The Globalization Times: October 2010

Wednesday, October 20, 2010

Press Freedom Index 2010

Europe falls from its pedestal, no respite in the dictatorships

“Our latest world press freedom index contains welcome surprises, highlights sombre realities and confirms certain trends,” Reporters Without Borders secretary-general Jean-François Julliard said as his organisation issued its ninth annual index today. “More than ever before, we see that economic development, institutional reform and respect for fundamental rights do not necessarily go hand in hand. The defence of media freedom continues to be a battle, a battle of vigilance in the democracies of old Europe and a battle against oppression and injustice in the totalitarian regimes still scattered across the globe.

“We must salute the engines of press freedom, with Finland, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland at their head. We must also pay homage to the human rights activists, journalists and bloggers throughout the world who bravely defend the right to speak out. Their fate is our constant concern. We reiterate our call for the release of Liu Xiaobo, the symbol of the pressure for free speech building up in China, which censorship for the time being is still managing to contain. And we warn the Chinese authorities against taking a road from which there is no way out.

“It is disturbing to see several European Union member countries continuing to fall in the index. If it does not pull itself together, the European Union risks losing its position as world leader in respect for human rights. And if that were to happen, how could it be convincing when it asked authoritarian regimes to make improvements? There is an urgent need for the European countries to recover their exemplary status.

“We are also worried by the harsher line being taken by governments at the other end of the index. Rwanda, Yemen and Syria have joined Burma and North Korea in the group of the world’s most repressive countries towards journalists. This does not bode well for 2011. Unfortunately, the trend in the most authoritarian countries is not one of improvement.”

European Union loses its leadership status

Reporters Without Borders has repeatedly expressed its concern about the deteriorating press freedom situation in the European Union and the 2010 index confirms this trend. Thirteen of the EU’s 27 members are in the top 20 but some of the other 14 are very low in the ranking. Italy is 49th, Romania is 52nd and Greece and Bulgaria are tied at 70th. The European Union is not a homogenous whole as regards media freedom. On the contrary, the gap between good and bad performers continues to widen.

There has been no progress in several countries where Reporters Without Borders pointed out problems. They include, above all, France and Italy, where events of the past year – violation of the protection of journalists’ sources, the continuing concentration of media ownership, displays of contempt and impatience on the part of government officials towards journalists and their work, and judicial summonses – have confirmed their inability to reverse this trend.

Northern Europe still at the top

Several countries share first place in the index again. This year it is Finland, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. They have all previously held this honour since the index was created in 2002. Norway and Iceland have always been among the countries sharing first position except in 2006 (Norway) and 2009 (Iceland). These six countries set an example in the way they respect journalists and news media and protect them from judicial abuse.

They even continue to progress. Iceland, for example, is considering an exemplary bill, the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative (IMMI), that would provide a unique level of protection for the media. Sweden distinguishes itself by its Press Freedom Act, which has helped to create a particularly favourable climate for the work of journalists, by the strength of its institutions and by its respect for all those sectors of society including the media whose role in a democracy is to question and challenge those in positions of power.

Ten countries where it is not good to be a journalist

In recent years, Reporters Without Borders drew particular attention to the three countries that were always in the last three positions – Eritrea, North Korea and Turkmenistan. This year, a bigger group of ten countries – marked by persecution of the media and a complete lack of news and information – are clumped together at the bottom. The press freedom situation keeps on deteriorating in these countries and it is getting harder to say which is worse than the other. The difference between the scores of the “best” and worst of the last 10 countries was only 24.5 points this year. It was 37.5 points in 2009 and 43.25 points in 2007.

It is worth noting that, for the first time since the start of the index in 2002, Cuba is not one of the 10 last countries. This is due above all to the release of 14 journalists and 22 activists in the course of the past summer. But the situation on the ground has not changed significantly. Political dissidents and independent journalists still have to deal with censorship and repression on a daily basis.

Freedom is not allowed any space in Burma, where a parliamentary election is due to be held next month, and the rare attempts to provide news or information are met with imprisonment and forced labour.

Finally, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Mexico, countries either openly at war or in a civil war or some other kind of internal conflict, we see a situation of permanent chaos and a culture of violence and impunity taking root in which the press has become a favourite target. These are among the most dangerous countries in the world, and the belligerents there pick directly on reporters such as French TV journalists Stéphane Taponier and Hervé Ghesquière, who have been held hostage in Afghanistan for the past 300 days.

