by Pavel Telicka
Many of the EU’s newest member states are no longer the euro-enthusiasts of yesteryear, and they also complain they have less influence on policymaking than they had hoped. Pavel Telicka assesses the newcomers' track record so far
Shortly after the Berlin Wall came down, Vaclav Havel led the so-called “new democracies” in declaring that Prague’s goal was to join the European Union. Knowledge of the EU among Central Europeans was at that time superficial to say the least, yet that goal of EU accession was to become an indispensible part of post-communist Europe’s political and economic transition.
The real reasons why these countries should join the European Union would only become clearer once the enlargement process was under way, and in any case they would differ not just between countries but also between the different age groups, social strata and professional structures that made up their populations. They nevertheless had a number of reasons in common. In Vaclav Havel’s words, the enlargement process was to lead to a “return to Europe.”
And then, of course, the applicant countries were concerned to have a seat at the table and a voice that could exert some influence on political and economic developments in Europe and beyond; for decades they had been isolated and forced to accept decisions taken in Moscow. But the change was at first less than democratic. In the early years after democracy was restored, the countries of central and eastern Europe found themselves exposed to the stern regulatory environment of the EU’s internal market without any chance to influence the way it was shaped or implemented.
Almost 20 years on, it is worth looking at whether and how effectively these countries’ two principle accession aims have been achieved. President Havel has often been criticised by Czech politicians for "disputing" the idea that even during the years of Soviet domination these countries were still a part of Europe.
The reality is, though, that it was only during the 1990s that the formerly communist countries regained their European heritage; Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania and all the others are once again part of Europe, belonging beyond any question at all to the same family as Spain, Italy or Greece. The big question, then, is what influence do the new EU members of this family have on the EU’s political processes?
Influence in Brussels’ decision-making could come only with accession, and even then a say in directing EU affairs would only come gradually. But the key elements that would determine the new candidate countries' political weight included their democratisation record, their ability to comply with EU objectives, including external policies, and the maturity of their own political system.
The formerly communist candidate countries naturally had to undergo an unprecedented democratisation process after 40 years of rule from Moscow. For the rest of the EU this was a process that is not only hard to understand but also defies assessment. The majority of central and eastern European countries nevertheless achieved their transformation goals, even if some of these achievements have proved somewhat fragile. But they were in any case sufficient for accession to the EU to go ahead, while also giving these countries a solid and credible basis for building on.
It is also fair to point out these criteria were never met by some of the older member states, and in recent years we have also witnessed an erosion of EU solidarity and heightened levels of national self-interest. The crises in EU politics has become a reality, and so much so that some people in western Europe were looking to central and eastern Europe in the hopes that their own tired democracies would get fresh impetus from the lively new politics of the newcomers. Sadly, this was true of the 1990s and is no longer the case. The older member states have firmly established their influence in various parts of the Union’s decision-making process, whereas the newcomers have yet to establish themselves in a club that they do not know and did not build.
Once the "big bang" enlargement had become a fact, when in May 2004 the 10 new members increased the EU from 15 states to 25, with Bulgaria and Romania to bring that to 27 two years later, the question being asked by the EU’s top officials was what European policies might be expected from the newcomers, and which would integrate the most easily. My own country, the Czech Republic, despite the well-known euroscepticism of political leaders like Vaclav Klaus, was expected to perform well.
But although, along with the other candidates, we in the Czech Republic were eager to join the EU, very little had been decided as to the policies to adopt once we were a full member. There was a lack of clarity concerning the country’s vision, its major interests within the EU and on strategy and priorities. There had been little political or public discussion on these issues. So it came as no surprise that many Czech politicians had little connection with the EU and to this day still perceive the EU as being the “other side.” The warnings by Vaclav Klaus that “we cannot influence anything in the EU and we will melt like a sugar cube in a cup of coffee” have borne fruit of a sort, for we Czechs can still hardly claim to have a conceptually sound European policy, and in that we differ little from the other new member states. This absence of a European policy has worrying implications for the predictability and positioning of the country, and thus for its influence within the wider EU structure. And on top of this we as a nation share with the older member states a propensity to blame the EU for anything and everything.
The last few years have seen politics in Europe become more nationally focused and pragmatic, responding all too readily to the whims of public opinion as they ebb and flow. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that European politics are now in crisis, and that being the case in the old EU, it exacerbates the political fragility of the new member states.
At the same time, it is a sad truth that both the Czech Republic and the other new members failed to appoint their best people to EU-related jobs. And given that the majority of older member states still send their best negotiators to Brussels, this is a practice the new member states can’t afford.
The combination of factors limiting the newcomer countries’ influence in the EU is daunting but not disastrous. It spans a lack of carefully prepared policies, sometimes antagonistic attitudes towards the EU (not that the EU does not deserve constructive criticism from time to time), weakly defined national interests, the absence of a strategic approach and the lack of a truly European mindset.
Are all these factors reason for pessimism? Not so much pessimism, perhaps, but rather impatience. The new member states' potential is being wasted. It is probably fair to say that they have not met the expectations of many people, and that the heritage of 40 years of isolation is proving heavier than anticipated.
On the other hand, there is evidence that the new members are becoming better equipped to cope with challenges and that their performance is improving. The evidence for this was provided by the EU presidencies of Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Neither of them were failures if compared to the presidencies of older member states, and the Czechs found themselves in the chair at a particularly difficult time. Not everyone appreciated the Czechs’ style, and the controversial “Entropa” installation by Czech artist David Černý in the entrance hall of the Council of Ministers building certainly provoked irritation as well as public attention. But the presidency nevertheless delivered in a number of areas, particularly transport and energy.
Mistakes were made too, of course. Many of them had their roots in the silly so-called euroscepticism of certain Czech politicians that inevitably were aimed in an open and competitive environment. But in general the Czechs performed no worse than the EU Presidency average up until the moment when domestic political calculation gained the upper hand over national interests and the Presidency’s responsibilities. The downfall of the government during its EU presidency caused by opportunistic opposition politicians devalued many efforts of officials and even some of the ministers.
Sadly, the flavour that remains is bitter. Yet the Czech Republic’s EU Presidency provided the country and many of its senior politicians with an important learning experience. There is now a much better understanding of what the EU really is about, and what is needed for any member state to have a say and at least exert some influence. There is also a better sense of responsibility in EU matters. The views of Vaclav Klaus are now without doubt in the minority, and perhaps even an extreme minority at that. This became painfully clear during the final stages of the Lisbon treaty saga. Czechs have learned that although they may have had a disproportionatly large influence on EU matters during the presidency, if they had less short-sighted political leaders they might have generated even more political capitial to be spent advantageously at a later date.
Yet the whole experience clearly strengthened the country’s integration into the EU, and there can be no doubt that the influence of the Czech Republic and other new member states is significantly higher than before the accession. That said, they have yet to exploit their full potential, and that's to the detriment of themseves and the European Union as a whole.
Source - www.europesworld.org
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