign ministry has published (unilaterally) an expert opinion drawn up in confidence by Knut Vollebaek, high commissioner for national minorities at the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a Vienna-based international organisation. Mr Vollebaek agrees that the bill does not in itself contravene international law or Slovakia’s earlier commitments to protect minority languages. But his opinion also highlights concerns over the hasty passage of the new legislation and the danger that it may be interpreted arbitrarily.

The big question is the meaning of the requirement that Slovak be used “in public”. Would, say, a Hungarian-speakers’ poetry club have to arrange for their meetings to be translated into Slovak? Perhaps not, but it is an odd thing to have to worry about these days in the European Union.

Grandstanding in the run-up to elections has fuelled the row. Mr Fico is gaining record popularity ratings. It helps divert opinion from issues such as corruption and economic decline. Mikulas Dzurinda, a former prime minister and opposition leader, says that the real danger to the Slovak language comes not from tongue-tied ethnic Hungarians, but from the debasing of Slovak by foul-mouthed chauvinists in the government, such as the leader of the Slovak National Party, Jan Slota. He recently provoked uproar by calling a policewoman (she says) a “cunt”. The charming gentleman’s complaint? She had refused to allow his driver unauthorised entry to a parliamentary garage.

За матеріалами www.economist.com

Тарапунькізація української культури

Давно те діялося. На зорі так званої незалежності згинуло ганебною смертю видавництво «Дніпро». Мабуть, єдиний осередок української культури, що забезпечував збереження національної ідентичності за моторошної совєтської доби, коли капелу бандуристів називали державною, бо люди там тільки «держали» бандури. Не стало видавництва, не стало вогнища національної культури, не стало школи перекладачів і редакторів – утрата, якої вже ніколи не надолужити.

Відтоді не відбулося ніякої деколонізації, не було визволення, навпаки, з милостивого благословення так званої української держави незмірно інтенсифікувалися процеси русифікації й денаціоналізації. З’явилося безліч російськомовних газет, поміж них і різноманітні «ведомості»: київські, чернігівські й т. ін. Як можна було дозволяти випуск газет із такими назвами в Україні? Ще Герцен у «Минулому й думах» писав із приводу виходу «відомостей» у кожному губернському місті: «Уряд привласнив собі монополію балаканини і тепер балакає без упину». Але головне навіть не це: в усіх російськомовних виданнях про Україну та українців говорили тільки в третій особі. Тобто людина, яка їх читала, несамохіть дистанціювалася від усього українського, опинялася на російському боці. Отак здійснювали – і здійснюють – відчуження українців від України. Найгеніальніше поставив діагноз цій ситуації поет, який кілька років був відсутній в Україні. На початку 1998-го Мойсей Фішбейн, з’я­вив­шись на «Сніданку з «1 + 1», на прохання стис­ло охарактеризувати ситуацію в Україні відповів, маючи видюще око поета, з математичною точністю: «Шалена деукраїнізація». Отак неупереджений митець охарактеризував результати діяльності «незалежної української держави». На цьому тлі аж ніяк не дивною була поява численних нібито гумористичних і часто «двомовних» телепередач («Шоу довгоносиків» та ін.) на кшталт совєтського дуету Штепселя й Тарапуньки: кремлівські маніпулятори суспільної свідомості та їхні місцеві лакеї почали інтенсивно насаджувати культуру безкультур’я, створювати образ тупого і неосвіченого хохла-сраколиза, примітивного селюка-салоїда, що не знає іншої мови, крім ганебного суржику. (Характерна річ: така практика поширена не тільки в Україні. Наприклад, у Вірменії теж є безліч телепередач, де представників народу, що має одну з найдавніших культур, зображують недоумками й дикунами.) Відбувались і відбуваються масована варваризація суспільства, створення плебсу, поз­­бав­­леного коріння та культури, люмпенізованого прошарку, що, усвідомивши свій «природжений ґандж» належності до українського етносу, не бачитиме ніяких духовних орієнтирів, окрім сяєва «високої» російської культури, яка зараз ллється з усіх телеекранів, бо – «завєтам Лєніна вєрни» – російські націоналісти не забувають його слів, що кіно для них – найважливіше з мистецтв. Ці московські «прєобразоватєлі природи» – національної – досягли своєї мети. Так, знайомлячись із Парижем, я навідався й до греко-католицької церкви на бульварі Сен-Жермен, під нею щонеділі збираються українські заробітчани. Більшого сорому за свою державу не відчував ніколи: я побачив юрбу дикунів, які дудлять пиво і жбурляють порожні бляшанки, плюються й спілкуються російськими матюками. Ось вони, культурні здобутки «української держави», наша візитна картка в Європі.