Economic growth does not mean press freedom

The BRICs – Brazil, Russia, India and China – may all be at a roughly similar stage of economic development but the 2010 index highlights major differences in the press freedom situation in these countries. Thanks to favourable legislative changes, Brazil (58th) has risen 12 places in the past year, while India has fallen 17 places to 122nd. Russia, which had a particularly deadly preceding year, is still poorly placed at 140th. Despite an astonishingly vibrant and active blogosphere, China still censors and jails dissidents and continues to languish in 171st place. These four countries now shoulder the responsibilities of the emerging powers and must fulfil their obligations as regards fundamental rights.

Heavy falls

The Philippines, Ukraine, Greece and Kyrgyzstan all fell sharply in this year’s index. In the Philippines this was due to the massacre of around 30 journalists by a local baron, in Ukraine to the slow and steady deterioration in press freedom since Viktor Yanukovych’s election as president in February, in Greece to political unrest and physical attacks on several journalists, and in Kyrgyzstan to the ethnic hatred campaign that accompanied the political turmoil.

The changes are unfortunately often deceptive. Some countries have risen sharply in the index this year but in fact all they have done is recover their traditional position after a particularly difficult if not disastrous 2009. This is the case with Gabon, which rose 22 places, South Korea (+27) and Guinea-Bissau (+25).

P.S. Among the neighbors of Ukraine the highest spots occupy Hungary (23rd) and Poland (32nd).

Among the big emergent economies troubling situation is noticed not only in China, India and Russia, but also in Mexico (136th) and Turkey (138th). Meanwhile, the US took the 20th place and Germany is on the 17th.

Source - Reporters without borders

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

The question marks over NGOs as media players

Autumn 2010

by Jean-Paul Marthoz

The major aid organisations have developed powerful information arms, says Jean-Paul Marthoz, yet they also have their own political agendas. What sort of relationship should there be between NGOs and journalists?

Should we define the changed new relationship between the media and NGOs? It’s not so much a question about the NGOs' communication policies as about their approach to information. For several years now a number of NGOs have become “information producers” almost on a par with the international press, and at times with greater means of investigation and distribution.

Who, for example, revealed the use of torture in American prisons in Afghanistan in 2003? Human Rights Watch. Who has been tracking down the multinationals’ pillaging of resources in Africa? Global Witness.

Although there are more and more media outlets, there is less and less old-style journalism. There are greater technological tools available for investigation and reporting, but fewer major investigations and less real reporting in the mass media.

The retreat of journalism as we knew it, combined with the revolution in satellite communications and online media, has seen both the public at large and the NGOs and think tanks invading the terrain of journalism by becoming purveyors of information and interpretation.

It’s not that recent a phenomenon. Over the past 20 years or so, when humanitarian aid was becoming so newsworthy, NGOs became information agents by bringing so many journalists to the frontline during humanitarian crises. These NGOs acquired greater credibility than most governments. And they did not merely supply information because they also determined its importance. To some extent the crises that would be talked about and those that would quickly be forgotten were selected by information-savvy NGOs in a process akin to medical triage.

The NGOs also supplied alternative “narratives” through the interpretations they offered of international events. When hundreds of millions of Hutus fled to Zaire in 1994, a number of humanitarian NGOs and UN organisations chose to describe this stampede in humanitarian terms, “forgetting” the fact that thousands of those refugees had themselves committed atrocities in the genocide.

This whole development has created a new set of risks. Among these, the grey area that now connects humanitarian and military affairs can easily lead to confusion and even collusion, with serious consequences for information.

In the world of francophone journalism the catch-phrase is “news paras”; meaning journalists who are parachuted in to cover a crisis without knowing much about the background to the events they are covering. And then, by contrast, there are the “para-journalists” who are not reporters as such but are investigators and researchers who appear to be journalists when not really part of the profession.

Organisations like Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First and Global Witness have become “news wholesalers”; they are on the ground like special correspondents and supplying their information to journalists. At the height of the second Intifada for instance, a researcher for Human Rights Watch was relaying information live from the embattled Palestinian refugee camp at Jenin.

Modern information technology is giving NGOs and other research organisations much more power to both obtain information and broadcast it. This has given them a new kind of media independence – every day thousands of people now visit the Human Rights Watch website just as if it were a specialised press agency.

So should we view these NGOs in much the same way as we see the press? Not if we look at their aims; for NGOs, information is a tool for influencing and even changing government or inter-governmental policies. Yet the way the NGOs process information clearly places them in much the same “sphere” as journalism. These organisations’ credibility depends on the quality of the information and opinions they disseminate. And their claim to impartiality also brings the NGOs close to the world of journalism. Even if they have a stated aim and are often “subjective”, they can only achieve their goals through demonstrating news impartiality. This means keeping a cool head when faced with the welter of facts submitted by various regimes or groups and subjecting them to the same evaluation criteria.

NGOs also share journalism’s acute awareness of the importance of accurate description and terminology. Calling a situation a massacre or a genocide has clear-cut consequences. Such an assessment can determine the international community’s reaction, define the reputations of those involved in a conflict and even settle the fate of many victims.

What all this means is that it’s essential for NGOs to put in place information collection, processing, interpretation and broadcasting systems that enable them to be reliable sources in the information chain. Their closeness to journalism doesn’t mean that NGOs are neutral, as they have their own priorities, calculations and reflexes. But these constraints do not in any way diminish their importance or legitimacy in the global newsgathering and dissemination process.

But this means that the NGOs and others must respect the fundamental principles of journalism by providing in-depth information without exaggeration or manipulation. Wherever possible they must contribute to improving journalism by making up for what it misses or ignores, by offering details from their own investigations which too often may have been overlooked by overly-rapid media scrutiny. Some NGOs do indeed see themselves as structurally part of journalism. Kimberly Abbott, a communications officer in the U.S. for the International Crisis Group (ICG) wrote not long ago in favour of a voluntary partnership policy between NGOs and journalists to improve international journalism. Her idea is that NGOs could offer their experience, logistics and knowledge to journalists, while for NGOs the media offers a way to reach a much larger audience for subjects so often ignored by the press.

Partnerships of this sort could lead to better reporting, but they also carry the risk of a conflict of interests. Quite aside from any experiments like these, journalism must also try to win back its lost ground and rediscover its complete independence and its will to cover international news. Whether it will do so depends not only on major decisions by media organisations but also on the implementation of new economic models for collecting and processing information. Leonard Downie, a former Editor of the Washington Post, and Michael Schudson of Columbia University have pointed out that the future of journalism involves finding new ways to financially support its activities. They envisage a number of different finance models, but it’s a topic on which debate will clearly rage for some time to come.

Technology and financial pressures are bringing about a large redeployment of the media, and that means the legitimacy of the press is in question. The role and the credibility of public information in the 21st century is increasingly at stake, and no doubt the media could make a difference if it were to take on the role of information steward and referee. So journalists should not scorn the new information players because they could make a positive contribution. But giving too much room to non-journalists, both as individuals and groups, would be a mistake. If the press were to do so it would be digging its own grave, and democracy would be the loser. Democratic societies need a free press that operates without fear or favour on its own conditions and according to its own rules. Journalism is, more than ever, the future of journalism.

Source - Europe's World

The West must open its eyes to the silent revolution among Arab women

Autumn 2010

by Gema Martín Muñoz

Photo: Jordan's Princess Rania

Western prejudices about Arab society and Islam have tended to cloak major social shifts in the Arab World. Gema Martín Muñoz says that smaller families and the changing role of women are major forces to be reckoned with.

Arab “reality” is multiform, diverse and many-sided. It is not a homogeneous whole that follows common rules inherent in its religion and culture. It is, on the contrary, a kaleidoscope of situations, developments and transformations, where political, economic and social factors interact with culture and religion, although these last two don’t necessarily determine outcomes. Arab countries and societies often have an image of being rigid and resistant to change because they are seen from the outside through the lens of their ruling regimes, which mostly resist development and change.

But this image does not reflect the reality of Arab societies. On the contrary, an enormous dynamism is opening doors to many types of change, albeit at different speeds and in complex, contradictory ways when change from below is held back from above. It’s a premise that is particularly important when looking at the situation of women in the Arab world.

The predominant image of Arab women is of a passive, exotic and veiled victim-woman who reacts to events instead of actively participating in them. She is an impersonal “communitarised” woman surrounded by stereotypes that feed cultural prejudices. But such simplistic ideas are in fast conflict with a reality that is much more complex. These conceptions are fixed in time and place, yet empirical evidence shows that on the contrary deep mutations are taking place that are changing everything, despite the power of patriarchal structures and equally potent reactionary forces. Arab societies are engaged in a process of intense and irreversible change in which women are playing a crucial role.