Не краща ситуація й тут. Культуру безкультур’я інтенсивно насаджує і значна частина сучасних українських письменників, які добачають свою «оригінальність» лише в калькуванні російського лихослів’я. На популярному телеканалі, що був колись піонером українізації, а тепер став флагманом русифікації, щонеділі транслюється передача «Я люблю русскую речь», щоправда, під іншою «кодовою» назвою. Ми бачимо, як «баришні», які й російської не знають до ладу, гидливо-здивовано силкуються вимовити кілька українських слів: за що їм кара така? Все українське – мова і персоналії – стає об’єктом глуму, аномалією, від якої мимоволі прагне дистанцію­ватися глядач. А «тубільці»-ведучі тільки поглиблюють пафос відстані, увиразнюють загальнодержавне лицемірство: у вправно та ефективно створеному за роки «незалежності» російськомовному середовищі заклики любити українську мову можуть бути тільки фальшю, засобом ще більшого відчуження від рідної мови та культури.

Аж ніяк не випадково в Україні популяризують уже й так відомого Гоголя. І так званий Гоголь-фест, і Сорочинський ярмарок стали мало не головними подіями тутешнього культурного життя. Чи не тому, що Гоголь ― яскравий приклад «тубільця», який зрікся рідного коріння і став стовпом чужої імперії? А може, тому, що заповітна мрія російських націоналістів – зробити так, щоб Україна й українці збереглися тільки на сторінках Гоголя?

Держава-колабораціоніст, держава, яка своїми діями й активною бездіяльністю плюндрує свою країну, нищить її культуру, готує плацдарм для чужого культурного, а зрештою, й територіального завоювання, – у чому полягає сенс її існування? Кому вона служить – своїм громадянам чи невситимому російському націоналізмові?

Автор - Таращук Петро. За матеріалами "Тиждень"

Rethink Old Notions about Poland

Economic growth and a strong, stable government to boot: time to rethink old notions about Poland

OUTSIDERS often have fixed ideas of Poland: a big, poor country with shambolic governments, dreadful roads and eccentric habits. Old stereotypes die hard, but the facts paint an increasingly different picture. By the grim standards of recent centuries, Poland has never been more secure, richer or better-run.

It was the only country in the European Union to register economic growth last year, at 1.2%. As Jacek Rostowski, Poland’s finance minister, likes to point out, GDP per head rose from 50% to 56% of the EU average in 2009—a record jump. By the same (somewhat flattering) measure, which adjusts for the greater purchasing power arising from lower prices, Poland now has Europe’s sixth-biggest economy.

Foreign investors like what they see. Whereas supposedly “west” European countries such as Greece flounder, ex-communist Poland is borrowing cheaply, for example with a $4.3 billion (€3 billion) Eurobond issue this month. Lenders’ generosity allowed the government to run a budget deficit of 7% of GDP in 2009 (though officials promise that a new public-finance law will cut spending growth sharply in the years ahead).

These good results owe much to luck. Poland’s stodgy banks came late to the wild foreign-currency lending that proved so disastrous in such countries as Latvia and Hungary. Poland’s big internal market has cushioned demand. Stimulus measures in Germany have spilled across the border. But the country has also benefited from some canny political leadership. Poland has something rare in the EU and all but unique in its ex-communist east: a sensible centre-right government with a majority in parliament.