The supposed immobility of the Arab and Islam world doesn’t correspond at all to reality. Demographic change along with social and economic factors affecting education and work are forcing a profound change on the traditional family model, and this is now observable in even the most vigorously conservative states. This change has already produced a positive transformation in the role of women and in relations between sexes in Arab societies, and will continue to do so. Arabs live, needless to say, in the same timeframe as the rest of the world, even if they are affected by such peculiarities as the weight of religious norms in the rules governing family life. This influence is not in any case specific to Islam and this “resort to the religious” serves only to slow down, not to block, social developments that now seem inevitable. Research carried out by myself and a broad interdisciplinary group of academics (Sophie Bessis y Gema Martín Muñoz (coords.), Mujer y Familia en las sociedades árabes actuales. Barcelona, Edicions Bellaterra, 2010) shows that although the rates of change may differ, and their forms and results diverge, fundamental changes in women’s conditions are general throughout the Arab world.

The pressures and demands of the modern world are undisputable, and they’re also widespread. Differences in schooling levels between boys and girls have lessened everywhere – even if at greater or lesser speeds. And in many Arab countries more girls than boys are now in secondary and higher education. This is a development that shows parents consider the education of their daughters to be just as important as that of their sons. Increased ages for marriage and declining fertility result directly from the teaching and use of contraception. The Maghreb region may lead in this regard, but the phenomenon is observable across the whole Arab world. All the surveys show that young men and women want to study and have a job before they marry. And more and more also want to choose their own partner.

During the last half century there has been a massive entry of women into the public arena, influenced most certainly by the intense shift to urbanisation in all Arab countries as that has enormously increased levels of waged employment among women. Arab countries' massive change from rural to urban societies is one of the greatest transformations they have ever experienced, and it has altered family structures, reducing them in size to something much closer to the ‘nuclear families’ of the West. This new family model now has so much force behind it that it is imposing itself on rural society too, where the decline of the agrarian economy is being matched by a strong shift towards smaller families in just the same way as in urban areas. This change in the family model sometimes occurs at slightly different speeds across the Arab world, but often it is occurring simultaneously in town and country.

These changes have, not surprisingly, led to a redistribution of power between old and young, and between men and women. We are now witnessing a progressive loss of power by representatives of the patriarchal order, and that is being reinforced by a profound shift from the extended family to more nuclear ones. And the increased weight in society of young people and of women today represents a fundamental trend in the contemporary Arab world’s evolution.

But these changes do not necessarily mark a break with the past. The many realities and different forms of ancient and modern development that arise in all the countries studied reflect local compromises with tradition and with patriarchal laws, and different rates of adjustment between old and new ways of life. Local conditions reflect various negotiations and strategies to sidestep existing norms without transgressing them frontally. The changes are notably weaker and more complex in countries like Palestine and Iraq, not only for intrinsic reasons but also because of the grave conflicts they have been undergoing.

The dynamics of change in Arab societies are rarely accompanied by change in the political climates of their states. The Arab region today has strong dynamic societies but is made up of states whose governance has rarely adapted to change, but rather reflects complex and very different realities. Most states resist transferring the processes of social transformation into their own legal framework. They fear, with reason, that extending freedoms and developing individual autonomy within the family, and so weakening patriarchal authority, could have repercussions in the public arena and produce a questioning of the ideological basis of state power. The result is widespread invocation of religious norms, and to a lesser extent references by governments to tradition as a way of legitimising the continuation of patriarchal rule. “State feminisms” are generally more demonstrations of rhetoric or political symbolism, concerned primarily with projecting an international image, than they are a real motor for change.

The process of change may be deep-seated, but it is not linear. Its progress is uneven because it encounters strong forces of inertia and resistance. Arab societies are, however, undergoing intense, fundamental and inevitable change that is quite independent of uneven regional conditioning. The region's political authorities, no less than families themselves, will be forced to accept the inconsistencies of the traditional model when it comes to the transformation of the condition of women. This is also a change that affects many others, so it must be analysed from within the Arab perspective and also from outside.

The situation of women is one of the main benchmarks that the outside world, and particularly the West, uses to assess the Arab world. But such assessments tend to focus on the supposed immobilism that derives from Islamic norms. This focus on the “women-Islam” tandem obscures a better knowledge of the real changes that are taking place. This predominant view of Arab societies often stifles outsiders' ability to break free of their firmly held beliefs that Islamic society confines all Arab women in the same way, when in reality they experience very different conditions. This sort of stereotypical vision prevents us from seeing and evaluating the deep changes taking place in Arab societies, and risks blinding us to how transformation of women is changing Arab societies. The western world thus risks depriving itself of an important key to understanding the Arab world as it is today, and will be tomorrow.

Catalonia - Southern Europe's Research Pole

Autumn 2010

by Josep Huguet

Catalonia is re-inventing itself as a hot-spot for research, development and innovation (RDI), not just to benefit the researchers who have flocked to this pole of scientific endeavour in recent years, but also to benefit society at large. As a result, the Catalan region is already embarking on its first big science projects and is able to compete with the big boys on the dynamic EU scene.

Our blueprint for the future is the Catalan Agreement on Research and Innovation (CARI). Drawn up in 2008, it was approved by government, political and civil society stakeholders, universities, parliament, trade unions and business associations. The CARI established guidelines for research and innovation until 2020 and underpins the commitments made by its signatories.

GROWTH IN INVESTMENT AND ACTIVITY

Catalonia’s success in blending private and public activity is evident from the data. It hosts more than 500,000 companies, including 3,100 foreign businesses. Some 98% are small and medium-sized enterprises, with more than 10,000 companies involved in innovation. Expenditure on R&D totalled €3.286m in 2008, of which two-thirds was private finance, with investment evolving rapidly since then.

In terms of infrastructure, there are 12 universities and 24 science and technology parks in the region. The Spanish High Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) has 21 centres in Catalonia, alongside a wide variety of research institutes, 39 of which are supported by the Government of Catalonia under the umbrella CERCA system of research centres. A further 100 TECNIO units are devoted to knowledge and technology transfer. The jewels in Catalonia’s research crown are the large-scale centres such as the Synchrotron Alba, the Barcelona Supercomputing Centre and the Clean Chamber for microelectronics. They share with the other organisations an enormous capacity to attract and promote talent. In total, this integrated system of RDI hosts more than 227,000 university students and around 25,000 researchers.

A LONG-TERM POLICY DESIGNED FOR THE FUTURE

The success of recent years has been built on a longer-term strategy, which began ten years ago when Catalonia started transforming its research landscape. The government put in place a policy to attract scientific talent by creating the Catalan Institute for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA) and founding and funding research institutes with their own legal identity and flexible working structures. As a result, we currently have 217 ICREA researchers, of whom 78 work in CERCA institutes.

Since then, this policy has been enriched with plans to attract large-scale research infrastructure. The result has been the creation of 24 new research institutes, while another 15 university institutes have been expanded and transformed. Prestigious names such as the Centre for Genomic Regulation, the Institute of Photonic Sciences and the Catalan Institute of Nanotechnology are all products of this policy. The quality of RDI in Catalonia is reflected in the high level of grants awarded to our institutions by the EU’s European Research Council (ERC). Collectively, the CERCA research centres, the universities and the other Catalan organisations have received 1.85% of all the competitive funds available from the ERC’s 7th Framework Programme (FP7). In addition, 40 Catalan projects have been awarded grants for being among the most groundbreaking in Europe, amounting to 60% of all such ERC grants to Spain. More than half of the 40 researchers who have received these ERC awards belong to ICREA.

LOOKING AHEAD

To fulfil the commitments of the CARI, the Government of Catalonia introduced significant changes to its RDI policy in 2009. For the first time, the 2010-2013 Plan for Research and Innovation (PRI) was designed as a truly inter-ministerial programme, with research and innovation integrated across all sectors of government. Organised into 10 strategic objectives, it provides a framework for publicly-funded research. The aim is to add economic value to RDI projects and to put talent – scientific, creative, innovative and entrepreneurial talent – into the driving seat. For private businesses, the PRI offers a more systematic, international approach, while also establishing that public contracts are aimed at innovative companies too. Wider society is not forgotten either, with some initiatives being launched to involve citizens in scientific progress as well.

THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION

RDI is a dynamic and highly competitive international sector. The European context, too, provides an incentive for regions such as Catalonia to adapt their local scientific structures. In this regard, Catalan science and innovation priorities have been organised into 17 areas, which will be developed into knowledge and innovation communities able to compete at the international level. They will target three main sectors: environmental resources and territorial challenges; people and society; plus scientific, productive and organisational challenges. Catalonia is also co-ordinating its actions with other administrations concerned with science policy, especially the European R&D programmes. With EU research funding growing, and the Catalan share already significant, the Catalan government has recently approved its official position regarding the next EU Framework Programme for research – known as FP8 – which will run from 2014-2020.