Many criticise the government for its caution, and more recently for sleaze (a scandal about lobbying by the gambling industry is outraging Poland’s puritanical media). Some long-term problems are unsolved, such as a low rate of participation in the workforce and patchy public services. As many as 2m Poles have voted with their feet by working abroad.

Even so, by the standards of Poland’s governments in the past, and of the rest of Europe now, the present lot look pretty good. The government has made inroads into some of Poland’s worst problems, notably with a tough, if partial, pension reform. It has belatedly started a programme to modernise roads and railways (2,000km of new fast roads will be built by 2012, when Poland and Ukraine co-host the European football championships).

It has also made some badly needed changes in the country’s stifling bureaucracy. Poland ranks low on most indices for friendliness towards business. A recent study by the World Bank put the Polish tax system at 151st out of the 183 countries it surveyed. But some improvements are under way, including online tax filing and faster customs clearance. A new law has liberalised the housing market, allowing short-hold tenancies. That should encourage Poland’s workers to move within the country in search of work, rather than emigrating. It can be easier to make a weekly commute to Britain by air than between Polish cities by road.

A big symbolic and practical change is that citizens can increasingly use a simple signed declaration (an oswiadczenia) instead of a costly, time-consuming notarised one (a zaswiadczenia) in their dealings with the state. “We assume that citizens are telling the truth unless there is evidence to the contrary. In the past, the reverse applied,” says Mr Rostowski. Sceptical Poles, scarred by their dealings with suspicious, nit-picking bureaucrats, may take some convincing of this.

A new Polish foreign policy has been a success, after a spell when the aim seemed to be to lose friends and alienate people. Under Radek Sikorski as foreign minister, Poland has managed to improve relations with all its neighbours and, despite some hiccups, won a favourable security deal from America under Barack Obama. After much haggling, a battery of American Patriot missiles will arrive in Poland in March.

Germany now claims that it wants its relations with Poland to be as close as they are with France. Guido Westerwelle, Germany’s new foreign minister, chose Warsaw for his first foreign visit. Poland’s relations with Russia, once equally neurotic, have calmed down. Even the unearthing of a Russian spy, who had been living for many years under a false identity in Poland, has caused only a ripple.

Some talk of Mr Sikorski as a future president. If he ran this autumn, it would solve a problem for the prime minister, Donald Tusk. Until he ruled himself out on January 28th, Mr Tusk had been dithering about whether to run himself against the incumbent, Lech Kaczynski.

Mr Kaczynski’s record is dire (his popularity rises only when he makes no public statements). His main role has been destructive, vetoing laws and blocking appointments. He is widely believed not to want a second term, but to have been pushed into it by his bossy twin brother, Jaroslaw, who leads the main opposition party, Law and Justice.

Mr Tusk wants to unseat Mr Kaczynski as part of a long-term plan to break up Law and Justice and absorb bits of it into his own Civic Platform party. But he was uneasy about relinquishing the prime minister’s job, especially as he hopes to trim the president’s power in future. Mr Sikorski is electable. He is Poland’s most popular politician and also something of an outsider (he was educated at Oxford; his wife is American; he has worked at a Washington think-tank). So he is no threat to Mr Tusk. As president, he might even help to dispel more of those tiresome stereotypes.

За матеріалами The Economist

Eastern Europe: Wrongly labelled

The economic downturn has made it harder to speak sensibly of a region called “eastern Europe”

IT WAS never a very coherent idea and it is becoming a damaging one. “Eastern Europe” is a geographical oddity that includes the Czech Republic (in the middle of the continent) but not Greece or Cyprus (supposedly “western” Europe but in the far south-east). It makes little sense historically either: it includes countries (like Ukraine) that were under the heel of the Soviet empire for decades and those (Albania, say) that only brushed it. Some of those countries had harsh planned economies; others had their own version of “goulash communism” (Hungary) or “self-managed socialism” (Yugoslavia).

Already unreliable in 1989, the label has stretched to meaninglessness as those countries’ fortunes have diverged since the collapse of communism. The nearly 30 states that once, either under their own names or as part of somewhere else, bore the label “communist” now have more differences than similarities. Yet calling them “eastern Europe” suggests not only a common fate under totalitarian rule, but a host of ills that go with it: a troubled history then; bad government and economic misery now.

The economic downturn has shown how misleading this is. Worries about “contagion” from the banking crisis in Latvia raised risk premiums in otherwise solid economies such as Poland and the Czech Republic—a nonsense based on outsiders’ perceptions of other outsiders’ fears. In fact, the continent’s biggest financial upheaval is in Iceland (see article, article), and the biggest forecast budget deficits in the European Union next year will not be in some basket-cases from the ex-communist “east” but in Britain and in Greece. The new government in Athens is grappling with a budget deficit of at least 12.7% of GDP and possibly as much as 14.5%. European Commission officials are discussing that in Greece this week.

None of the ten “eastern” countries that joined the EU is in so bad a mess. They include hotshots and slowcoaches, places that feel thoroughly modern and those where the air still bears a rancid tang from past misrule. Slovenia and the Czech Republic, for example, have overhauled living standards in Portugal, the poorest country in the “western” camp. Neither was badly hit by the economic downturn. Some of the ex-communist countries now have better credit ratings than old EU members and can borrow more cheaply. Together with Slovakia, Slovenia has joined the euro, which Sweden, Denmark and Britain have not. Estonia—at least in outsiders’ eyes—is one of the least corrupt countries in Europe, easily beating founder members of the EU such as Italy.

Three sub-categories do make sense. One is the five autocratic ’stans of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). They scarcely count as “Europe”, though a hefty Britain-sized tenth of Kazakhstani territory (some 200,000 square kilometres) lies unambiguously in Europe. Kazakhstan also this year chairs the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a Vienna-based post-cold-war talking shop. But none of the ’stans has become a member of the Council of Europe (another talking shop and human-rights guardian, based in Strasbourg). That shows the problem. The definition of “Europe” is as unreliable as the word “eastern”.

The ’stans vary (Tajikistan is poor, Kazakhstan go-getting). But all have slim prospects of joining the EU in the lifetime of anyone reading this article. That creates a second useful category: potential members of the union. It starts with sure-fire bets such as Croatia, and other small digestible countries in the western Balkans such as Macedonia. It includes big problematic cases such as Turkey and Ukraine and even—in another optimistic couple of decades—four other ex-Soviet republics, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan (the last, maybe, one day, on Turkey’s coat-tails).

The third and trickiest category is the ten countries that joined in the big enlargement of 2004 and in the later expansion of 2007. They are a mixed bunch, ranging from model EU citizens such as Estonia (recently smitten by a property bust, but all set to gain permission this year to join the euro) to Romania and Bulgaria, which have become bywords in Brussels for corruption and organised crime respectively. Eight of them (Romania and Bulgaria are the exceptions) have already joined Europe’s Schengen passportless travel zone. Most (Poland is a big, rankling exception) also have visa-free travel to America. All (unlike EU members Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta) are in NATO.

Some worries remain constant, mild in the countries in or near the EU, more troubling in those in the waiting room and beyond. Exclusion and missed opportunity from the communist years still causes anger, as does near-exclusion from top jobs in international organisations (another consequence of the damaging “eastern Europe” label, some say). Toxic waste from that era, such as over-mighty spooks and miles of secret-police files, create openings for blackmail and other mischief-making, especially where institutions are weak. Lithuania’s powerful security service, the VSD, is in the centre of a political storm, but worries about lawlessness and foreign penetration ripple from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Four countries—Poland and the three Baltic states—worry a lot about Russian revisionism (or revanchism). Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are concerned too, but more about energy and economic security than military sabre-rattling. Yet elsewhere, in the former Yugoslavia for example, such fears seem mystifying and even paranoid.