The first outstanding issue was to link the FP8’s priorities, and the Catalan PRI priorities, to the pressing socioeconomic challenges facing European society today. The Catalan government also needed to respond to proposals to allow regions to participate in the governance of the European Research Area, which would open up decision-making to places with a significant record in promoting, managing, evaluating and implementing RDI programmes. Sub-programmes of the FP8 are also due to be opened up to regional administrations. The Catalan position on the FP8 also backs the continuation of the Ideas Programme, in particular its support for young researchers, and stronger initiatives to ensure that RDI helps to make Europe more competitive. Catalonia is also well placed to benefit from another proposal for FP8 – to strengthen Europe’s RDI ties with third countries, particularly those in the Euro-Mediterranean region. When combined with local scientific excellence and emerging economic sectors, this can only support Catalonia’s on-going efforts to create a real research pole in the south of Europe, one with a growing influence in the Euro-Mediterranean area.

This section is sponsored by the Government of Catalonia.

www.gencat.cat/diue

Saturday, October 9, 2010

OVER 40 SOVEREIGN NATIONS MAY EMERGE UP TO 2030 ON THE WORLD POLITICAL MAP

Reasons to foster the emergence of newly independent states:

1. Ethnic (multinational countries have a higher risk of separatist tendencies)

2. Language (patchy language picture is often regarded to be as a destabilizing factor for nation’s unity)

3. Religion (struggle for faith is a catalyst of many wars, which used to lead to newly independent states)

4. Economic (too rich/too poor regions of the country may often be felt tempted by longing to become even richer or to correct the “unfair” discrepancies)

5. Geographical distance

6. Political (voluntary will of the mother country)

7. Social readiness to be independent

8. International pressure

The new most prominent actors are indicated below:

1. Southern Sudan will secede from Northern Sudan due to religious (Southern Sudan is mainly Christian and anemic), racial (unlike Arab Sudan, southern part of Sudan is a part of so called black Africa), socio-economical and political (low level of inclusion in central politics of Sudan, already institutionalized regional bodies) reasons. It will occupy 640,000 square kilometers, being populated by almost 8,3 million people. Meanwhile, landlocked Southern Sudan will expand the list of the poorest countries in the world. The principal consequences of Southern Sudan’s Independence for international relations would be the start of Sudan’s break-up and possible destabilization in neighboring Ethiopia.

2. Greenland, Denmark occupies more than 2,166 million square kilometers that is more than Mexico’s territory. With a population of 56,452 (January, 2010 estimate) it would be the least densely populated country in the world. Reasons for secession are ethnic (indigenous people comprise the prevalent majority), geographical (distant location from its mother country Denmark) and political (voluntary will of Denmark to grant independence to Greenland). The main outcomes of Greenland’s independence would be the emergence of a new actor in the Arctic geopolitical game, its stronger inclusion in Northern America integration processes and the renaissance of indigenous nationalism in Asian part of Russia.

3. Kurdistan, Iraq will occupy more than 40,000 square kilometers being populated by 4 million people. Newly independent state may be expanded up to 190,000 km²–390,000 km (due to the joining of Turkey’s and Iran’s parts of Kurdish ethnic regions) if geopolitical situation in the Middle East is fortunate.

Reasons for secession of Iraq’s Kurdistan are the following: highly inefficient central government in Baghdad and desire to distance itself from troubling Arab part of the country, ethnic (Kurds are still the most populous non-state nation in the Middle East) and political (already existent autonomous state bodies).

The consequences of independent Kurdistan will be enormous, especially for the security of Turkey and integrity of Kurd-populated neighbors which would be challenged significantly.

4. Flanders, Belgium will emerge as a result of ongoing political crisis of Belgian state, historical, language and economic differences between Flanders and Wallonia (Flanders is more economically advanced in comparison with other parts of present Belgium; unlikely Wallonia and Brussels, Flanders is predominantly Dutch speaking; last but not least, Flanders has its own long historical memory of independent state). Flanders will occupy more than 13,000 square kilometers with a population of about 6 million people. Flanders GDP will be higher than Hungary’s or Portugal’s. The implications of independent Flanders will be immense for European integration as it would be the first case of break-up of founding EU member state. Apart from that, it may strengthen the secessionist spirit in Spain, UK, France, Italy and Canada.

5. Darfur, the present Sudan’s territory, has already seceded from the Nilo-Sudan politically, economically and emotionally because of marginalization and exclusion. Among other reasons to see the independent state of Darfur are historical background (independence during five centuries and forcible unification with Sudan) and failure of official Khartoum to end Darfur war lasting since 2003. The newly independent state will have the population of between 6 and 8 million people. The region covers an area of some 493,180 square kilometers—approximately the size of Spain. Meanwhile, it’s unlikely to have a prosperous Darfur in the near future. The main implications of Darfur’s secession are the feasible end of Darfur war and Intensification of secessionist movements in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Senegal.

6. New Caledonia, the present semi-dependent territory of France, is approximately half the size of Taiwan, it has a land area of 18,575 square kilometers. The population was estimated in January 2009 to be 249,000. New Caledonia is set to decide whether to remain within the French Republic as an autonomous overseas collectivity or become an independent state in a referendum to be held between 2014 and 2019. The main reasons to secede from France are the international pressure (UN) and voluntary will of official Paris, ethnic differences from mother country (indigenous people comprise almost the half of the population), geographical distance from France and economic self-sufficiency (due to the wealth of natural resources, especially nickel). The principal implications of independent New Caledonia will be the emergence of the third largest economy in Oceania (after Australia and New Zealand) and an impetus for other French and British dependencies to proclaim independence.

7. Quebec, Canada will occupy more than 1,5 million square kilometers being populated by almost 8 million people. Quebec GDP will commensurate with Austria’s GDP. Reasons to secede from Canada are language differences (it’s French-speaking region as opposed to English-speaking Canada), political (existent autonomous bodies and two referendums on independence) and religious (predominance of Roman Catholics).

The main outcomes of independent Quebec will be the crisis of Northern American integration and the renaissance of language conflicts and language separatism in Cameroon, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Spain, Iran and Turkey.

8. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the present Russia’s region, will occupy 15,300 square kilometers that is commensurate with Israel’s area. The population of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria will be more than 1,1 million people. The reasons to secede will be the political crisis in Moscow that will engulf Russia into the third Caucasian war, religious, language and ethnic differences between the Chechens and the Russians, political and historical (live historical memory about independent state and violent wars).

Implications of Ichkeria’s independence will be significant for Caucasian geopolitics, in particular It will lead to the secession of some Russia’s regions: Dagestan, Ingushetia and possibly Buryatia and Tatarstan. Ichkeria’s independence will expand the boundaries of Islamic world and along with the independence of Dagestan will usher in the removal of Russia from Muslim Caucasus. Meanwhile, Ichkeria’s independence won’t reduce the work of international human rights groups as Chechens will lack democratic political culture.

9. Dagestan, Russia occupies almost 50,000 square kilometers being populated by 2,6 million people. Religious, ethnic, language, economic differences will lie in the root of secession from Russia. Political crisis in Moscow and the third Caucasian war will push Dagestan to independence. Among the implications of Dagestan’s sovereignty from Russia are the emergence of a state bigger in population and area than Moldova or Latvia, changes in Caucasian and Caspian geopolitics, in particular the step-up of Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan, serious challenges related to the unity of Dagestan (due to its multiethnic composure).

10. Ingushetia, Russia occupies only 3,500 square kilometers having a population of almost 500,000 people. It will be so far the smallest nation in the former Soviet Union. The reasons for secession are predominantly religious and ethnic (majority of people is Muslim, the Russian comprise only 5% of a total population). Political crisis in Moscow, the third Caucasian war and the proclamation of Ichkeria as an independent state will prompt Ingushetia’s elites to proclamation its sovereignty. Implication of Ingushetia’s independence will be the same as in the cases of Ichkeria and Dagestan. Meanwhile, Ingushetia backward economy may be a grave case for international aid organizations.

11. Tibet, the present China will occupy 1.2 million square kilometers being populated by only 3 million people. Historical memory of independence, ethnic and linguistic differences, political factors (already existing government in exile), international pressure lie in the basis of Tibet’s future independence. But only a political crisis in China will give a chance for Tibetan elite to accomplish its long-awaited end. Among the implications of Tibet’s independence will be the strengthening of separatism movement in the so called Seven Sister states of India, Kashmir and the forging of nationalism inside China.