The new and future members also share capital-thirstiness. All need lots of outside money (from the EU’s coffers, from the capital markets and from foreign bank-lending) to modernise their economies to the standards of the rest of the continent.

But the usefulness of the “new member state” category is clearly declining as the years go by. Oxford University still has a “New College” which was a good label in 1379 to distinguish it from existing bits of the university. It seems a bit quaint now. Poles, Czechs, Estonians and others hope that they will drop the “new” label rather sooner, so that they can be judged on their merits rather than on their past.

За матеріалами The Economist

Estonia: Get an e-life

In politics, health care, education, Estonia has been in the vanguard of internet use in every area of public life for years now. But all this e-life could be taking its toll on real life, cautions an editorialist.

We’re so used to living with e-everything that we talk about an e-police, e-government, e-state, e-school, e-health care, and the list goes on and on. But several dangers lurk behind all that e-existence. All these IT solutions are marvellous, to be sure: they save time and money, spare our nerves and plenty else as well. But they can also prove dangerous when the means become ends in themselves. What becomes crucial then, for e-government, is the e-connection, which has nothing whatever to do with the substance or quality of actual governance.

We often talk about e-health care, which uses high-speed internet capabilities for the extremely rapid and global transmission of data. But that could be at the expense of actual health care. We fund an e-school, but the money doesn’t go into running the school or its curriculum: it serves to set up another data base. In a word, the real meaning of things ends up going by the board. To put it another way, reality fades, true feelings pall and end up being supplanted by e-love (virtual sex already exists) or coded text messaging. The more e-solutions and e-communication there are, the less real communication there will be. It might be amusing and cost-effective to hold e-weddings, with e-happiness and e-guests into the bargain. The latter will relish delicacies alighting onto their plates like tetrominoes and e-drinks that won’t get them drunk. If all that suits the masses, that’s perfect. That’s what it takes to get re-elected. The e-elections are already turning into an end in themselves. As a result, the whole point of the electoral process – giving someone a mandate to represent the citizenry and safeguard their interests – is becoming lost, or at least blurred.

E-management is as convenient as it is expeditious, but has given rise to a system in which human beings are secondary and partly exonerated from any responsibility. “Send me a mail and we’ll see...”, and it goes without saying that when you receive an invoice containing a mistake (provided you actually get it, of course), you’re in for an excuse like: “But that’s what my computer said….” The means have become so all-important that everyday life has been superseded by a sort of e-life, which is beginning to play a part in every domain. In the end, we might be better off escaping from real life when it no longer satisfies us, and hiding behind e-life, forming e-relationships and, eventually, having our e-remains conveyed to the e-cemetery by the operating system.

За матеріалами www.presseurop.eu

Europe in 2034

Swedish essayist Kjell Albin Abrahamsson imagines that in 25 years every European country will be in the EU – except Turkey. Armed with a common energy policy and, at long last, a single voice – the EU will take the helm in international diplomacy.
How odd to reflect that, a mere 25 years ago, the European Union had only 27 member states. Now, a quarter century later, all the European countries are members of the Union. The penultimate stronghold of resistance was Belarus, where the Lukashenko brothers were finally ousted by a popular uprising. The very last continental country to join was that inviolable strongroom Switzerland, which held out till 2030 before finally joining the puissant Union, the same year Sweden became a fully-fledged member of NATO. The international press correspondents club in Brussels marked the occasion by awarding Switzerland the “Václav Klaus” Prize, named after a Czech president notorious for swimming against the current.