12. Uyghurstan, China may appear on the territory of the present western Xinjiang where Uyghurs are the majority. Then, it will occupy about 600-700,000 square kilometers with a population of 9 million people. The reasons of secession will be obvious: ethnic, language and religious differences, marginalization within Chinese society, historical background of its own independence and historical glory.

Implications of Uygurstan’s emergence on the political map will be bigger than in case of Tibet, especially due to strong tensions between Chinese and Uyghur in Xinjiang. The boundaries of a new state will be unclear through a long colonization of originally Uighur lands and attempts of a new Uighur government to restore old borders of Ughur’s ethnic area.

13. Kashmir, India/Pakistan. As we know, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 established the rough boundaries of today, with Pakistan holding roughly one-third of Kashmir, and India one-half, with a dividing line of control established by the United Nations. New state with a population of about 10 million people will primarily emerge in India’s part with the help of international community pushing Delhi to cease murderous Kashmir crisis. The principal impetuses for rebellion will be the strengthening of separatism in North Eastern India and emergence of Tibet and Uyghur sovereign nations close to India’s northern borders. India’s Kashmir may manage to unite with Pakistan’s Kashmir due to voluntary will of Pakistan hoping for a strong ally in the struggle against India.

14. Assam Federation, India will be the newly independent state due to economic marginalization, geographical distance from mainland India and a fresh historical memory of British Assam in the last two centuries. Language, ethnic and religious reasons will be less important during the decision to proclaim independence from Delhi. The main implication of Assam Federation’s emergence will be the reforms in India’s political system to avoid a total break-up of the multiethnic state. Besides, Assam Federation will lack political and social stability (due to its multiethnic and multi religion composure) that may become a headache for international community. The overall population of Assam Federation will exceed 45 million people.

15. Southern Nigeria will become independent from the rest of Nigeria through its Christian population (unlike Muslim authorities of Abudja and Sharia-keeping Northern states), economic factors (uneven distribution of national wealth harming the interests of the South) and a long violent conflict in the Niger Delta. Southern Nigeria will occupy about 500,000 square kilometers with a population of 80 million people. The main consequences of Southern Sudan independence will be the drift of 80 mln. Northern Nigeria to a blatant Islamic authoritarianism and strained relations between Christian and Muslim population throughout Africa and South Eastern Asia.

16. Scotland may emerge on the world political map mainly due to historical memory, institutionalized state bodies and economic self-sufficiency. Ethnic and linguistic differences will be overshadowed by the above mentioned factors. Scotland’s secession will be very painful for the United Kingdom igniting a wave of English nationalism inside the country. Besides, it will mean the emergence of the new EU member state with a population of more than 5 million people. However, the emergence of Scotland sovereign state may be under question due to the soft ethnic and linguistic differences between English and Scots. 300 years interdependence of England and Scotland may be a substantial obstacle to independence.

17. Euscadi, Spain may secede from Spain within the borders of only one present Spanish region Pais Vasco, as a result of linguistic, ethnic discrepancies, historical background of the independent Basque state and socio-economic supremacy of the Basque area over other regions of Spain. The implications of Euscadi’s emergence will be the increase in separatism of Catalonia, Wales, Corsica and Padania. The population of Euscadi sovereign nation will exceed 2 million people and won’t include the Basque minority leaving in France and Navarra region of Spain. The independence of Euscadi may be postponed through the weak expansion of Basque language as a native language among Basques (not more than third of ethnic Basques call Basque language as their mother tongue) and dual pressure of 2 EU countries, France and Spain, to avoid full independence.

18. Catalunya, Spain may become the biggest newly independent state in Europe after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Its population will prevail 7,5 million and GDP will be commensurate with Greece. The reasons of secession will be similar to Basque’s reasons. Meanwhile, its implications for European and especially Mediterranean geopolitics will be enormous due to economic weight of the newly independent state. Nevertheless, Catalunya’s sovereignty may be under question because of the high inclusion of Catalan elites into the Spanish political and economic life.

Up to 2030 independence may also be achieved by the following nations:

America:

1. Cambas, Bolivia

2. French Guiana, France

3. Puerto Rico, USA

4. Guadeloupe, France

5. Martinique, France

6. Aruba, Netherlands

7. Cayman Islands, UK

8. Virgin Islands, USA

Asia/Eurasia:

1. Buryatia, Russia