In this year of our Lord 2034, the question of Turkish accession still hasn’t been decided, even though the country does meet all the formal requirements. This exclusion is entirely owing to staunch opposition from Germany, Great Britain and France. Turkey cooperates closely with the European Union, and fully benefits from its structural funds, among other things. But it's not officially in the club. “We’re entitled to all the dishes on the European menu, but we’re spared the nauseating bureaucratic Brussels sprouts,” as the Turkish prime minister recently put it in a nutshell. Thanks to its secular state, thriving market economy and lively democracy, Turkey has become a role model for its Muslim neighbours in the region. The country’s population outstripped Germany’s 10 years ago, and this simple demographic fact – along with the still unresolved Cyprus question – is the underlying reason for Turkey’s peculiar position on the outskirts of the Union.

The end of an ethnocentric Union
A quick glance in the rear-view mirror shows that every enlargement of the EU has brought ever tougher challenges in train. A nimbus of nostalgia still surrounds the easeful enlargement of the European family back in 1995, with the advent of such rich, neutral, middle-ground-seeking countries as Finland, Austria and Sweden. The 2004 enlargement, on the other hand, involving the integration of eight ex-Communist countries in Central Europe, along with two Mediterranean islands, proved an economic and psychological ordeal for a union hitherto “ethnocentred” on the West. Even within the Union, the former Eastern European countries are still gnawed by their bitter experience of Communism and the planned economy: they remain very wary of government intervention and overregulation. The fiercest resistance to the EU’s makeover into a "super-state" came from precisely those countries, along with Bulgaria and Romania, and their accession was to take a heavy toll on the Union. The subsequent integration of the ex-Yugoslav republics, starting with Croatia, then all the others, plus Albania, was costly in economic terms, but strongly anchored in popular support: "a resuscitated Yugoslavia, but in a bigger, pacified and democratised package”, as one journalist put it.

International diplomacyIn spite of all the prophecies of doom, significant headway has been made since then on environmental and climate issues – though there were several setbacks along the way, and no fewer than four Copenhagen Conferences were held in the space of two decades. The biggest stride forward was the creation of a common energy agency, which put a stop to the worst abuses of national energy policies. So 25 years ago the Union first got a president – something that now seems a matter of course. On the other hand, we are still at loggerheads over whether he or she ought to be a skilful negotiator or a charismatic leader. The major European powers are partial to outstanding, even flamboyant, leaders – provided the latter hail from their country. The smaller countries, on the contrary, show a marked preference for CEOs. Europe’s role in foreign policy has grown significantly over the past quarter century. In the 1970s, US secretary of state Henry Kissinger was already bemoaning the fact there was no number to call to reach Europe, hence its lack of clout. Now, ever since the EU got itself a number, it has taken the reins of international diplomacy in hand, potently proving the point by settling a number of conflicts raging in East Africa. So Olof Palme’s statement that Swedish accession to the EEC was inconceivable owing to the need for a coordinated foreign policy now seems ancient history.

TWO SCENARIOS
Superpower or mega-meltdown?
What will the EU be 25 years down the road? A 40-strong “superunion”, or a patchwork coming apart at the seams, worn out by successive enlargements and debilitated by internecine strife? The Swedish magazine Fokus envisions an EU with 40 members – and plenty more clout than today – that has cashiered one of its most controversial policies: farm subsidies. In this scenario, “the feisty French farmers are finally vanquished by relentless resistance from several new member countries”. It has also achieved its aspiration of becoming a key player in the international arena, and European peace-keepers are ready to deploy to hot spots anywhere in the world at a moment’s notice.

In the second scenario, however, Fokus portrays a union with growing pains, incapable of pursuing further enlargement or even really integrating the newcomers. The nations of Central and Eastern Europe, hard hit by the economic crisis that struck in 2008, have never recovered and flounder in frustration and stagnation. Mass unemployment again sweeps the continent, sparking widespread social tension and the success of extremist parties. Ultimately, in this bleak picture of the road ahead, “The Lisbon Treaty will not have saved Europe or solved all the problems so many hoped it would.”

За матеріалами www.presseurop.eu